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I. LEGISLATION AND POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 
Competition policy empowering citizens and businesses for the benefit of all 
With more than half a billion consumers and 24.5 million companies, the internal market is 
one of the EU’s greatest achievements and its greatest asset. EU competition policy goes hand 
in hand with the development of a deeper and fairer internal market. Enforcing EU 
competition rules makes markets function better for the benefit of consumers - households as 
well as businesses - and for society as a whole. Competitive markets play an important role 
supporting the Commission's efforts to achieve a strong and prosperous EU. Moreover, EU 
competition policy aims at fostering a competition culture both within the EU, for instance by 
promoting competition-friendly regulation, and worldwide.  
DG Competition's competition policy actions in 2018 targeted a wide range of sectors in the 
EU economy, thereby promoting open and efficient markets so that both businesses and 
citizens can get a fair share of the benefits of economic growth. Moreover, EU competition 
policy continued to support key political priorities of the Commission, in particular the 
Deeper and Fairer Internal Market, the Digital Single Market, the Energy Union, the fight 
against tax evasion, and climate action as set out in the Commission President's Political 
Guidelines and the Commission Work Programme 2018.   
The present Staff Working Document is composed of two parts, one presents the main 
legislative and policy developments in 2018 across the three competition instruments 
(antitrust, including cartels, mergers and State aid), while specific actions are detailed in the 
sectoral overview part. 
1. ANTITRUST AND CARTELS 
 
Articles 101, 102 and 106 TFEU  
According to Article 101 TFEU, anti-competitive agreements are prohibited as incompatible with the internal 
market. Article 101 TFEU prohibits agreements with an anti-competitive object or effects where companies 
coordinate their behaviour instead of competing independently. However, even if a horizontal or a vertical 
agreement could be viewed as restrictive it might be allowed under Article 101(3) TFEU if it ultimately fosters 
competition (for example by promoting technical progress or by improving distribution).  
Article 102 TFEU prohibits abuse of a dominant position. It is not in itself illegal for an undertaking to be in a 
dominant position or to acquire such a position. Dominant undertakings, as any other undertaking in the market, 
are entitled to compete on the merits. However, Article 102 TFEU prohibits the abusive behaviour by dominant 
undertakings that, for example, directly or indirectly impose unfair purchase- or selling prices or other unfair 
trading conditions.  
Finally, Article 106 TFEU prevents Member States from enacting or maintaining in force measures contrary to 
the Treaty rules regarding public undertakings and undertakings to which Member States grant special or 
exclusive rights. 
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Antitrust and cartel decisions 2010-2018 
 
 
1.1 Guidance in antitrust and cartel proceedings 
During 2018, the Commission continued streamlining the procedures in competition cases to 
enhance the timeliness and effectiveness of EU competition rules.  
Following the established and successful framework for rewarding cooperation by companies 
investigated in the area of cartels
1
 and a first non-cartel cooperation case in 2016,
2
 the 
Commission pursued five antitrust cases on the basis of cooperation in return for reduced 
fines.
3
 In these cases, the investigated firms acknowledged that they had infringed the 
competition rules before the Commission issued a Statement of Objections. All five 
companies provided evidence that added significant value to the investigation and 
complemented evidence already on the Commission's file at the time when the voluntary 
submissions were made. Moreover, in one of the cases – Guess - the investigated company 
revealed an infringement of the EU competition rules which was not yet known to the 
Commission. In addition, all companies waived certain procedural rights, resulting in 
administrative efficiencies. The individual reductions granted, ranging between 40% and 
50%, reflected the timing of the cooperation (both in terms of the acknowledgement of 
liability and the evidence) as well as the extent to which the evidence strengthened the 
                                                          
1 
 This framework allows the Commission to reduce the fine if a company has provided so-called self-
incriminating evidence (see Commission Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel 
cases) and/or if a company admits the infringement and agrees to follow a more streamlined and shorter 
procedure (see Commission Notice on the conduct of settlement procedures in cartel cases). See: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/legislation/leniency_legislation.html, and 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/legislation/settlements.html.  
2
  Case AT.39759 - ARA foreclosure, See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-3116_en.htm.  
3 
 Cases AT.40181 – Philips, AT.40182 - Pioneer, AT.40465 - Asus and AT.40469 - Denon & Marantz (see:  
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4601_en.htm), and Case AT.40428 – Guess (see: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-6844_en.htm).  
4
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Commission's case. On 17 December 2018, DG Competition published a fact-sheet setting out 
the framework for cooperation cases in the antitrust field.
4
 
On 12 December 2018, updated guidance on confidentiality claims in access to file and the 
use of voluntary confidentiality rings was published by DG Competition.
5
 The guidance 
explains how companies involved in antitrust investigations should identify business secrets 
and other confidential information in documents submitted to the Commission. Moreover, the 
guidelines explain how non-confidential versions of documents should be prepared. In 
addition, the guidance explains the benefits and the functioning of the confidentiality-ring 
procedure for access to file in pending antitrust investigations. By means of a confidentiality 
ring, documents in the Commission's file are made accessible to the addressee(s) of a 
Statement of Objections in a restricted manner. Similar to a data room, the number of persons 
having access to and who may use the information is restricted to what is strictly necessary 
for the rights of defence. The guidance include a template for a non-disclosure agreement 
between the addressee(s) of a Statement of Objections and the information providers.  
In 2018, the Commission started a reflection process how competition policy can best serve 
European consumers in a fast-changing world. To this end, the Commission appointed, 
Professors Heike Schweitzer, Jacques Crémer and Assistant Professor Yves-Alexandre de 
Montjoye as Special Advisers on the future challenges of digitisation for competition policy.
6
 
The Special Advisers’ Report “Competition Policy for the Digital Era” was published on 4 
April 2019.
7
 In their report, the Special Advisers (i) identify what they see as the main 
specific features of digital markets; (ii) provide their views on the goals of EU competition 
law in the digital era; and (iii) discuss the application of competition rules to digital platforms 
and data, as well as the role of merger control in preserving competition and innovation.   
On 11 October 2018, DG Competition Director-General Johannes Leitenberger gave a speech 
which addressed current challenges for competition policy and enforcement, including digital 
platforms, algorithms and the relevance of data.
8
  
In October 2018, the Commission launched the review of the Vertical Block Exemption 
Regulation (VBER) which will expire in May 2022.
9
 The review is carried out in line with the 
Commission’s Better Regulation requirements. The purpose of the evaluation exercise is to 
allow the Commission to decide whether to let the VBER-rules lapse, prolong their duration 
or revise them. An evaluation roadmap for stakeholder comments was published on 8 
November 2018.
10
 Stakeholders will be able to provide further comments at subsequent stages 
of the review process. In addition to stakeholder contributions, the review will take into 
account information gathered by the Commission in the E-commerce Sector Inquiry and the 
experience gained through the 2018 antitrust decisions against four consumer-electronics 
manufacturers for fixing online resale prices.
11
 Moreover, the evaluation will draw on the 
                                                          
4
  See: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/data/factsheet_guess.pdf.  
5 
 See: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/conf_rings.pdf.   
6 
 See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/commission-
appoints-professors-heike-schweitzer-jacques-cremer-and-assistant-professor-yves_en and 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/scp19/.  
7  
See: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/kd0419345enn.pdf. 
8
  See: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2018_14_en.pdf.  
9 
 Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted 
practices, OJ L 102, 23.4.2010, p. 1. 
10  
See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/initiatives/ares-2018-5068981_en.  
11
  Cases AT.40181 – Philips, AT.40182 - Pioneer, AT.40465 - Asus and AT.40469 - Denon & Marantz 
(vertical restraints), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4601_en.htm. 
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national competition authorities’ (NCAs) experience from enforcing the EU competition rules 
in this area.  
1.2 Important judgments by the European Union Courts 
Preliminary rulings 
Dissemination of misleading information 
In Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd and Others v Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del 
Mercato,
12
 the Court of Justice stated that an arrangement between competing undertakings to 
disseminate misleading information
13 
about adverse reactions resulting from the off-label use 
of a medicine
14
 sold by one of the undertakings to reduce the competitive pressure on the 
other, may constitute a restriction of competition by object within the meaning of Article 
101(1) TFEU.
15
 The Court of Justice considered that such an arrangement cannot be 
considered ancillary to the licensing agreement that the two undertakings had concluded 
several years before the arrangement in question, nor can it be justified under Article 101(3) 
TFEU. This is the first time that the Court of Justice reviewed the spreading of misleading 
information ("disparagement") and found it anticompetitive.
16 
In the ruling the Court of 
Justice concluded that, in so far as a pharmaceutical product used on-label is substitutable by 
another product used off-label (for the same therapeutic indications), they can be included in 
the same product market. 
Meaning of competitive disadvantage 
In MEO,
17
 the Court of Justice gave guidance on the interpretation of the concept of 
competitive disadvantage in Article 102(c) TFEU which precludes dominant undertakings 
from "applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, 
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage". The Court of Justice held that the mere 
presence of an immediate disadvantage affecting trading partners, who were charged more, 
compared to their competitors for an equivalent service, does not mean that competition is 
distorted or is capable of being distorted. Instead, a finding of a competitive disadvantage 
must be based on an analysis of all the relevant circumstances of the case leading to the 
conclusion that the behaviour at issue has or is capable of having an effect on the costs, profits 
or any other relevant interest of one or more of those partners. While this finding does not 
require proof of actual quantifiable deterioration in the competitive situation, it does require 
showing that the conduct is capable of affecting that situation. Furthermore, the Court of 
Justice concluded that the seriousness of a possible competitive disadvantage is not a 
                                                          
12  
Case C-179/16 Hoffmann - La Roche Ltd and Others v Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, 
Judgment of the European Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 23 January 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:25. 
13
  To regulators, medical professionals and the general public. 
14  
The term "off label" refers to the intentional prescription of an authorised medicine for a purpose that is not 
covered by the terms of its marketing authorisation. 
15  
The two medical products - Avastin and Lucentis - were developed by the same company, Genetech. 
However, Avastin was commercialised by Genetech's parent company Roche, while the commercial 
exploitation of Lucentis was entrusted to Novartis group via licensing agreement. The arrangement to 
disseminate misleading information between Roche and Novartis concerned the use of Avastin and was 
designed to reduce its use and render more profitable the exploitation by Novartis of the technology rights 
over Lucentis.  
16  
The ruling follows a series of four decisions by NCAs upheld by national courts, three by the French NCA 
and one by the Italian NCA. The latter case gave rise to this preliminary ruling. 
17 
 Case C-525/16 Meo - Serviços de Comunicações e Multimédia, Judgment of the Court of Justice of 18 April 
2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:270. 
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requirement for finding an infringement of Article 102(c) TFEU given that there is no 
appreciability (de minimis) threshold for the application of Article 102 TFEU. 
Actions for damages 
In Apple Sales International,
18
 a preliminary ruling concerning the interpretation of Council 
Regulation No 44/2001 ("Brussels Regulation"),
19
 the Court of Justice concluded that, in the 
context of an action for damages for an infringement of Article 102 TFEU, brought by a 
distributor against its supplier, the application of a contractual jurisdiction clause is not 
excluded on the sole ground that it does not expressly refer to disputes relating to liability 
incurred as a result of an infringement of competition law. The Court of Justice thus made 
clear that in Article 102 TFEU cases where an anticompetitive behaviour is related to a 
contractual relationship, jurisdictional clauses in the agreement governing the commercial 
relationship between the parties will also affect any related antitrust damages claims. 
Review of decisions finding an infringement 
“Pay for delay” and market definition 
In eight judgments
20
 the General Court confirmed large parts of the Commission’s decisions 
finding that a number of companies producing generic pharmaceuticals which had concluded 
anticompetitive “pay-for-delay” agreements.21  
In line with its previous ruling in Lundbeck,
22
 the General Court confirmed in Servier
23
 that 
patent settlements involving payments from the originator to the generics producer can 
constitute pay-for-delay agreements having an anticompetitive object. The General Court  
therefore upheld the Commission's finding that the agreements concluded by Servier with five 
generic companies had such an object in breach of Article 101 TFEU. The General Court 
considered that it was the inducement (that is to say the reverse payment), and not a 
recognition of the validity of the patent, that led the generics producers to agree to withdraw 
from the markets.  
Moreover, the General Court ruled that while in principle, side deals similar to direct 
payments can induce generics producers to withdraw from competition, not all side deals 
constitute an anticompetitive inducement. In particular, the General Court was not convinced 
                                                          
18 
 Case C-595/17 Apple Sales International and Others v MJA, Judgment of the European Court of Justice of 
24 October 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:854. 
19
  Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2001 L 12, p. 1). 
20
  Case T-677/14 Biogaran v Commission, Case T-679/14 Teva UK and Others v Commission, judgment of 12 
December 2018, ECLI:EU:T:2018:910;, Case T-680/14 Lupin v Commission, judgment of 12 December 
2018; ECLI:EU:T:2018:908; Case T-682/14 Mylan Laboratories and Mylan v Commission, judgment of 12 
December 2018, ECLI:EU:T:2018:907; Case T-684/14 Krka v Commission, judgment of 12 December 2018,  
ECLI:EU:T:2018:918; Case T-701/14 Niche Generics v Commission judgment of 12 December 2018, 
ECLI:EU:T:2018:92; Case  T-705/14 Unichem Laboratories v Commission judgment of 12 December 2018; 
ECLI:EU:T:2018:915; Case T-691/14 Servier and Others v Commission, judgment of 12 December 2018 
ECLI:EU:T:2018:922. 
21 
 Pay for delay agreements are settlement agreements that may restrict generic market entry in exchange for 
benefits transferred from an originator firm to a company intending to introduce a generic version of a 
medicine. Such agreements result in delayed market entry of cheaper generic medicines, to the detriment of 
patients and taxpayers financing the health systems. 
22 
 Case T-472/13 Lundbeck v Commission, judgment of 8 September 2016, ECLI:EU:T:2016:449. 
23
   Case T-691/14 Servier and Others v Commission, judgment of 12 December 2018, ECLI:EU:T:2018:922. 
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that the license provided to Krka
24
 constituted an inducement for Krka’s withdrawal from a 
number of markets and therefore rejected the Commission’s finding that the Krka agreement 
restricted competition by object. Moreover, the General Court found that the Commission 
decision did not prove that the Krka agreement had restrictive effects under Article 101 
TFEU. The General Court took the view that, considering that the agreement had been 
implemented, the Commission should have assessed actual, and not only potential effects on 
competition, taking into account also factual developments occurring after the agreement had 
been concluded. 
Finally, the General Court annulled the Commission’s finding that Servier had abused its 
dominant position on the market for perindopril, a medicine used to treat hypertension and 
heart failure. The General Court held that the Commission failed to show that the relevant 
product market was limited to the perindopril molecule alone. The General Court found that 
the Commission had made an incorrect assessment of the therapeutic substitution of 
perindropil with other medicines in the same therapeutic class. Moreover, the Commission 
had relied excessively on price-related factors. The General Court therefore concluded that the 
Commission erred in finding Servier in a dominant position in accordance with Article 102 
TFEU.  
Cartel participation and single and continuous infringement 
In Power Cables,
25 the General Court referred to the necessary conditions for holding a cartel 
participant liable for a single and continuous infringement depending on the form of its 
participation. The General Court confirmed that even if a participant is unaware of, but could 
reasonably have foreseen the unlawful conduct planned and was prepared to take the risk, the 
cartel participant’s potential lack of knowledge of some forms of that conduct does not 
exempt it from liability.26 Moreover, the General Court held that when an undertaking has 
infringed Article 101 TFEU, it cannot escape being penalised on the ground that another 
                                                          
24
  Case T-684/14 Krka v Commission, judgment of 12 December 2018,  ECLI:EU:T:2018:918. 
25
  In the Power Cables judgments, the General Court dismissed all the appeals brought against the 
Commission’s decisions in their entirety. For the sake of clarity, the various aspects covered by the Power 
Cables judgements are dealt with thematically in the sections that follow below. The 15 cases are the 
following: T-419/14 The Goldman Sachs Group v Commission, judgment of the General Court 12 July 2018, 
ECLI:EU:T:2018:445; T-422/14 Viscas Corp. v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2018, 
ECLI:EU:T:2018:446; T-438/14 Silec Cable SAS and General Cable Corporation v Commission, judgment 
of the General Court of 12 July 2018, ECLI:EU:T:2018:447; T-439/14 LS Cable & System Ltd v 
Commission, judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2018, ECLI:EU:T:2018:451; T-441/14 Brugg Kabel 
AG and Kabelwerke Brugg AG Holding v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2018, 
ECLI:EU:T:2018:453; T-444/14 Furukawa Electric Co. Ltd v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 
12 July 2018, ECLI:EU:T:2018:454; T-445/14 ABB v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 12 July 
2018, ECLI:EU:T:2018:449; T-446/14 Taihan Electric Wire Co. Ltd v Commission, judgment of the General 
Court of 12 July 2018, ECLI:EU:T:2018:444; T-447/14 NKT Verwaltungs and NKT Holding A/S v 
Commission, judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2018, ECLI:EU:T:2018:443; T-448/14 Hitachi 
Metals, Ltd v Commission, Judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2018, ECLI:EU:T:2018:442; T-449/14 
Nexans France SAS and Nexans SA v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2018, 
ECLI:EU:T:2018:456; T-450/14 Sumitomo Electric Industries Ltd and J-Power Systems Corporation v 
Commission, judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2018, ECLI:EU:T:2018:455; T-451/14 Fujikura Ltd v 
Commission, judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2018, ECLI:EU:T:2018:452; T-455/14 Pirelli & C. 
SpA v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2018, ECLI:EU:T:2018:450; T-475/14 
Prysmian SpA and Prysmian Cavi e Sistemi Srl v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 12 July 
2018, ECLI:EU:T:2018:448. See also: https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2018-
07/cp180107en.pdf. 
26  
Case T-448/14 Hitachi Metals, Ltd v Commission, Judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2018, 
ECLI:EU:T:2018:442. 
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cartel participant has not been fined.  
Constructive refusal to deal and margin squeeze 
With its rulings in Deutsche Telekom
27
 and Slovak Telekom
28
 the General Court largely 
upheld the Commission decision finding that Slovak Telekom, a subsidiary of Deutsche 
Telekom, had abused its dominant position by refusing access to its local loop and by 
engaging in margin squeeze practices. The General Court noted that the relevant regulatory 
framework had imposed on Slovak Telekom an obligation to grant unbundled access to the 
local loop. Moreover, the General Court acknowledged the need for alternative operators to 
access the local loop to allow the development of effective competition. Therefore, the 
General Court concluded that the Commission was not required to demonstrate that access to 
Slovak Telekom's local loop was indispensable for potential competitors. While largely 
upholding the Commission's finding of margin squeeze, the General Court held that the 
Commission had failed to show exclusionary effects for a period of four months when the 
margins were positive according to the "year-by-year" assessment method. Accordingly, the 
General Court reduced the amount of the fine.  
Parental liability 
In Deutsche Telekom,29 the General Court upheld Deutsche Telekom's parental liability for 
the infringement, but found that Deutsche Telekom’s turnover did not reflect the company’s 
individual conduct in the infringement. Deutsche Telekom’s turnover could therefore not 
serve as a basis for a calculation of an additional fine to be imposed on the company. The 
General Court consequently reduced the amount of the fine. 
In Power Cables,30 the General Court confirmed the line taken by the Commission and 
concluded that the fact that an undertaking is a ‘pure financial investor’ does not constitute a 
legal criterion for the non-imputation of liability for the parent company. Therefore, a 
financial investor is to be treated like any other parent. In the case in question, the parent 
company had to assume parental liability based on 100% voting rights, even if its 
shareholding was as low as 33%.
31
  
Territorial jurisdiction 
In Power Cables,32 the General Court confirmed the Commission's practice as regards 
territorial jurisdiction. The General Court held that the Commission is entitled to penalise 
                                                          
27  
Case T-827/14, Deutsche Telekom AG v European Commission, Judgment of the General Court of 13 
December 2018, ECLI:EU:T:2018:930. 
28 
 Case T-851/14,  Slovak Telekom a.s. v European Commission, Judgment of the General Court of 13 
December 2018, ECLI:EU:T:2018:929. 
29
  Case T-827/14, Deutsche Telekom AG v European Commission, Judgment of the General Court of 13 
December 2018, ECLI:EU:T:2018:930. 
30
  Cases T-441/14 Brugg Kabel AG and Kabelwerke Brugg AG Holding v Commission, judgment of the 
General Court of 12 July 2018, ECLI:EU:T:2018:453; T-447/14 NKT Verwaltungs and NKT Holding A/S v 
Commission, judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2018, ECLI:EU:T:2018:443. 
31 
 Additional objective circumstances supported the conclusion that the undertaking in question exercised 
decisive influence. 
32
  Cases T-419/14 The Goldman Sachs Group v Commission, judgment of the General Court 12 July 2018, 
ECLI:EU:T:2018:445; T-422/14 Viscas Corp. v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2018, 
ECLI:EU:T:2018:446; T-438/14 Silec Cable SAS and General Cable Corporation v Commission, judgment 
of the General Court of 12 July 2018, ECLI:EU:T:2018:447; T-439/14 LS Cable & System Ltd v 
Commission, judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2018, ECLI:EU:T:2018:451; T-441/14 Brugg Kabel 
AG and Kabelwerke Brugg AG Holding v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2018, 
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practices implemented outside the EEA, when it is foreseeable that the practices in question 
will have an immediate and substantial effect in the internal market. 
Review of investigatory powers - inspections 
The General Court rendered two rulings on the actions for annulment brought by České 
dráhy,
33
 concerning two Commission inspection decisions.
34
  
In the first ruling, which partially upheld the Commission inspection decision, the General 
Court assessed whether the Commission had reasonable grounds to suspect an infringement of 
the competition rules and whether the inspections powers circumscribed by the inspection 
decision were restricted to the suspected infringement. The General Court found that the 
Commission had reasonable grounds to suspect an infringement of Article 102 TFEU by way 
of predatory pricing on the railway route Praha – Ostrava. However, the General Court 
concluded that the Commission had no grounds to suspect other types of anticompetitive 
conduct under Article 102 TFEU on the Praha – Ostrava route or on other routes. The General 
Court dismissed the other grounds for annulment put forward by České dráhy. In doing so, the 
General Court confirmed that parallel inspections by the Commission and NCAs, cannot give 
rise to legitimate expectations that the Commission would refrain from intervening in the 
case. The General Court also made clear that the fact that the route under investigation was 
domestic does not preclude the Commission from considering that the potential infringement 
could have an effect on trade between Member States.  
In the second ruling, the General Court upheld the second Commission inspection decision 
addressed to České dráhy. The second inspection decision concerned a suspected 
infringement of Article 101 TFEU based on documents obtained during the first inspection. 
The General Court's review focused on whether the underlying evidence for the second 
inspection decision had been lawfully obtained during the first inspection. The General Court 
explored whether the documents that served as a basis for the second inspection decision 
concerning a suspected infringement of Article 101 TFEU were related to possible predatory 
pricing (the subject-matter of the first inspection under Article 102 TFEU). The General Court 
confirmed that the indications contained in these documents, albeit imprecise, were related to 
the costs of České dráhy and therefore relevant for the assessment of an alleged predatory 
pricing strategy on the Praha-Ostrava route. The documents were therefore found to have 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
ECLI:EU:T:2018:453; T-444/14 Furukawa Electric Co. Ltd v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 
12 July 2018, ECLI:EU:T:2018:454; T-445/14 ABB v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 12 July 
2018, ECLI:EU:T:2018:449; T-446/14 Taihan Electric Wire Co. Ltd v Commission, judgment of the General 
Court of 12 July 2018, ECLI:EU:T:2018:444; T-447/14 NKT Verwaltungs and NKT Holding A/S v 
Commission, judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2018, ECLI:EU:T:2018:443; T-448/14 Hitachi 
Metals, Ltd v Commission, Judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2018, ECLI:EU:T:2018:442; T-449/14 
Nexans France SAS and Nexans SA v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2018, 
ECLI:EU:T:2018:456; T-450/14 Sumitomo Electric Industries Ltd and J-Power Systems Corporation v 
Commission, judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2018, ECLI:EU:T:2018:455; T-451/14 Fujikura Ltd v 
Commission, judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2018, ECLI:EU:T:2018:452; T-455/14 Pirelli & C. 
SpA v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2018, ECLI:EU:T:2018:450; T-475/14 
Prysmian SpA and Prysmian Cavi e Sistemi Srl v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 12 July 
2018, ECLI:EU:T:2018:448. See also Court press release: 
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2018-07/cp180107en.pdf. 
33
  Cases T-325/16 České dráhy a.s. v European Commission, judgement of the General Court of 20 June 2018, 
ECLI:EU:T:2018:368 and T-621/16 České dráhy a.s. v European Commission, judgement of the General 
Court of 20 June 2018, ECLI:EU:T:2018:367. 
34
  For the Commission’s powers of inspection, see Articles 20 and 21 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 
16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the 
Treaty, OJ L 1, 04.01.2003, pp.1-25. 
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been lawfully obtained.  
The judgment of the General Court in the Bio-ethanol35 case declared as inadmissible all 
claims that the Commission had violated, through its methodology for electronic searches 
during the inspection, the principles of protection of legal and professional communication. 
Such claims are subject to Court review only in the context of a final Commission decision. It 
follows that companies cannot use arguments that the inspection was carried out in an 
unlawful manner to support claims for annulment of the inspection decision itself. Moreover, 
the General Court stated that any prior letter from the Commission refusing to suspend its 
investigation based on such claims is not an act that can be challenged in Court before the 
conclusion of the investigation.   
In Power Cables,36 the General Court reviewed the continued inspection procedure. If the 
document review has not been concluded at the envisaged end of the on-site inspection, a 
copy of the dataset still to be searched may be sealed and brought to the Commission’s 
premises, where the inspection is continued within a reasonable time limit. The General Court 
found that Article 20(2)(b) of Regulation No 1/2003 does not prescribe that the examination 
of business records must be carried out exclusively at the inspected company’s premises. 
However, when examining documents at its own premises, the Commission must offer the 
same guarantees as those given when the examination takes place at the inspected 
undertaking’s premises. Finally, the General Court considered that the intermediate step of 
copying or copy-imaging documents as a part of the forensic IT analysis falls within the scope 
of the powers provided for in Article 20(2)(b) and (c) of Regulation No 1/2003.  
Review of fines 
The judgments of the Court of Justice in the Freight Forwarding37 cases confirm several 
policy points crucial for the Commission's decision-making practice, that is to say the 
leniency regime, the Commission’s discretionary powers in choosing the entities to be 
addressed and its fining methodology. As regards fining, the Court of Justice affirmed that the 
cartelised services were international airfreight forwarding and not solely the various 
components of such services on which the parties colluded. Consequently, the Court of 
Justice considered that "since the sales falling within the sphere of the infringements at issue 
were made on that market" the Commission set the fines correctly based on the entire sales 
value of the overall market for international air freight forwarding services. 
The judgment of the General Court in the North Sea Shrimps38 case confirmed the existence 
and scope of the cartel and the company Stührk's participation in it. However, the General 
Court reminded the Commission of the fact that it must properly justify and explain the 
                                                          
35 
 Case T-274/15 Alcogroup and Alcodis v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 10 April 2018, 
ECLI:EU:T:2018:179. Judgement currently under appeal with case reference C-386/15 P(R).  
36 
 Cases T-449/14 Nexans France SAS and Nexans SA v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 12 July 
2018, ECLI:EU:T:2018:456 and T-475/14 Prysmian SpA and Prysmian Cavi e Sistemi Srl v Commission,, 
judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2018, ECLI:EU:T:2018:448.  
37
  Cases C-271/16 P Panalpina v Commission, judgement of the Court of Justice of 1 February 2018, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:59; C-264/16 P Deutsche Bahn / Schenker v Commission, judgement of the Court of 
Justice of 1 February 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:60; C-263/16 P Schenker Ltd. (successor of BAX Global UK) v 
Commission, judgement of the Court of Justice of 1 February 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:58 and C-261/16 P 
Kuehne & Nagel v Commission, judgement of the Court of Justice of 1 February 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:56. 
See also court press release: https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2018-
02/cp180009en.pdf. 
38 
 Case T-58/14, Stuehrk Delikatessen Import v Commission. Judgment of the General Court of 13 July 2018, 
ECLI:EU:T:2018:474.     
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calculation of its fine, in particular when deviating from its own Fining Guidelines,39 even 
when it does so in favour of the parties.40 On this basis, the fine was annulled.   
In Power Cables,41 the General Court confirmed the use of Point 18 of the Fining Guidelines 
to re-distribute the value of sales (in this case the sales within the EEA) amongst all the cartel 
participants. In this case, the undertakings active in the EEA reserved the EEA for themselves 
while the Asian undertakings committed to stay out of the EEA. The cartel participants 
allocated projects between themselves according to the geographic region or customer. In 
particular, the companies active in the EEA agreed to allocate projects within the EEA. 
In this case, a direct application of point 13 of the Fining Guidelines (where the Commission 
uses the value of sales of each undertaking in the EEA) would result in zero sales (and 
therefore zero fines) for the Asian undertakings, because they had no sales in the EEA. By 
applying Point 18 of the Fining Guidelines, the sales achieved in the EEA amongst all the 
cartelists (regardless of activity within the EEA) were re-distributed in proportion with the 
market shares that the cartelists have in the entire geographic area covered by the 
infringement. 
Regarding gravity and mitigating circumstances for the fines set by the Commission, the 
General Court confirmed the Commission's approach that less active participation in the 
infringement of an undertaking was correctly taken into account when the Commission 
assessed the mitigating circumstances.42  
Moreover, the General Court held that the Commission did not have to allocate the internal 
shares of the overall fine imposed on those held jointly and severally liable. According to the 
General Court, such an allocation would harm the objective of the joint and several liability 
mechanisms, the purpose of which is to provide an additional legal device available to the 
Commission to strengthen both the effectiveness of the recovery of fines imposed and the 
objective of deterrence pursued generally by competition law.  
In the Heat stabiliser
43
 judgement, the General Court annulled the Commission's decision 
amending the attribution of joint and several liability, finding an infringement of the equal 
treatment principle when determining the joint and several liability for the fine. The issue 
                                                          
39
  Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003, OJ 
2006/C 210/02) See: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52006XC0901(01)&from=EN. 
40 
 See also: case AT.39780 – Envelopes, decision of 10 December 2014. Annulled by the General Court, in case 
T-95-15, Printeos and Others v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2016:722. 
41
  Cases T-422/14 Viscas Corp. v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2018, 
ECLI:EU:T:2018:446; T-439/14 LS Cable & System Ltd v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 12 
July 2018, ECLI:EU:T:2018:451; T-444/14 Furukawa Electric Co. Ltd v Commission, judgment of the 
General Court of 12 July 2018, ECLI:EU:T:2018:454; T-446/14 Taihan Electric Wire Co. Ltd v Commission, 
judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2018, ECLI:EU:T:2018:444 and T-451/14 Fujikura Ltd v 
Commission, judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2018, ECLI:EU:T:2018:452. See also Court press 
release: https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2018-02/cp180009en.pdf. 
42
  In addition, the General Court confirmed the line of the Commission that an ‘exclusively passive or follow-
the-leader’ position in the infringement implies, by definition, that the undertaking concerned will keep a 
‘low profile’, that is to say not actively participate in the creation of any anticompetitive agreements and that 
this role can be shown by a significantly more sporadic participation in cartel meetings than that of the 
ordinary members of the cartel and also by an express declaration regarding the role played by that 
undertaking in the cartel made by a representative of another undertaking which has participated in the 
infringement.  
43
  Case T-640/16 GEA Group AG v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 18 October 2018, 
ECLI:EU:T:2018:700. 
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arose on the facts that - at the time of the infringement - three entities were part of the 
undertaking, one (ACW) directly participating throughout the infringement, one (GEA) being 
the ultimate parent throughout the infringement and one being intermediate parent for part of 
the infringement (Chemson). After the infringement, but before the adoption of the decision, 
GEA sold ACW and Chemson. ACW’s fine was capped due to the application of the 10% 
ceiling. The General Court found that this fine reduction for one party (ACW) breached the 
principle of equal treatment, and should have been attributed proportionately between the two 
other parties (GEA and Chemson). 
In Orange Polska,44 the Court of Justice dismissed the appeal by Orange Polska against a 
General Court judgment45 which upheld the European Commission's decision
46
 fining 
Telekomunikacja Polska (now Orange Polska) for abusing its dominant position on Polish 
broadband markets. The Court of Justice ruling confirms that, when imposing a fine for an 
infringement that has ended, the Commission is not obliged to justify in its decision the 
existence of a legitimate interest in finding that infringement. The Court of Justice also 
confirmed that in assessing the gravity of the infringement for the purpose of calculating the 
fine, the Commission is not required to take into account the actual or likely effects of the 
infringement committed.   
Review of commitment decisions 
In Canal+
47
 the General Court dismissed the application for annulment brought by Canal+ 
against the Commission decision making binding the commitments offered by Paramount 
Pictures Ltd (“Paramount”). The commitments addressed the Commission’s concerns that 
clauses in Paramount’s pay-tv film licensing agreement with Sky UK prevented cross-border 
passive sales and therefore amounted to absolute territorial protection eliminating all cross-
border competition between pay-tv broadcasters. In its commitments, Paramount committed 
not to enforce and not to honour contractual restrictions on passive sales for a period of five 
years throughout the EEA. Canal+ challenged the commitment decision as a third party, 
claiming that the contested clauses are not restrictive of competition and that the Commission 
decision breaches the principle of proportionality.   
The General Court examined the legal and economic context of the contested clauses and 
confirmed the Commission's concerns that the contested clauses amounted to absolute 
territorial protection and have as their object the elimination of all cross-border competition 
between pay-tv broadcasters. According to the General Court, this finding applies to the 
licensed work, whether it is copyright-protected or not. In addition, the General Court noted 
that the clauses imposed restrictions that went beyond what was indispensable for the 
improvement of the production and distribution of copyright-protected works. 
As regards the principle of proportionality, the General Court stated that, where a 
commitment consists of the non-implementation of a contractual clause, a Commission 
commitment decision will make binding such a commitment only on the undertakings that 
offered them, and not on third parties that could see their rights affected by the commitment. 
Third parties have the possibility to protect their legal rights before national courts. The 
                                                          
44 
 Case C-123/16 P Orange Polska v Commission, judgment of the Court of Justice of 25 July 2018, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:590. 
45
  Case T-486/11 Orange Polska v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 17 December 2015, 
ECLI:EU:T:2015:1002. 
46 
 Commission Decision C(2011) 4378 final of 22 June 2011. 
47
  Case T-873/16, Groupe Canal + v European Commission, judgment of the General Court of 12 December 
2018, ECLI:EU:T:2018:904. 
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General Court also confirmed that the Commission was entitled to, without breaching the 
principle of proportionality, accept Paramount's commitment not to implement the contested 
clauses in its contract with Sky UK for the United Kingdom and Ireland (countries where the 
Commission had expressed concerns), but also in license agreements with other broadcasters 
in the EEA for different national territories. 
Review of decisions rejecting complaints 
In Agria Polska,
48
 the Court of Justice dismissed an appeal against the General Court's ruling 
upholding the Commission decision rejecting a complaint due to lack of EU interest. The 
Court of Justice found that the scope and cost of an investigation sought by a complainant 
cannot be regarded as decisive criteria for finding EU interest, even where the investigation 
would cover several Member States. Moreover, the Court of Justice dismissed the argument 
that the Commission should open an investigation to ensure the effectiveness of the 
competition rules if the complainant faces procedural or institutional obstacles to bring an 
action before national courts. The Commission has no obligation to compensate shortcomings 
in judicial protection at national level by opening an investigation. It is the Member States’ 
responsibility to ensure effective judicial protection for individual parties, the Court of Justice 
concluded. 
In EAEPC,
49
 the General Court fully upheld a Commission decision rejecting the complaint of 
the European Association of Euro-Pharmaceutical Companies (EAEPC) alleging that 
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) had violated Article 101 TFEU by applying a dual pricing scheme. 
GSK had notified the scheme to the Commission in 1998 under the previous authorisation 
regime of Regulation 17/1962
50
 and EAEPC had filed its original complaint in 1999. Acting 
on the EAEPC complaint, the Commission adopted in 2001 a decision finding that the dual 
pricing scheme was a restriction by object and refused to exempt it. In 2006, the General 
Court annulled the Commission decision because the Commission had incorrectly found that 
the practice in question restricted competition by object and had failed to carry out an 
adequate assessment under Article 101(3) TFEU. In 2009, the Court of Justice partially 
overturned the General Court’s judgment. The Court of Justice upheld the Commission’s 
conclusion that the practice was a restriction by object but confirmed the General Court’s 
finding that the Commission had failed to conduct a full examination under Article 101(3) 
TFEU. Following the Court of Justice judgment, GSK formally withdrew the application for 
an individual exemption of the practice under Article 101(3) TFEU. However, the EAEPC did 
not withdraw its complaint against GSK. In 2013, the EAEPC required that the Commission 
adopt a decision on the complaint. The Commission rejected the complaint for lack of EU 
interest considering among other things that the conduct at issue took place many years ago, 
was only in operation for a very short period, did not produce any persisting effects, and that 
the case could be brought before national authorities.   
Review of publication decisions 
EU Courts reaffirmed the Commission’s publication policy in competition cases with two 
orders rejecting applications for interim measures.  
                                                          
48 
 Case C-373/17 P Agria Polska and Others v European Commission, judgment of the Court of Justice of 20 
September 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:756. 
49  
Case T-574/14 EAEPC v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 26 September 2018, 
ECLI:EU:T:2018:605. 
50
  Council Regulation No 17 of 6 February 1962, implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, OJ 
English Special Edition 1959-62, p. 87. 
 14 
In Power Cables,
51
 the Vice-President of the Court of Justice issued an order upholding the 
order by the General Court President, refusing interim measures against the Hearing Officer’s 
decision to publish a non-confidential version of the Power Cables decision, with minor 
amendments. The order by the Court of Justice confirms that the Commission has no 
obligation to wait for a final judgment on the substance of its decision before publishing. The 
Vice-President of the Court of Justice stated that the applicants’ rights to be heard and to 
obtain redress in the main case would not be affected by the publication. Finally, the Court of 
Justice Vice-President concluded that the publication would not infringe the applicants’ rights 
to an effective remedy in the main case. 
The orders of the President of the General Court in Euribor
52
 stipulated that the publication of 
a Commission decision under Article 101 TFEU cannot be stopped because the decision is 
being challenged in Court. The applicants’ argument that the presumption of innocence would 
preclude the Commission from publishing a decision with the parties’ names and details of 
the behaviour found to be anticompetitive, was rejected since the parties can submit an 
application for annulment of the decision in question. In Power Cables,
53
 the Vice President 
of the Court of Justice confirmed the Order of the President of the General Court which 
rejected the claim that the information included in the decision should be covered by 
professional secrecy because of an ongoing appeal against that decision.    
 
1.3 The fight against cartels remains a top priority 
Cartels are secret agreements between sellers or buyers of the same product or service. They 
are made with the objective of fixing prices, limiting output or allocating clients and 
suppliers. Cartels harm the consumers at all levels of the value chain and the economy as a 
whole. Cartelists charge inflated prices, limit the choice of the consumers and block 
innovation. Only undistorted competition guarantees that scarce resources are used in the 
most efficient way. The Commission's action to stop hard core cartels prevents companies 
from continuing to profit from illegal overcharges and thereby contributes to fair and 
balanced business relationships. The significant sanctions imposed by the Commission deter 
companies from entering into cartels or from remaining in cartels, sending a clear signal that 
operating a cartel will ultimately not pay off.  
The Commission's strong enforcement record against hard core cartels continued in 2018. As 
in preceding years, the Commission adopted cartel decisions in important sectors for 
innovation and investment, such as the electronic components market and the automotive 
industry. The settlement procedure remains an efficient tool regularly used by the 
Commission in its fight against cartels as shown by the fact that the procedure accounted for 
75% of the decisions adopted this year.  
                                                          
51 
 Case C-65/18 P(R)-R Order of the Vice-President of the Court of 2 February 2018 - Appeal – Application for 
suspension of operation and other interim measures under Articles 278 and 279 TFEU and Article 160(7) of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Court, ECLI:EU:C:2018:62 Case T-449/14 Nexans France SAS and Nexans SA 
v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2018, ECLI:EU:T:2018:456. 
52 
 Cases T-419/18, Crédit agricole and Crédit agricole Corporate and Investment Bank v Commission, Order 
by the President of the General Court of 25 October 2018, ECLI:EU:T:2018:726 and T-420/18, JPMorgan 
Chase and others v Commission, Order by the President of the General Court of 25 October 2018, not yet 
published.   
53
  Case C-65/18 – Nexans France and Nexans v European Commission, Order of the Vice President of the 
Court of Justice of 2 February 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:426. 
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The Commission fined eight producers of capacitors - Elna, Hitachi Chemical, Holy Stone, 
Matsuo, NEC Tokin, Nichicon, Nippon Chemi-Con, Rubycon (Sanyo received immunity) – 
EUR 254 million for participating in a cartel between 1998 and 2012.
54
 Capacitors are 
electrical components that store energy electrostatically in an electric field and are used in a 
wide variety of electronic products. As these products included smart phones, appliances in 
homes and electronic systems in cars the cartel operated at the expense of both manufacturers 
and consumers. Although the meetings and contacts took place outside the EU, the cartel was 
implemented on a global scale including in the EEA. This decision, in contrast to the other 
cartel infringements in 2018, was conducted under the ordinary procedure.  
Ordinary procedures remain significant because not all investigations may be eligible for 
settlement discussions. Relevant factors include the number of parties, the proportion of 
leniency applicants in relation to the total number of parties, the degree of contestation, 
conflicting positions between the parties and the existence of novel features or aggravating 
circumstances in the investigated practices. When the right circumstances are not met, as the 
Capacitors case shows, the Commission will apply the ordinary procedure.  
The Commission continued its work against cartels in the maritime transport services and the 
automotive sectors. With regard to the maritime transport sector, it fined four maritime car 
carriers – CSAV, "K" Line, NYK and WWL-EUKOR (MOL received immunity)55 - EUR 395 
million for taking part in a cartel. For almost 6 years, from October 2006 to September 2012, 
the five carriers formed a cartel in the market for deep sea transport of new cars, trucks and 
other large vehicles such as combine harvesters and tractors, on various routes between 
Europe and other continents. The cartel affected both European car importers and final 
customers, as imported vehicles were sold within the EEA, and European vehicle 
manufacturers, as their vehicles were exported outside the EEA. In 2016, some 3.4 million 
motor vehicles were imported from non-EU countries, while the EU exported more than 6.3 
million vehicles to non-EU countries in 2016. Almost half of these vehicles were transported 
by the carriers that were fined by the Commission. During its investigation, the Commission 
cooperated with several competition authorities around the world, including in Australia, 
Canada, Japan and the US. 
With regard to the automotive sector, two further cartels were sanctioned. The Commission 
also fined two suppliers of spark plugs (automotive electric devices) - Bosch and NGK - EUR 
76 million for participating in a cartel with immunity applicant Denso. The Commission also 
found two cartels relating to braking systems. The first concerned the supply of hydraulic 
braking systems and involved TRW (immunity applicant; now ZF TRW), Bosch and 
Continental. The second cartel concerned the supply of electronic braking systems and 
involved Bosch and Continental (immunity applicant) with the Commission imposing total 
fines of EUR 75 million.  
The Commission remains committed to pursuing all cartels across all sectors where it has 
sufficient evidence of an infringement detected either through its leniency programme or its 
ex officio action (more information on the cartel decisions is available in the sectoral 
overview). The Commission's cartel enforcement was effective, with four decisions imposing 
fines in excess of EUR 800 million, and customer savings of approximately EUR 1.6 billion 
                                                          
54  
See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-2281_en.htm, and: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52018XC1211(01). 
55 
 See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-962_en.htm., and: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52018XC0906(01).  
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(or three euro per EU citizen).
56
 Enforcement is expected to remain effective also in the future 
due to solid enforcement work in 2018. 
Case name Adoption date Fine imposed 
EUR 
Undertakings 
concerned 
Prohibition 
Procedure 
Maritime Car 
Carriers 
21/02/2018 395 288 000 4 Settlement 
Braking systems 21/02/2018 75 426 000 3 Settlement 
Spark plugs 21/02/2018 76 099 000 3 Settlement 
Capacitors 21/03/2018 253 935 000 9 Prohibition 
 
1.4 Continuing close cooperation within the European Competition Network and 
with national courts  
The NCAs play a key role in applying the EU competition rules alongside the Commission. 
Action by the NCAs accounts for 85% of public enforcement of the EU antitrust rules. This is 
a significant contribution to further drive economic growth and to make sure that markets 
work well, empowering consumers and businesses alike.  
However, there is room for improvement. The 2014 Commission Communication on Ten 
Years of Regulation 1/2003
57
 identified a number of areas of action to make enforcement by 
the NCAs more effective, in particular that they have effective enforcement powers and fining 
tools, and have adequate resources and are sufficiently independent when enforcing EU 
competition law. By way of follow-up, the Commission carried out a public consultation
58
 
between November 2015 and February 2016 and sounded out options for concrete action with 
both the NCAs and the Member State ministries. In the public consultation, 80% of 
stakeholders considered that action should be taken to ensure that NCAs have the means and 
instruments they need.
59
 On 22 March 2017, the Commission proposed a Directive to 
empower NCAs to be more effective enforcers.
60
 The co-legislators adopted the Directive on 
11 December 2018, and it was published in the Official Journal on 14 January 2019.
61 
Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
necessary to comply with this Directive by 4 February 2021.  
Empowering NCAs to become more effective enforcers 
Once transposed by Member States into national law, the Directive to empower NCAs to be more effective 
enforcers will ensure that all NCAs: 
• benefit from the guarantees of independence when applying EU competition rules; 
                                                          
56  
DG Competition 2018 Annual Activity Report. To be published here: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/annual-activity-reports_en.  
57 
 Communication from the Commission of 9 July 2014, Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 
1/2003: Achievements and Future Perspectives, COM/2014/0453 See: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/antitrust_enforcement_10_years_en.pdf. 
58
  See: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2015_effective_enforcers/index_en.html. 
59 
 See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5998_en.htm and 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2015_effective_enforcers/index_en.html.  
60 
 See: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/nca.html.  
61 
 Directive (EU) 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 to empower the 
competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper 
functioning of the internal market (Text with EEA relevance.) OJ L 11, 14.1.2019, p. 3–33. 
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• have the basic guarantee of the human and financial resources they need to perform their tasks; 
• have an effective investigative and decision-making toolbox, including to gather digital evidence stored 
on mobile devices; 
• be able to impose deterrent fines, for example companies can no longer escape fines by restructuring; 
• have effective leniency programmes in place which encourage companies to report cartels throughout 
the EU; 
•   provide each other with mutual assistance so that, for example companies with assets in other Member 
States cannot escape from paying fines. 
The importance of companies' fundamental rights is underlined. Appropriate safeguards will be put in when 
NCAs exercise their powers, in accordance with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and general principles of 
EU law. 
Cooperation with national courts 
Effective overall enforcement of antitrust rules in the EU, for the benefit of for both EU 
households and businesses, requires interplay between public and private enforcement. In 
addition to its cooperation with NCAs in the context of the European Competition Network 
(ECN), the Commission also continued its cooperation with national courts under Article 15 
of Regulation 1/2003. The Commission helps national courts to enforce the EU competition 
rules in an effective and coherent manner by providing case-related information or an opinion 
on matters of substance or by intervening as amicus curiae in proceedings pending before the 
national courts. 
Following approval from the concerned courts, the Commission publishes its opinions and 
amicus curiae observations on its website. 
Private enforcement 
Directive 2014/104/EU on antitrust damages actions (Damages Directive)
62
 aims at ensuring 
that anyone harmed by infringements of the EU competition rules can effectively avail itself 
of the right to compensation before national courts. The deadline to implement the Damages 
Directive in Member States' legal systems expired on 27 December 2016. Seven Member 
States transposed it before the deadline expired. On 18 January 2017, the Commission sent 
Letters of Formal Notice opening infringement procedures for non-communication of 
transposing measures by the deadline against 21 Member States. Of those, 18 Member States 
fully transposed the Directive in 2017 and the respective infringements proceedings were 
closed. Bulgaria, Greece and Portugal adopted transposing measures in the first half of 2018 
The Commission is finalising the completeness checks of their transposing measures before 
the closure of the respective three infringement proceedings. The Commission is also 
proceeding to the conformity check of all the 28 national transpositions.  
In addition, following the publication of a “Study on quantifying passing-on effects in 
antitrust damages actions” in October 2016, the Commission launched in July 2018 a targeted 
public consultation on draft guidelines in order to estimate the share of the overcharge passed 
on to indirect customers. The Commission intends to adopt a final version in 2019.
63 64  
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  Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules 
governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the 
Member States and of the European Union, OJ L 349, 5.12.2014, pp. 1-19. 
63
  European Commission Study on the Passing-On of Overcharges. See:  
www.ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/KD0216916ENN.pdf.    
64 
 As foreseen in Article 16 of the Antitrust Damages Directive. 
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2. MERGER CONTROL 
 
EU merger control  
The purpose of EU merger control is to ensure that market structures remain competitive while enabling smooth 
restructuring of the industry. This applies not only to EU-based companies, but also to any company active on 
the EU markets. Industry restructuring is an important way of fostering efficient allocation of production assets. 
However, there are also situations where industry consolidation can give rise to harmful effects on competition, 
taking into account the merging companies' degree of market power and other market features. EU merger 
control ensures that changes in the market structure which lead to harmful effects on competition do not occur.  
EU merger control seeks to maintain open and competitive markets, which is the best way to 
ensure that businesses and final consumers obtain fair outcomes. It strives to protect all 
aspects of competition. As a result, merger control helps to preserve market structures, in 
which companies compete not only on price, but also on other competitive parameters such as 
innovation. The Commission's merger enforcement practice in 2018, in the agri-chemical,
65
 
pharmaceutical66 and oxygen systems67 sectors, shows that the Commission considers 
innovation and investments as important aspects of competition. The Commission will 
continue to assess the effects on innovation in future cases. 
EU merger control ensures that all firms active in EU markets can compete on fair and equal 
terms. Proposed transactions which may distort competition are subject to close scrutiny by 
the Commission. If necessary to protect competition, the Commission can give merging firms 
the possibility to dispel competition concerns by offering commitments. If sufficient 
commitments cannot be found or agreed upon, the Commission may prohibit the transaction.  
In its assessments, the Commission takes into account efficiencies possibly brought about by 
mergers. Efficiencies may have positive effects on costs and innovation, for example, 
provided that they are verifiable, merger-specific and likely to be passed on to consumers.  
As highlighted in previous reports on competition policy, the Commission continuously 
evaluates the substantive and procedural rules that make up the legal framework for merger 
control. Such reflections are conducted both internally, based on experience, and by using 
external input. In this context, the Commission regularly assesses concerns and suggestions 
for further improvements expressed by stakeholders. It evaluates the need for reform and 
policy changes in specific areas, and checks that its policies and enforcement practices do not 
create unduly high compliance costs for merging companies, thereby hampering investment 
and innovation. 
2.1 Recent enforcement trends  
In 2018, 414 mergers were notified to the Commission, the highest number in the history of 
EU merger control. This number represents a substantial increase compared with preceding 
years. The total number of notifications received in 2018 was 9% higher than in 2017 and 
almost 50% higher than in 2013. Moreover, the Commission received 23 reasoned pre-
notification submissions by notifying parties, requesting referral of a proposed merger from 
                                                          
65 
 Case M.8084 Bayer/Monsanto, Commission decision of 21 March 2018. See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-17-772_en.htm. See also Case M.8851 - BASF / Bayer divestment business, Commission decision 
of 30 April 2018. See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-3622_en.htm.  
66  
Case M.8955 - Takeda/Shire. See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-6497_en.htm. 
67 
 Case M.8658 - UTC/Rockwell. See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-3682_en.htm.  
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the Commission to a national competition authority or vice versa. 
Like previous years, most notified mergers did not raise competition concerns and could be 
processed speedily. The simplified procedure was used in 75% of all notified transactions in 
2018, showing the impact of the simplification package adopted by the Commission in 
December 2013. The proportion of simplified cases in the period 2004-2013 was substantially 
lower, at 59%. 
The year 2018 required intensive work by the Commission, due to the large number of 
notified transactions as well as the complexity of a large number of the cases. An increasing 
number of notified transactions concerned already concentrated industries, such as the agri-
chemical and steel sectors. This development required the Commission to carefully assess the 
proposed mergers’ potential impact on competition, employing sophisticated quantitative 
techniques and carrying out comprehensive qualitative investigations. 
In 2018, the Commission opened in-depth investigations (second phase) in twelve cases. 
These cases concerned sectors such as telecommunications, steel, industrial gases and, 
railway transport. 
The Commission adopted 393 merger decisions in 2018,
68
 and intervened in 25 cases, 
resulting in customer savings of approximately EUR 20 billion (or EUR 39 per EU citizen).
69
 
The number of interventions was somewhat higher compared to the average of the last seven 
years, with approximately 20 interventions per year.
70
 In 2018, 17 mergers were cleared 
subject to commitments in the first phase, four were cleared without remedies after second- 
phase investigations, and six were cleared with remedies after second phase investigations. In 
two cases, the parties abandoned the transaction during the in-depth investigation.
71
 The 
Commission did not prohibit any transactions in 2018.  
When reviewing proposed concentrations, the Commission assesses their impact on all 
aspects of competition. In 2018, the Commission intervened in several proposed 
concentrations, which, in addition to price, quality and choice concerns, risked impeding 
innovation. In Bayer/Monsanto
72
 and BASF/Bayer divestment business73
 
the Commission 
identified concerns related to innovation. The Commission approved the Bayer/Monsanto 
transaction after the parties submitted an extensive divestiture package comprising in 
particular Bayer's global vegetable seed business and broadacre crop seed and trait business 
(including R&D), its glufosinate business, and its digital agriculture activities. These 
divestitures addressed all competition concerns identified by the Commission, including those 
related to innovation. The divestiture businesses were sold to BASF. The acquisitions would 
allow the company to compete and innovate as actively and effectively against the merged 
firms, for the benefit of European farmers and consumers.  
                                                          
68  
For the purposes of this report, decisions based on Articles 6(1)(a), 6(1)b, 6(1)b in combination with 6(2), 
8(1), 8(2) and 8(3) of the Merger Regulation are considered as final decisions. 
69  
DG Competition 2018 Annual Activity Report. To be published here: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/annual-activity-reports_en. 
70  
Commission interventions in merger cases include prohibition decisions and mergers cleared subject to 
commitments, as well as withdrawals during second phase in-depth investigation. 
71
  Case M.8547 - CELANESE / BLACKSTONE  / JV, notified to the Commission on 12 September 2017 and 
the notification withdrawn on 19 march 2018 and case M.8907 - APERAM / VDM, notified to the 
Commission on 23 October 2018 and the notification withdrawn on 21 December 2018. 
72 
 Case M.8084 - Bayer/Monsanto. See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-772_en.htm. 
73 
 Case M.8851 - BASF / Bayer divestment business. See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-
3622_en.htm. 
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Most remedies accepted by the Commission in 2018 were divestitures of tangible or 
intangible assets.
74
 This is in line with the Commission’s general preference for structural 
remedies in merger cases. In a few cases in 2018, the Commission accepted non-divestiture 
remedies,
75
 where they were considered to solve the underlying competition concerns. 
Moreover, in 2018 the Commission continued to make significant efforts to enforce 
procedural obligations under the EU Merger Regulation.
76
 Following the fine of EUR 110 
million imposed on Facebook in 2017 for providing misleading information during the review 
of its acquisition of WhatsApp
77
, the Commission imposed in 2018 a fine of EUR 124.5 
million on Altice78 for  implementing its acquisition of the Portuguese telecommunications 
operator PT Portugal before notification or approval by the Commission (so-called gun 
jumping). Three other procedural infringement cases were under investigation in 2018; two 
against General Electric and Merck GmbH (including Sigma-Aldrich) concerning their 
alleged provision of incorrect and/or misleading information during the Commission's merger 
review. Moreover, the Comission is pursuing a case against Canon for allegedly 
implementing a merger before notification and clearance.  
Merger decisions 2010-2018:  
 
 
 
                                                          
74  
Case M.8084 - Bayer/Monsanto, Commission decision of 21 March 2018; Case M.8444 -  Arcelormittal/Ilva, 
Commission decision of 7 May 2018; Case M.8480 - Praxair/Linde, Commission decision of 20 August 201. 
75 
 Case M.8306 - Qualcomm/NXP semiconductors, Commission decision of 18 January 2018; Case M.7000 - 
Libery Global/Ziggo, Commission decision of 30 May 2018. 
76
  Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation), OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, pp. 1-22. 
77
  Case M.8228 - Facebook/ WhatsApp. See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1369_en.htm.  
78
  See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-3522_en.htm. 
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2.2 The ongoing evaluation of EU merger controlselected procedural and 
jurisdictional aspects of EU mergers 
In 2016, the Commission launched a public consultation concerning an evaluation of selected 
procedural and jurisdictional aspects of EU merger control. The evaluation builds  upon the 
results of the public consultation on the 2014 Commission white paper "Towards more 
effective EU merger control".
79
 The evaluation focusses on four topics, namely (i.) possible 
further simplification of EU merger control, (ii.) the functioning of the jurisdictional 
thresholds, (iii.) the functioning of the referral system, and (iv.) specific technical aspects.  
The public consultation was open until mid-February 2017 and attracted wide interest. A 
summary of the submissions received during the public consultation, together with their non-
confidential versions, were published on the Commission's Competition website on 28 July 
2017.
80
 The Commission is carrying out further research on the topics covered by the 
evaluation and will reflect on whether further action would be required. 
2.3 Significant judgments by the European Union courts in merger control  
In 2018, the EU Courts adopted five judgments in the field of merger control. 
In its judgement of 16 May 2018,
81
 the General Court partially annulled the Commission 
decision of 25 July 2016,
82
 which rejected Lufthansa’s request for a waiver of the 
commitments made binding by the Commission in its 2005 decision  Lufthansa/Swiss.
83 
The 
General Court annulled the Commission’s decision to reject the request for a waiver for the 
Zürich-Stockholm route. The General Court considered that the Commission made a manifest 
error of assessment by failing to take into account and carefully examine all relevant 
information. The General Court concluded that the Commission has no obligation to review 
long-term commitments on its own initiative. It is for the parties bound by the commitments 
to make a waiver request and to provide the necessary evidence. However, the Commission 
must supplement or refute such evidence by way of an investigation. According the the 
General Court, the Commission had not adequately investigated the change in competitive 
conditions that had occurred on this route since the adoption of its decision. However, the 
General Court dismissed the appeal in relation to the Zürich-Warsaw route. 
On 31 May 2018, the European Court of Justice issued its preliminary ruling on a question 
referred to it by a Danish Court concerning the interpreation of Article 7(1) of the Merger 
Regulation, which prohibits companies from implementing a concentration before the 
Commission has cleared it.
84
 The issue at stake in the national proceedings was whether the 
termination by KPMG of its cooperation agreement with the KPMG international network 
prior to the approval of its merger with Ernst & Young by the Danish Competition Authority 
amounted to gun jumping or not. In its judgment, the Court of Justice concluded that Article 
7(1) of the Merger Regulation must be interpreted in such a way that a concentration is 
considered to be implemented only by a transaction which, in whole or in part, in fact or in 
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 See: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2014_merger_control/index_en.html.  
80 
 For the summary of the submissions and their non-confidential versions, see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2016_merger_control/index_en.html.  
81
  Case T-712/16 - Deutsche Lufthansa AG v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 18 May 2018. 
82
  Commission Decision C(2016) 4964 final of 25 July 2016, see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m3770_373_3.pdf.   
83
  Case M.3770 – Lufthansa/Swiss, decision of 4 July 2005, see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m3770_373_3.pdf.    
84
  Case C-633/16 Ernst & Young vs C-633/16 Ernst & Young vs Konkurrencerådet, judgment of 31 May 2018.  
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law, contributes to the change in control of the target undertaking. The Court of Justice 
applied this test to the specific circumstances in the Danish proceedings and concluded that 
the termination of the cooperation agreement does not constitute gun-jumping, even if it had a 
conditional link with the concentration and was likely to be of ancillary and preparatory 
nature. 
On 9 October 2018, the General Court delivered judgements in three cases
85 
concerning the 
implementation of remedies in the case Telefónica Deutschland/ E-Plus
86 
that had been 
cleared conditionally in 2014. Each of the three applicants 1&1 Telecom, Mass Response and 
Multiconnect claimed that the Commission incorrectly interpreted the scope of Telefónica's 
obligations under its commitments. The General Court declared the appeals inadmissible.  
 
3. STATE AID CONTROL 
 
State aid control is an integral part of EU competition policy and a necessary safeguard to preserve effective 
competition and free trade in the single market. 
The Treaty establishes the principle that State aid which distorts or threatens to distort competition is prohibited 
in so far as it affects trade between Member States (Article 107(1) TFEU). However, State aid, which contributes 
to well-defined objectives of common interest without unduly distorting competition between undertakings and 
trade between Member States, may be considered compatible with the internal market (under Article 107(3) 
TFEU).  
The objectives of the Commission's control of State aid are to ensure that aid is growth-enhancing, efficient and 
effective, and better targeted in times of budgetary constraints that aid does not restrict competition but addresses 
market failures for the benefit of society as a whole. In addition to this, the Commission acts to prevent and 
recover State aid which is incompatible with the internal market. 
3.1 Uptake of the State Aid Modernisation  
Since 2014, as part of the State Aid Modernisation (SAM), there has been a surge in State aid 
granted without prior notification to the Commission, indicating an important reduction in red 
tape. The 2018 State Aid Scoreboard
87
 confirms that modernisation has lead to quicker 
implementation of public support by Member States. This is possible due to the General 
Block Exemption Regulation (GBER)
88
, adopted in the context of the State aid reform, which 
simplifies the aid-granting procedure for Member States by authorising - without prior 
notification - a wide range of measures fulfilling certain criteria and specific EU objectives in 
the common interest. For the aid categories covered by the GBER, only cases with the largest 
potential to distort competition in the single market have to be notified.  
As shown in the graph below,
89
 since 2015 more than 96% of new measures for which 
expenditure was reported for the first time were covered by the GBER, entailing an increase 
                                                          
85 
 General Court judgements in cases T-43/16, T-884/16 and T-885/16.  
86 
Case M.7018  -  Telefonica Deutschland/E-Plus. See:  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7018_6053_3.pdf. 
87  
The 2018 State Aid Scoreboard comprises aid expenditure made by Member States before 31 December 
2017 and which falls under the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU. The data is based on the annual reporting by 
Member States pursuant to Article 6(1) of Commission Regulation (EC) 794/2004. See: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/index_en.html.  
88 
 Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible 
with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of TFEU, OJ L 187, 26.6.2014, p.1. 
89 
 The 2018 State Aid Scoreboard figures: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/index_en.html.  
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of some 28 percentage points compared to 2013. Approximately 82% of all measures with 
reported expenditure (that is to say not only new measures), fell under the block exemption in 
2017. Expenditure on GBER measures in the EU was approximately EUR 41.7 billion in 
2017, which corresponds to about 38% of total expenditure. However, when considering the 
average of individual Member States' expenditure, in 2017 Member States spent some 48% of 
their total spending on GBER measures, an increase of approximately 14 percentage points 
compared to 2013. 
 
The 2014 GBER introduced new aid categories
90
 and to a large extent, the reported increase 
in expenditure of GBER measures reflects the impact of the new Regulation. In 2017, as 
compared to 2014, total GBER spending for aid to culture and heritage conservation, for 
broadband and for local infrastructure has increased dramatically, while it more than doubled 
for SMEs, including risk finance. Large increases were also recorded for environmental 
protection and energy savings (+80%), for research, development and innovation (+69%) and 
for aid to compensate damages caused by natural disasters (+50%). The GBER was further 
extended in 2017, especially as regards aid to ports and airports.
91
 It is therefore to be 
expected that block-exempted aid as a share of total aid granted by Member States will 
increase even further in the coming years.  
                                                          
90 
 Aid to innovation clusters and aid to process and organisational innovation, aid schemes to make good the 
damage caused by natural disasters, social aid for transport residents of remote regions, aid for broadband 
infrastructure, aid for culture and heritage conservation, including aid schemes for audio-visual works, aid for 
sport multifunctional recreational infrastructures, as well as investment aid for local infrastructure; the new 
GBER also broadened categories of aid already covered by the previous (2008) GBER. 
91 
 In 2017, Member States reported more than 50 million EUR of State aid spending under Articles 56a and 56b 
of the GBER, of which 7 million EUR for inland ports, 39 million EUR for maritime ports and 6 million 
EUR for regional airports, respectively. 
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The growing share of spending falling under the GBER implies that on average State aid 
measures registered by the Commission are implemented much more quickly than in the past 
by Member States. Compared to 2013, the average time to implement State aid measures 
decreased by 15%. However, notified measures that are still subject to scrutiny tend to cover 
bigger budgets and spending than in the past, in line with the Commission's approach to be 
'big on big things and small on small things'.
92
 In 2017, the average annual budget of 
implemented notified measures was some EUR 230 million, an absolute increase of 
approximately 126% compared to 2013. 
State aid enforcement (Commission decisions, monitoring and Member States' 
Evaluation Plans) 2010-2018 
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  Speech by European Commission President-elect on 10 September 2014, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-585_en.htm. 
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Cooperation with Member States 
To facilitate the implementation of SAM, the Commission supports Member States in various 
ways in the framework of a multilateral partnership. The Working Group on SAM 
implementation (SAM WG) is a forum for Member States to exchange best practices on their 
systems for State aid control, creating an effective network for the informal discussion of 
issues concerning the implementation of State aid rules among Member States and with the 
Commission. Other dedicated working groups or workshops deal with specific aspects of 
SAM implementation, in particular the requirements for transparency and evaluation (see 
respective sections infra) or issues related to international subsidy policy and State aid to 
infrastructure. Once a year, all these working groups report to a High Level Forum, which 
takes place in Brussels. The High Level Forum provides guidance on the future work of the 
SAM WG and is also the occasion for the Commission and Member States to discuss State 
aid policy more generally.   
The SAM WG met three times in 2018, under the Chairmanship of France, and addressed 
several policy and compliance topics related to SAM implementation, such as specific aspects 
of the notion of aid and the interplay between State aid rules and Structural Funds 
implementation. It reported on the main topics discussed during the past year and on the 
follow-up to recommendations from past Chairs (Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom) 
to the High Level Forum held on 19 June, in Brussels. On this occasion the High Level Forum 
also endorsed the work plan submitted by the Chair for the period 2018-2019.  
In 2018, the Commission also continued its bilateral cooperation with Member States. 
Launched in 2015, the overall objective of this process is to achieve both good State aid 
policy and effective State aid control at the national level. Tailored to each Member State's 
specific needs, bilateral cooperations have taken a variety of dimensions, from structured 
cooperation processes (with Italy, Bulgaria and Romania), to more bespoke informal bilateral 
interactions (with Belgium, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovenia and Spain). These various cooperation processes generally deal with horizontal 
cross-cutting State aid issues, such as country-specific compliance and implementation issues, 
governance issues and issues concerning State-owned enterprises, as well as cases in 
problematic sectors. Each Member State also has a dedicated State Aid Country Coordinator 
at the Commission, who acts as a first entry point for this Member State's horizontal State Aid 
questions. After several years of operation, work is on-going towards refining the various 
bilateral cooperation processes with all Member States.  
Transparency Award Module 
The transparency provisions currently part of SAM are in force since 1 July 2016 and require 
Member States to publish information about the beneficiaries of aid awards above EUR 
500 000.
93
 Member States have six months starting from the date of granting to provide the 
required aid awards' data, with the exception of awards in the form of fiscal aid for which the 
information needs to be provided within one year from the date of granting. The Commission 
services facilitated compliance with this requirement by developing, in cooperation with 
Member States, the Transparency Award Module (TAM) – an informatics tool for submission 
and publication of data required under the transparency provisions.
94
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  Competition Policy Brief 4/2016: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpb/2016/2016_004_en.pdf.  
94 
 See the Transparency Award Module (TAM): 
https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/competition/transparency/public/search.   
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The TAM ensures that information submitted by granting authorities is consistent and 
comparable across Member States. In addition, the associated transparency public search page 
provides all stakeholders, i.a. citizens, competitors and researchers, with a single entry point 
allowing them to make comparable extractions and analysis. For these reasons, the 
Commission pursues efforts to improve the user friendliness and the interoperability 
capabilities of the tools, to incentivise those Member States already having National State Aid 
Registries in place to use the TAM as well.  
At the end of 2018, 25 Member States have joined the TAM and more than 43 000 aid 
grantings have been published by 25 Member States and Iceland. The Commission services 
support the implementation of the TAM by facilitating, together with Member States' 
representatives, the Transparency Steering Group (one meeting in 2018) and by organising 
dedicated training courses upon request. In addition, the Commission conducted the first 
compliance checks in early 2018 to verify the completeness and accuracy of the information 
published by Member States under the transparency requirements through either the TAM or 
National State Aid Registries. This first round of compliance checks proved to be very 
effective in improving compliance with the transparency obligations. The scopoe of the 
compliance checks will be substantially extended in 2019. 
Evaluation of aid schemes 
Evaluation of aid schemes is another requirement introduced by SAM. The aim is to gather 
the necessary evidence to better identify impacts, both positive and negative, of the aid and to 
provide input for future policy-making by the Member States and the Commission.  
Since 1 July 2014, evaluation is required for large GBER schemes in certain aid categories
95 
as well as for a selection of notified schemes under the new generation of State aid 
guidelines.
96
  
By the end of 2018, the Commission had approved evaluation plans covering 40 State aid 
schemes. Five additional schemes are currently under analysis, covering a total of 15 Member 
States.
97
 Most of these decisions concerned either large regional aid projects or R&D&I aid 
schemes under the GBER or notified energy and broadband schemes. These schemes account, 
in total, for over EUR 50 billion of annual State aid budget. The first evaluation report was 
submitted in January 2018.  
The Commission services have continued to accompany the implementation of the evaluation 
requirement by publishing policy briefs
98 
and by organising dedicated workshops with 
Member States' representatives and evaluation experts. The current priorities of the 
Commission services are: (i.) to enlarge the scope of the evaluation initiative to additional 
Member States, including through bilateral contacts; and (ii.) to prepare the ground for a 
comprehensive assessment of evaluation reports, both intermediate and final, to provide 
appropriate feedback to Member States and make sure that results are effectively used for 
                                                          
95  
Schemes with an average annual State aid budget above EUR 150 million in the fields of regional aid, aid for 
SMEs and access to finance, aid for research and development and innovation, energy and environmental aid 
and aid for broadband infrastructures. 
96
  Evaluation can apply to notified aid schemes with large budgets, containing novel characteristics or when 
significant market, technology or regulatory changes are foreseen.  
97 
 Czechia, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Austria, Poland, Portugal, 
Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom.  
98 
Competition Policy Briefs 7/2014: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpb/2014/007_en.pdf; and 
3/2016: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpb/2016/2016_003_en.pdf. 
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better policy-making. 
Aid for research, development and innovation  
While one of the headline targets of the Europe 2020 Strategy
99
 is for Research, Development 
and Innovation (R&D&I) investments in the EU to reach 3% of EU GDP, R&D&I spending 
in the EU has been lagging behind major global competitors, mainly due to lower levels of 
private investment. To achieve the greatest possible impact with the available budgets 
R&D&I aid measures should not replace or crowd out private financing. On the contrary, 
efforts should be directed at encouraging more private investments. The very purpose of 
R&D&I aid is that it should bring added value where markets and companies do not deliver 
the investments for promising but highly risky innovative projects.  
Therefore, the State aid rules for R&D&I help ensure that public funding goes to research 
projects that would not otherwise be realised due to market failures, that is to say projects that 
truly go beyond the state of the art and which bring innovative products and services to the 
market and ultimately to consumers. The rules, using flexible and simple criteria for assessing 
the compatibility of State aid, facilitate the implementation of support for R&D&I projects by 
Member States.  
In 2018, the Commission ensured that aid schemes and individual measures notified or pre-
notified under the R&D&I rules were well targeted to projects enabling ground-breaking 
research and innovation activities. Its State aid control activities covered a variety of sectors 
including the automated/connected driving, e-mobility, aeronautic, space, microelectronic 
sectors as well as virtual research infrastructures and innovation clusters. 
Moreover, in a significant number cases the Commission cooperated with a number of 
Member States with a view to enabling them to adjust certain envisaged R&D&I measures 
and bring them in line with the GBER. This way, aid measures could be granted swiftly 
without having to be notified to the Commission, thereby speeding up public support for 
R&D&I. It is noteworthy that following the State Aid Modernisation in 2014, 95% of all 
R&D&I measures (70% in value terms) in the Union are implemented under the GBER. 
Aid enabling Member States jointly to support important projects of common European 
interest  
In June 2014, the Commission adopted a Communication on Important Projects of Common 
European Interest (IPCEI)
100
, aiming to encourage Member States to support projects that 
make a clear contribution to economic growth, jobs and the competitiveness of Europe. The 
IPCEI framework complements other State aid rules such as the General Block Exemption 
Regulation
101
 and the Research, Development and Innovation Framework
102
, which allows 
supporting innovative projects whilst ensuring that potential competition distortions are 
limited. The rules thus enable ground-breaking research and innovation and sharing of the 
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 Communication of 3 March 2010 from the Commission, Europe 2020 A Strategy For Smart, Sustainable And 
Inclusive Growth, COM(2010) 2020 final. See:http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid= 
1427303331326&uri=CELEX:52010DC2020.  
100
  Communication from the Commission - Criteria for the analysis of the compatibility with the internal market 
of State aid to promote the execution of important projects of common European interest, OJ C 188, 
20.6.2014, pp. 4–12. 
101 
 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/block.html#gber.  
102
  Communication from the Commission - Framework for State aid for research and development and 
innovation, OJ C 198, 27.6.2014, pp. 1–29. 
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results widely, whilst ensuring that the support by taxpayer money truly serves European 
citizens. 
In December 2018, the Commission found that an integrated project jointly notified by 
France
103
, Germany
104
, Italy
105
 and the United Kingdom
106
 for research and innovation in 
microelectronics is in line with EU State aid rules and contributes to a common European 
interest. The Commission has identified micro- and nano-electronics as one of six Key 
Enabling Technologies deemed to be crucial for future industrial development.
107
 
This first case in the area of R&D&I of an Important Project of Common European Interest 
(IPCEI) demonstrates that the instrument can deliver intra-EU R&D&I cooperation and 
coordination for Key Enabling Technologies, including investment into first industrial 
deployment.  
During 2018, in line with the Commission's battery alliance initiative, discussions with a 
group of Member States and companies for a possible important project of common European 
interest (IPCEI) in the area of batteries for e-mobility and energy storage have intensified. 
This is in line with the Commission's policy for a shift from the use of environmentally 
harmful fossil fuels to alternative fuel technologies. 
Regional aid  
Regional aid is an important instrument in the EU toolbox to promote greater economic and 
social cohesion. The 2014-2020 regional aid framework is in place since July 2014. 
In 2018, the Commission continued advising Member States' authorities on how to interpret 
and implement the regional aid provisions of the GBER, thus helping them to make a success 
of the reforms introduced under SAM to the benefit of both consumers and businesses. 
In 2018, the Commission adopted a decision under the Regional Aid Guidelines for 2014-
2020 approving a regional investment aid for a large investment project to BorsodChem.
 108
 
The investment has the objective to increase the vertical integration of BorsodChem’s existing 
Hungarian methylene diphenyl diisosyanate (MDI) manufacturing plant in Kazincbarcika by 
adding a facility for the production of aniline.The Commission found that without the public 
funding, the project would not have been carried out in Hungary or another EU Member 
State, as it would be cheaper for the beneficiary to continue importing aniline from existing 
production plants outside EU. The investment project contributes to the economic 
development of a disadvantaged region and creates direct jobs. It also leads to the reduction of 
environmental risks associated with long distance transportation of aniline which is a toxic 
material.  
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The Commission also adopted a positive decision on regional investment aid to Jaguar Land 
Rover
109
 in Slovakia (car manufacturing). The Commission's formal investigation established 
that without the investment aid, the project would not have been carried out in Europe. It also 
showed that the aid was limited to the minimum necessary to trigger the decision by Jaguar 
Land Rover to carry out the investment in Slovakia. The Commission found that the 
investment aid contributes to job creation as well as to the economic development and to the 
competitiveness of a disadvantaged region. Finally, the Commission established, after a 
careful examination of all facts, that there was no causal link between the aid granted by 
Slovakia and the closure of activities elsewhere in Europe.  Therefore, the positive effects of 
the project on regional development clearly outweigh any distortion of competition brought 
about by the State aid. The Commission also found that certain infrastructure measures 
financed by the Slovak state and carried out to develop the industrial estate where the new 
Jaguar Land Rover plant is located will not only benefit Jaguar Land Rover, but also all other 
companies located in the industrial estate and more generally in the Nitra region. These 
measures should for that reason not qualify as State aid. Finally, the Commission found that 
the transfer by the Slovak state to Jaguar Land Rover of the land plot, where the car plant is 
being built, was carried out at market price. 
Finally, the Commission adopted two decisions approving evaluation plans relating to 
regional aid schemes for Hungary ('Investment incentives')
110
 and for Greece ('General 
Entrepreneurship' scheme
111
). The first decision concerns the evaluation plan of an 
investment aid scheme intended to address the low level of employment and investment in 
Central Hungary's “c” areas and in the less developed regions of Hungary ("a" regions). It 
also aims to facilitate the development of new technical and technological solutions, facilitate 
the development of exports and increase the competitiveness of products manufactured and 
services provided in compliance with the GBER. The second Commission decision concerns 
the evaluation plan of a regional aid scheme aiming to boost the economy and increase of 
employment in Greece. The aid is directed towards enterprises of all sizes in all regions and to 
manufacturing and internationally traded services and products allowed by the GBER. 
Disaster aid (promotion of economic development in areas affected by a natural disaster of 
an exceptional nature) 
In 2018, the Commission approved under Article 107(3)(c) TFEU an Italian aid scheme to 
support investments in regions affected by earthquakes in 2016 and 2017.
112
 The notified aid 
scheme aims at mitigating the economic and social damages in central Italy which have been 
affected by abnormal seismic activity. The aid takes the form of a tax credit for all companies 
making initial investments in the area. Support to large companies is limited to aid for setting 
up a new company, diversifying a company's activity or acquiring the assets of a company 
that has closed down. The Commission found that the aid scheme contributes in a 
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proportionate manner to the promotion of economic development and recovery in areas 
affected by a natural disaster of an exceptional nature. 
 
Aid to risk finance  
SMEs across the EU remain heavily dependent on traditional bank lending, which is still 
limited by banks' refinancing capacity, risk appetite and capital adequacy. The financial crisis 
has exacerbated the problem with a large number of SMEs still being unable to receive the 
necessary finance in recent years. Given the pivotal importance of SMEs and midcaps for the 
whole EU economy, the situation has a significant negative impact on growth and job 
creation. The current Risk Finance rules aim to offer better incentives for private sector 
investors - including institutional ones – to increase their funding activities in the critical area 
of SME and midcaps financing. The rules also mirror other EU initiatives designed to 
promote wider use of financial instruments in the context of new support programmes such as 
Horizon 2020 or COSME (the Programme for the Competitiveness of Enterprise and 
SMEs).
113
 
The current Risk Finance Guidelines
114
 and the corresponding parts of the GBER, provide the 
framework for seamless support for new ventures from their creation to their development 
into global players. The aim is to help new ventures to get past the critical stages where 
private financing is either unavailable or not available in the necessary amount or form. 
Aid measures encouraging investment and innovation in SMEs 
In 2018, under the Risk Finance Guidelines, the Commission dealt with notified schemes aimed at encouraging 
investment in innovative SMEs and midcaps. In particular, it approved the prolongation of an amended scheme 
in Italy granting fiscal incentives for investments in innovative start-ups.  
Moreover, the Commission cooperated with a number of Member States with a view to enable them to adjust 
certain envisaged risk finance measures and bring them in line with the current GBER. This way, aid measures 
could be granted swiftly without having to be notified to the Commission, thereby speeding up public support to 
innovative SMEs.  
In all these cases, the Commission took the view that the measures at issue covered a real gap in the market, and 
worked together with the Member States on solutions to limit the impact on competition in the single market. In 
particular, the Commission considered that the risks inherent to the activities of these young firms and 
innovative companies (that is to say products/technologies not yet proven to be economically viable) and the 
lack of financial guarantees limited their capacity to access funding and that the aid was necessary to stimulate 
investment that, if unprompted, would not have been provided by the market. 
Infrastructure 
In 2018, the Commission continued providing guidance to the Member States' authorities by 
using analytical grids on the application of State aid rules to the public financing of 
infrastructure projects. The applicable provisions were revised in the light of the adoption of 
the Commission Notice on the notion of State aid in 2016,
115
 and the adoption of the revised 
GBER in 2017.
116
 The Comission continued advising Member States' authorities on how to 
interpret and implement the State aid provisions of the GBER on infrastructure projects, thus 
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helping them to ensure legal certainty regarding the public funding of infrastructure. 
The Commission also adopted three decisions on State aid for the development of motorways, 
notably by the approval of an investment plan for Italian motorways,
117
 the approval of the 
prolongation of the existing concession agreement for the Istrian Y motorway in Croatia,
118
 
and the construction of the southern section of the Central Greece Motorway (E65 
concession).
119
 
Italian motorways plan: The Commission approved under EU State aid rules on services of 
general economic interest the Italian plans to prolong two motorway concessions and impose 
a cap on the tolls imposed on users. The Italian motorways plan involves the prolongation of 
major motorway concessions held by Autostrade per l'Italia (ASPI) and by Società Iniziative 
Autostradali e Servizi (SIAS). These concessions include a cap on potential toll increases at a 
sustainable level for motorway users. At the same time, the prolongation of the concessions 
provide ASPI and SIAS with sufficient revenues to finance significant investments on the 
concessions concerned. The approved plan is also accompanied by a series of safeguards to 
avoid that ASPI and SIAS are overcompensated and to limit competition distortions, 
including: (i) a cap on the amount that ASPI and SIAS could receive at the end of the 
concession from a sale of the assets; (ii) a mechanism to avoid overcompensation, and (iii) a 
series of detailed requirements to tender out the majority of infrastructure works downstream 
in order to limit distortions of competition. The Commission found that the measures will 
promote growth and unlock investment, while limiting the impact on motorway users. The 
limited prolongation of concessions and the safeguard measures minimises distortions of 
competition in line with the State aid rules. 
Croatian Istrian Y motorway: The Commission approved under EU State aid rules on services 
of general economic interest the Croatian plan to prolong the existing Istrian Y motorway 
concession agreement. The positive decision allows new investments to go ahead, while 
limiting distortions of competition.The Commission found that the Croatian plan to prolong 
the Istrian Y motorway concession agreement does not overcompensated the concessionaire. 
It also found that the prolongation of the motorway concession is proportionate to the amount 
needed to finance the works required for building a second stretch of the carriageway on the 
north-eastern side of the motorway. The measure promotes growth and unlock investment, 
while limiting the impact on motorway users, in line with EU State aid rules.  
Greek E65 motorway concession: The Commission approved approved under Article  
107 3(c) TFEU Greek public funding for the construction of the southern section of the 
Central Greece Motorway (E65) in line with earlier decisions on the same road.
120
 The 
Commission found the support measure necessary and proportionate for the implementation 
of the project insofar as Greece has demonstrated that (i) the public financing corresponds to 
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the inflation adjusted construction costs and that (ii) the concessionaire will assume the 
operation and maintenance costs of the project, and any excessive revenues will be returned to 
the State via a claw-back mechanism. The project will also not receive any cross-subsidies 
from other concessions Furthermore, the approved project contributes to objectives of 
common EU interest and in particular to EU transport policy, as it will support the completion 
of a key Trans-European Road Network and improve transport links for Greek citizens living 
in the Sterea Ellada region, without causing undue distortions of competition. 
3.2 State Aid Modernisation continues  
State aid modernisation started in 2012, culminating in a comprehensive review of the main 
State aid guidelines as well as the adoption of the General Block Exemption Regulation in 
2014. The General Block Exemption Regulation enables Member States to implement a wide 
range of State aid measures without prior Commission approval because they are unlikely to 
distort competition to an extent that is contrary to the common interest. As a result, 
approximately 95% of State aid measures implemented by Member States are now exempted.  
In 2017 the Commission extended the scope of this Regulation to ports and airports. 
Further extension of the scope of the GBER 
The efforts to focus and modernise EU State aid rules and improve the Commission's working 
methods are continuing. In the context of the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-
2027, the Commission has proposed to simplify co-investment involving both EU funding 
and Member State investment, through a revision of the EU State aid Enabling Regulation, 
which is the legal basis for adopting the GBER. A revised GBER could also cover national 
financing combined with the InvestEU Fund, a single set of rules for all financial instruments 
and budgetary guarantees in the next EU budget. The Commission would have an important 
role in the selection and evaluation of the supported projects and schemes. Member State 
funds channelled through InvestEU could in the future be exempted from prior notification to 
the Commission under State aid rules.  
Launch of the Fitness check of the 2012 State aid modernisation package, railways guidelines 
and short term export credit insurance 
In 2018, the Commision launched in line with Commission's Better Regulation Guidelines, 
the evaluation of State aid rules, which were adopted as part of the State Aid Modernisation, 
the railways guidelines and the short term export credit insurance.
 
The evaluation takes the 
form of a “fitness check” to verify whether the rules have actually worked in the way intended 
and are fit for purpose.
121
 It will provide a basis for decisions, to be taken by the Commission 
in the future, about whether to further prolong or possibly update the rules.
 122
 
                                                          
121
  A fitness check is an evaluation of a group of EU interventions which have a relationship with each other - 
normally a joint set of objectives – which justify a joint analysis. A fitness check assesses the performance of 
the relevant framework with respect to its policy objectives. A fitness check should pay particular attention to 
identifying and trying to quantify any synergies (e.g. improved performance, simplification, lower costs, 
reduced burdens) or inefficiencies (e.g. excessive burdens, overlaps, gaps, inconsistencies, implementation 
problems and/or obsolete measures) within the group of interventions which may have appeared over time, 
and help to identify the cumulative impact of the interventions, covering both costs and benefits. See: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/better-regulation-guidelines-evaluation-fitness-checks.pdf. 
122
  The current fitness check will cover the General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER), De minimis 
Regulation, Regional aid Guidelines, Research, Development and Innovation (RDI) Framework, 
Communication on State aid for important projects of common European interest (IPCEI Communication), 
Risk finance, Airport and aviation Guidelines, Energy and Environmental Aid Guidelines (EEAG), Rescue 
and restructuring Guidelines but also the Railways Guidelines as well as the Short term export credit 
Communication (the two latter that have not been included in the 2012 SAM package). 
 33 
Launch of the review of the Emissions trading scheme State aid guidelines (ETS Guidelines) 
In line with Commission’s Better Regulation Guidelines, the review of the ETS Guidelines  
has been launched. Under the ETS Guidelines the Member States can compensate some 
electro-intensive users, for part of the higher electricity costs resulting from the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme. The objective of such compensation is to minimise carbon leakage risk, 
which materialises when emission costs cause relocation from the EU to third countries 
without comparable constraints. The existing rules allowing for compensation will be revised 
to ensure that they are adapted to the new Emissions Trading Scheme for the period 2021-
2030. 
Prolongation of the Export Credit Insurance State aid rules until 2020 
On 17 December 2018, the Commisison adopted a Communication prolonging the State aid 
rules for export credit insurance until 2020.
123 
The Export Credit Insurance State aid rules set 
criteria under which EU governments can provide financial support to buyers of exports from 
their country, in the form of short-term credit insurance. If there is a viable private market for 
insuring the risk that sellers will not be paid, public export credit agencies may only provide 
insurance at market rates.  
Prolongation of the Regulation on de minimis aid to undertakings providing services of 
general economic interest (SGEI) until 31 December 2020 
On 7 December 2018, the Commission adopted the prolongation of the Commission 
Regulation on de minimis aid to undertakings providing services of general economic interest 
until 31 December 2020.
124
 The prolongation will reduce the administrative burden and 
provide legal certainty for compensation measures which do not exceed EUR 500 000 over 
any period of three fiscal years granted to undertakings providing such a service and therefore 
shall be deemed not to affect trade between Member States and/or not to distort competition. 
Revision of the Simplified Procedure Notice and Best Practices Code 
A new Best Practices Code
125
 was adopted in July 2018 and replaces and combines the 
previous Simplified Procedure Notice and Best Practices Code. The Best Practices Code for 
State aid control gives guidance on how the Commission, Member States and other 
stakeholders work together in State aid procedures. This covers, for example, how to ensure 
that complex State aid cases are handled most effectively, how complaints about State aid are 
followed up, and monitoring of how Member States implement State aid measures in practice. 
The Best Practices Code explains how State aid procedures are carried out, and sets out the 
steps the Commission is taking to increase the speed, transparency and predictability of these 
procedures.  
3.3 Monitoring, recovery, evaluation and cooperation with national courts  
Increased monitoring of existing State aid to ensure competition on fair and equal terms 
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Over the years, the architecture of State aid control has evolved. Today, a substantial part of 
aid is granted under block-exempted schemes which are not examined by the Commission 
before entering into force. Overall, roughly 80% of aid is granted on the basis of previously 
approved aid schemes or block exemption regulations.
126
 In that context, it is essential for the 
Commission to verify that Member States apply State aid rules for the schemes correctly and 
that they only grant aid when all required conditions are met.  
To that end, the Commission introduced in 2006 a regular, ex post, sample-based control of 
existing aid schemes ("monitoring"). After a modest start covering some 20 schemes and ten 
Member States in each monitoring cycle, the Commission has considerably stepped up 
monitoring since 2011. Building on the Court of Auditors recommendations,
127
 the 
Commission has substantially increased the size of the monitoring sample and is monitoring 
approximately 50 schemes per year. It also extended the scope of its control beyond block-
exempted and authorised aid schemes, for example schemes falling under the SGEI 
Decision.
128
  
The 2018 cycle covered most Member States
129
 and all main types of aid approved as well as 
block-exempted schemes. Since the reporting of individual aid exceeding EUR 500 000 have 
to be encoded for the first time by Member States and is subsequently published in the 
TAM,
130
 the Commission verified the reporting for the schemes monitored.  
The Commission follows up on irregularities and uses the means at its disposal, as 
appropriate, to address the competition distortions that these may have caused. In some cases, 
Member States offer to voluntarily redress the problems detected, for example to amend 
national legislation or to recover the excess aid granted. In other cases, the Commission may 
need to take formal action.  
Restoring competition through recovery of State aid granted in breach of the rules 
To ensure the integrity of the single market, the Commission has the power and the duty to 
request that Member States recover unlawful and incompatible aid which has unduly distorted 
competition and trade between Member States. In 2018, further progress was made to ensure 
that recovery decisions are enforced effectively and immediately. 
By 31 December 2018, the sum of illegal and incompatible aid recovered from beneficiaries 
amounted to EUR 26.6 billion.
131
 At the same point in time, the outstanding amount pending 
recovery was EUR 5 billion.  
In 2018, the Commission adopted seven new recovery decisions and an amount of 
EUR 13.3 billion was recovered by the Member States. As of the end of December, the 
Commission had 43 pending recovery cases. 
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 Recovery decisions adopted in 2018 7 
Amount recovered in 2018 (EUR billion) 13.3 
Pending recovery cases on 31 December 2017 43 
As a guardian of the Treaty, the Commission may use all legal means at its disposal to ensure 
that Member States implement their recovery obligations, including launching infringement 
procedures. In 2018, the Commission decided to file one infringement action to the European 
Courts under Article 108(2) TFEU.
132
  
An in-depth review of the 2007 Commission's recovery notice
133
 was initiated in 2018 with 
the aim to consolidate into the text the case law developments established since. The new 
notice will also include more information on the infringement procedures, both Articles 
108(2) TFEU and 260 TFEU, as well as established new practices in the cooperation between 
the Commission and the Member State concerned by a recovery decision. 
Cooperation with national courts to ensure the effectiveness of State aid rules  
The Commission continued its cooperation with national courts and tribunals under Article 29 
of the Procedural Regulation.
134
 This cooperation includes direct case-related assistance to 
national courts when they apply EU State aid law. The courts and tribunals can ask the 
Commission to provide case related information, or to provide an opinion on the application 
of State aid rules. The Commission may also submit amicus curiae observations at its own 
initiative.  
In 2018, the Commission responded to two requests for information. In one instance, a district 
court in the Netherlands enquired on the state of play in an investigation; the other request 
forwarded by a French administrative appeal court enquired on certain information which the 
Commission might have in the case file of a closed investigation. 
The possibility for the Commission to submit amicus curiae observations before national 
courts on its own initiative was introduced in the 2013 amendment to the Procedural 
Regulation. In this respect, Article 29 of the Procedural Regulation mirrors Article 15(3) of 
Regulation 1/2003 in the field of antitrust. In 2018, the Commission intervened in 
proceedings before the courts in six Member States and in arbitral proceedings where State 
aid issues were considered.
135
 To make its views publicly known, the Commission publishes 
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its opinions and amicus curiae observations, as well as observations to others, on its 
website.
136
  
In 2018, the Commission also continued its advocacy efforts. It was actively involved in 
evaluating the financing of training programmes for national judges and in assessing their 
needs. The Commission staff also provided training during workshops and conferences.
137
 
Finally, in 2018 the Commission commissioned a study on the application of the cooperation 
tools by national courts to analyse in greater depth the State aid rulings of courts in the 28 EU 
Member States. 
3.4 Significant judgments by the European Union Courts in the State aid area  
In 2018, the EU Courts adopted a number of important judgments in the State aid area. The 
following overview is based on a selection of court judgments, notably on issues related to the 
concept of advantage, selectivity, compatibility assessment and on a number of procedural 
points.  
Advantage  
The most relevant judgments as regards advantage are FIH
138
 and EDF.
139
  
In FIH, the Court of Justice overturned the General Court judgement and upheld the 
Commission 2014 decision. The case concerned two successive State aid measures declared 
compatible by the Commission (in 2009 and 2014) and the applicability/application of the 
MEOP to the second one, in its declination as market economy investor test (as argued by the 
Commission) or market economy creditor test (as held by the General Court). 
The Court of Justice first confirmed that the Market Economy Operator Principle (“MEOP”) 
is applicable to the case of FIH. The Court of Justice first noted that in order to apply the 
MEOP only the benefits and obligations linked to the situation of the State as a private 
operator, to the exclusion of those linked to its situation as a public authority, are to be taken 
into account. In this regard, in line with the Land Burgenland case law,
140
 the Court of Justice 
reiterated that by granting aid, a Member State pursues by definition objectives other than that 
of making profits: the risks resulting from that State aid are not among the factors that a 
private operator under normal market conditions would have taken into account in its 
economic calculations. Since the 2009 measures were clearly State aid under Article 107 
TFEU, the Court of Justice concluded that the General Court had wrongly required the 
Commission to assess the economic rationale of the second measure from the point of view of 
a private creditor rather than a private investor. 
Another important judgement related to the existence of an advantage and the 
applicability/application of the MEOP is EDF. In its judgment, the General Court fully upheld 
the Commission’s decision of 22 July 2015 and, accordingly, the obligation for France to 
recover approximately EUR 1.37 billion from EDF. 
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The General Court stated that the applicability of the MEOP test (in its declination as Market 
Economy Investor Principle, “MEIP”, in this case) ultimately depends on the State having 
conferred, in its capacity as shareholder and not in its capacity as public authority, an 
economic advantage to an undertaking belonging to it. It is for the Member State to 
demonstrate that before or at the same time as conferring the advantage, it took the decision to 
make an investment in that undertaking in line with what a private investor would have done. 
In order to establish the economic rationale of its decision, the Member State can submit 
elements showing that the decision was based on economic evaluations comparable to those 
that a private investor would have made before implementing the measure at issue for the 
purposes of determining its future profitability. The elements taken into account must be 
contemporaneous to the measure and cannot result from ex post studies. The General Court  
noted that in the case of EDF this had not occurred and upheld the Commission decision. 
Selectivity 
In 2018, the EU courts delivered a number of judgements dealing with the selective nature of 
State measures. 
The three-step test 
On selectivity issues, it is worth noting firstly the preliminary ruling in the A-Brauerei case.
141
 
The case concerns an exemption from the German tax on real property transfers 
(Grunderwerbsteuergesetz) in certain cases - transfers of properties in the context of 
transformations within groups - and in particular whether such an exemption constitutes a 
selective advantage and thus State aid. The Court of Justice confirmed that the selectivity of a 
fiscal measure has to be assessed using the methodology of the three-step test.
142
 The Court of 
Justice ruled that the tax exemption at stake constitutes a prima facie selective advantage 
since it differentiates between companies which are in the same situation, in the light of its 
objective (taxing any change in ownership of real property). However, it also considered that 
this difference in treatment could be justified (in certain circumstances) by a guiding principle 
of the tax system, namely the principle to avoid double taxation, thereby potentially escaping 
the qualification as State aid.  
Another important judgement on the application of the three-step test is Sanierungklausel,
143
 
where the Court of Justice overturned the General Court judgements
144
 and annulled the 
Commission's decision of 26 January 2011.
145
 In substance, the cases deal with the 
application of State aid rules to an exception from an exception in the corporate tax system. 
The German system of loss carry-forward allows companies to offset losses in a given year 
against taxes on profits in future years, except when there has been a significant change in 
ownership. The latter rule is aimed at preventing abuses, such as acquiring failed companies 
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for the sole purpose of tax avoidance. A third rule, the so-called "Sanierungsklausel" or 
reorganisation clause, authorises the loss carry-forward for companies that are illiquid or 
over-indebted, despite a change in ownership, if the change serves the purpose of 
restructuring. The Commission's decision (confirmed by the General Court) concluded that 
this clause was incompatible aid because it departed from the general rule preventing the 
carry-forward of losses after a significant change in ownership and procured a selective 
advantage to companies in difficulty. The Court of Justice, however, overturned the General 
Court's judgements and annulled the decision, taking the view that the Commission had 
wrongly defined the reference framework. First, the Court of Justice pointed out that the 
selectivity of a tax rule does not depend on whether it is an exception to a general rule or not. 
This is only relevant when it leads to treating differently two groups of persons which, in light 
of the objective of the measure, are in a comparable legal and factual situation. The Court of 
Justice then held that the prohibition to carry forward losses in case of a significant change in 
ownership was clearly an exception to the general rule of loss carry-forward. The Court of 
Justice considered that the General Court erred when it accepted that the Commission, while 
noting the existence of a more general loss carry-forward rule, determined the reference 
framework to be the rule governing the forfeiture of losses in case of change of ownership. 
Because the incorrect definition of the reference system corrupts the entire selectivity 
analysis, the Court of Justice annulled the decision. 
Special purpose levies 
A further important judgement in the field of selectivity (and in particular for the assessment 
of selectivity of special purpose levies with a parafiscal objective) is the preliminary ruling in 
ANGED.
146
 The case concerns (regional) taxes on large retail operators. The objectives 
assigned to the retail taxes are environmental protection and town and country planning, that 
is to say the need to develop urban infrastructure and to take into account the pollution created 
by customers using private cars to go shopping. 
The taxes are calculated on the basis of the surface of the retail establishment, as a proxy for 
the adverse effects caused mainly by the use of private cars by customers. The most 
prominent features of the measures are (i) an exemption for individual retail outlets below a 
given surface threshold; (ii) exemptions/reduction for certain specialised retail outlets (garden 
centres, establishments selling vehicles, construction materials, machinery or industrial 
supplies, furniture, doors and windows, and do-it-yourself stores); and (iii) a de facto 
exemption of large collective establishments (that is to say shopping malls) in Catalonia, 
because the individual outlets of the mall are below the surface threshold. 
After having recalled the Member States’ competence to design their fiscal measures, in the 
absence of EU rules governing the matter, the Court of Justice noted that the tax at stake 
pursues objectives of environmental protection and town and country planning and carries out 
the selectivity assessment (especially the comparability test) in the light of these objectives, 
noting that it is not disputed that the environmental impact of retail establishments largely 
depends on their size. 
As regards the exemption of individual outlets below the threshold, the Court of Justice held 
that smaller establishments are not in a similar legal and factual situation as larger 
establishments subject to the taxes in particular in light of their environmental objective.  
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With regard to the exemption for specialised shops, the Court of Justice accepted the 
argument that such an exemption would be justified if these retail outlets, which require very 
large areas, do not have a significant adverse effect on environment and on town and country 
planning as the others. The Court of Justice  accepted the justification in principle, but leaves 
this to be checked by the referring national court. 
Finally, with regard to the de facto exemption of large collective establishments (that is to 
say) in Catalonia, the Court of Justice held that they are objectively in a comparable situation 
to large retail outlets considering the objectives of the measures. As a result, the exemption of 
collective establishments from the tax was held to be selective and to constitute State aid. 
Compatibility 
In its judgement in Hinkley Point C,
147
 the General Court upheld the Commission decision of 
8 October 2014 approving the aid in favour of the construction of the Hinkley Point C nuclear 
power station in the UK. 
The General Court stated that to be compatible with Article 107(3)(c) TFEU an aid should 
relate to a public interest objective, be appropriate, necessary and proportionate. Concerning 
the objective of public interest, the General Court referred to the narrower concept of public 
interest rather than to common interest.
148
 The General Court noted that the objective of 
promoting the creation of new nuclear energy is related to the Euratom Community's goal of 
facilitating investment in the nuclear field. Furthermore, it follows from the TFEU that each 
Member State has the right to choose its own energy mix. Consequently, the General Court 
held that the Commission did not err in taking the view that the UK was entitled to define the 
development of nuclear energy as being a public-interest objective, even though that objective 
is not shared by all Member States. 
The General Cour also confirmed that Article 107(3)(c) TFEU does not require the existence 
of a “market failure”. The relevant question is whether the pursued public interest objective 
would be attained without the Member State's intervention, even if, as such, the market cannot 
be considered to be failing. In this regard, the General Court held that given the lack of 
market-based financial instruments and other types of hedging contracts, the Commission was 
correct to conclude that State intervention was necessary in order to develop, in good time, 
new nuclear energy generation. 
Concerning the proportionality of the aid, the General Court concluded that Austria did not 
demonstrate that the Commission made a manifest error when it balanced the positive effects 
of the measure against its negative effects. The General Court indicated that the Commission 
was entitled to take into account all positive effects of the new nuclear capacity, including on 
security of supply and low carbon policy. 
The General Gourt concluded that operating aid is not per se incompatible. It can be declared 
compatible if it fulfils all the requirement of Article 107(3)(c) TFEU, notably when the 
operating aid promotes new investment as in the present case. At the same time, the General 
Court notes that an operating aid solely intended to maintain the status quo and covering the 
operating expenditure of a normal business activity cannot be considered to pursue an 
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objective of public interest. 
In its judgment Rittinger and Others of 13 December 2018,
149
 the Court of Justice confirmed 
that the German broadcasting contribution is compatible with EU law and that Germany did 
not have to notify the Commission of an alteration to existing state aid. In 2007 the 
Commission found that the broadcasting fee in Germany was to be classified as existing 
aid.
150
 In 2013 Germany modified the basis for calculating the broadcasting fee. This 
modification was challenged before the Landgericht Tübingen, which made a referral to the 
Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.  
 
The Court of Justice found that the replacement of the broadcasting fee (which was payable 
on the basis of possession of a broadcast receiving device) with the broadcasting contribution 
(which is payable among other things on the basis of occupation of a dwelling or business 
premises) does not constitute a substantial alteration to the system of financing public 
broadcasting in Germany. Therefore, it was not necessary to notify it to the Commission as an 
alteration to existing state aid. 
The replacement of the broadcasting fee by the broadcasting contribution was made  to  
simplify the levying of the broadcasting contribution, in a context of evolving technologies 
for receiving the public broadcasters’ programmes. Moreover, that simplification did not lead 
to a substantial increase in the compensation received by the public broadcasters to cover the 
costs associated with the public service tasks entrusted to them.  
Procedural issues 
In 2018, the EU courts delivered a number of relevant judgements on procedural points. 
In its judgement in Dutch Seaports,
151
 the General Court dismissed the appeal by the Dutch 
public seaports (supported by the Netherlands), and upheld a 2016 Commission decision. The 
Commission had found that the Dutch corporate tax exemption for public seaports amounted 
to incompatible aid. Since the aid was existing, the Commission had asked the Netherlands to 
abolish it at the latest by 1 January 2017. The main focus of the judgement is the application 
of the principle of equal treatment by the Commission. The applicants criticised the 
Commission for not completing the investigations on similar measures implemented by 
Belgium, France and Germany the same time as the Dutch one.  
The General Court first concluded that the Commission had sufficiently motivated its decision 
and that it had clearly explained why it considered that the situation of competing seaports 
was not relevant. On this basis, it was normal for the Commission not to give further 
explanations as to the investigations it was conducting on those competing seaports. The 
General Court then reiterated that a possible breach by a Member State of an obligation 
incumbent on it under the Treaty, in particular Article 107(1) TFEU, cannot be justified by 
the fact that other Member States could also be in breach of this obligation and that several 
distortions of competition do not neutralize each other but, on the contrary, have a cumulative 
effect.  
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The General Court moreover noted that the respect for the principle of equal treatment must 
be reconciled with the principle of legality, which means that a person may not rely, in 
support of his claim, on an unlawful act committed in favour of a third party. Since the 
Commission had found that the Dutch corporate tax exemption as incompatible aid and that it 
had to be abolished, the applicants could not derive from the principle of equal treatment the 
right to continue to benefit from that incompatible aid. 
Another important judgement procedure-wise is the General Court ruling in Tempus 
Energy.
152
 The General Court annulled a 2014 Commission decision which declared a State 
aid for a UK capacity mechanism compatible with the internal market. The annulment is 
based on the General Court consideration that the Commission should have opened the formal 
investigation procedure under Article 108(2) TFEU, in light of the circumstances of the 
preliminary investigation and the characteristics of the measure. In particular, the General 
Court held that the Commission should have open the formal investigation in light of the 
length of the pre-notification phase (approximately 18 months), the complexity and novelty of 
the case (it was the first decision approving a capacity mechanism under the then new 
Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy 2014-2020,
153
 and its 
significance in terms of high aid amounts. 
In the Øresund case
154
 the General Court partially annulled the Commission’s 2014 decision 
approving State guarantees granted by Denmark and Sweden to support the construction and 
operation of the Øresund Fixed Link (a 16-kilometre long toll-funded tunnel and bridge 
infrastrucuture linking the two countries). The Commission decision declared the State aid 
compatible under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU as funding for an important project of  common 
European interest (IPCEI). The General Court upheld the decision insofar as it found that the 
State funding for the “hinterland” rail infrastructure connecting the Fixed Link to the national 
rail networks did not constitute State aid since there is no market for the operation of the 
national rail networks in Denmark or Sweden. However, the General Court found that the 
Commission had encountered serious difficulties in establishing the compatibility of the State 
aid to the Fixed Link on several points, in particular as regards the necessity and 
proportionalty of the State guarantees which were not clearly quantified in view of their 
undefined amount and duration.  The Commission should consequently have opened a formal 
investigation pursuant to Article 108(2) TFEU. 
Finally, the judgement in Montessori
155
 is noteworthy. The case related to an exemption from 
the municipal real estate tax in Italy for religious entities and non-for-profit organisations 
since 2006. The Commission found that such an exemption (from 2006 until 2011) was 
unlawful and incompatible aid but did not order Italy to recover the aid from the beneficiaries, 
accepting the arguments raised by the Member States as regards the absolute impossibility of 
recovery. The judgment is important for two procedure-related reasons, namely the 
admissibility of actions for annulment under the third limb of Article 263(4) TFEU and the 
principles underlying absolute impossibility of recovery of unlawful and incompatible aid. 
First, the Court of Justice confirmed for the first time that a State aid decision declaring an aid 
scheme incompatible (without ordering recovery) can be considered a regulatory act that is 
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subject to appeal under the third limb of Article 263(4) TFEU. Second, the Court of Justice, 
while confirming that the Commission can in principle accept arguments on absolute 
impossibility of recovery before the final decision, stressed that the condition of absolute 
impossibility cannot be satisfied when the Member State alleges mere internal difficulties. 
The Court of Justice held that recovery of unlawful and incompatible aid may be considered 
objectively and absolutely impossible when (i) the difficulties relied upon by the Member 
States are real, and (ii) there are no alternative methods of recovery. 
4. DEVELOPING THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF EU COMPETITION POLICY 
The main objective of the Commission's international activities in the competition field  is to 
advocate a global competition culture, promoting competition conditions allowing  companies 
to compete on the merits on fair and equal terms across the world. This endeavour includes 
subsidies. The Commission’s strategy has a multilateral as well as a bilateral component.   
4.1. Multilateral relations 
In 2018, the Commission continued its endeavours to improve multilateral rules for subsidies. 
Reforming the subsidy rules is one of the EU’s main priorities for the modernisation of WTO 
trade rules. Moreover, in 2018 the Commission was engaged in several sectoral initiatives 
addressing subsidies in the international context, for example the G20 Global Forum on steel 
excess capacity,
156
 the development of regional support guidelines for the semiconductor 
industry in the Government/authorities meeting on semiconductors (GAMS),
157 
and for 
shipbuilding within the OECD. Finally, the Commission worked with EU Member States in 
the International Subsidy Policy Group, gathering information on subsidies granted by 
countries outside the EU, exchanging views and coordinating initiatives concerning 
international subsidy policies at multilateral and bilateral level.
158 
 
In 2018, the Commission continued its active engagement in competition-related international 
fora such as the OECD Competition Committee, the International Competition Network 
(ICN), the World Bank, and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD).  
At the OECD Competition Committee meeting in June 2018, the Commission contributed to 
the discussions on leniency progammes,
159
 non-price effects of mergers,
160
 implications of e-
commerce for competition policy
161
 and market concentration.
162
 In December 2018, the 
Commission contributed to the Competition Committee’s deliberations on the treatment of 
legally privileged information in competition proceedings,
163
 gun jumping and suspensory 
effects of merger notifications,
164
 excessive pricing in pharmaceuticals,
165
 personalised 
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pricing in the digital era,
166
 quality considerations in the zero-price economy,
167
 benefits and 
challenges of regional competition agreements,
168
 and investigative powers in practice.
169
 
In March 2018, the Commission participated in the Annual Conference of the ICN in New 
Dehli. Throughout the year, the Commission co-chaired the ICN Cartel Working Group and 
contributed to several projects such as the survey on the “Key elements for efficient and 
effective leniency programme and its application” and the new chapter of the ICN Anti-Cartel 
Enforcement Manual on Private Enforcement. The Commission is also an active member in 
the other ICN Working Groups; the Merger Working Group, the Unilateral Conduct Working 
Group, the Advocacy Working Group, and the Agency Effectiveness Working Group.  
 
The Commission participated in the 17th meeting of the UNCTAD Intergovernmental Group 
of Experts on Competition Law and Policy, held in Geneva in July 2018. The conference 
included discussions on policy challenges faced by developing countries in competition and 
regulation in the maritime transport sector, capacity building in competition law and policy, 
and competition issues in the sale of audio-visual rights for major sporting events.
170
 
Moreover, in 2018 contributed to a UNCTAD proposal to develop a Toolkit on International 
Cooperation within the UNCTAD Discussion Group for International Cooperation.
171  
4.2. Bilateral relations 
At bilateral level, the Commission aims at including provisions on competition and State aid 
control when negotiating Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). In 2018, the Commission continued 
FTA negotiations with Chile, Mexico, Mercosur, Azerbaijan, Tunisia and Indonesia, and 
opened negotiations with Australia, New Zealand, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. At the end of  
2018, the European Union and Switzerland agreed on the text of an Institutional Framework 
Agreement, which also includes State aid control rules. The draft agreement is currently in 
consultation with Swiss stakeholders. 
The Commission's negotiations on an Investment Agreement with China are still ongoing.  
As regards the draft Second Generation Agreement between the Commission and the 
Competition Bureau Canada, the Commission analysed the impact which the Opinion of the 
Court of Justice on the 2014 EU Canada Passenger Name Record Agreement
172
 would have 
on the Second Generation Agreement. Moreover, the Commission continued the negotiations 
with Japan on a Second Generation Agreement with a view to update the existing cooperation 
agreement from 2003.
173  
 
Another key area of the Commission’s activities is technical cooperation on competition 
policy and enforcement with the European Union’s main trading partners. To frame this 
cooperation, the Commission has signed a number of Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs). 
The Commission has signed MoUs with the BRICS
174
 countries, and it has engaged in 
technical cooperation with these countries to varying degrees. With the same objective, the 
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Commission signed an Administrative Arrangement with Mexico in June 2018.
175 
 
The Commission also assists neighbouring countries when they implement the competition 
provisions included in FTAs. For example, in 2018 the Commission was involved in 
negotiating the FTA implementing rules with Tunisia and in monitoring the implementation 
of the EU competition acquis in countries such as Ukraine.  
In negotiations with candidate countries and potential candiadate countries, the Commission's 
main policy objective - in addition to advocating a competition culture - is to help these  
countries to create legislative frameworks with well-functioning competition authorities and 
to build up a solid enforcement record. To meet the conditions for EU accession in the 
competition policy field, these requirements must be fulfilled. In 2018 the Commission 
continued to monitor candidate countries’ compliance with their commitments under the 
Stabilisation and Association agreements. 
5. EXTERNAL COMMUNICATION 
DG Competition's external communication is focused on the use of mass media to reach a 
variety of audiences, including businesses, lawyers, researchers, academics, students and the 
general public. This is achieved principally via the Commissioner's press conferences, press 
releases and speeches, as well as social media. In addition, the Directorate-General issues 
newsletters and other publications aimed at stakeholders and the general public, as well as 
participation by staff in stakeholder conferences. 
The mass media are by far the most cost-effective channel to reach a wide audience.  
According to a 2014 Eurobarometer on "Citizens’ Perception about Competition Policy", 
people's two main sources of information about competition policies were television (62%) 
and newspapers or magazines, including online (60%). These were followed by internet-based 
media (38%) and radio (34%).  The results of a Eurobarometer survey conducted in January 
2019 show that newspapers or magazines and television remain the main information sources 
(both 58%), followed by radio and websites (both 33%), and online social networks (24%, an 
increase of 10% since 2014). 
DG Competition produced 560 press releases related to competition cases during 2018. Of 
these, 140 were longer, multilingual, press releases while a further 420 were shorter and 
monolingual. Media coverage of some of the cases was worldwide, reaching tens of millions 
of people, for example, of the Google Android and Qualcomm antitrust decisions. All of these 
cases were covered by TV, radio, print and internet media around the globe. 
Throughout 2018, Commissioner Vestager delivered 102 speeches to a variety of audiences. 
The Director-General delivered 16 speeches176 at a number of international events. 
On social media, the Directorate-General for Competition was active on Twitter during 2018. 
Throughout the year, more than 1,200 tweets from the Directorate-General’s account 
generated more than 3.6 million impressions.177 The most popular tweets related to the 
Google Android and Qualcomm decisions, the consumer electronics cartel decisions as well 
as the tweets concerning the investigation into possible collusion between car manufacturers 
about clean emission technology. Followers of the Directorate General's Twitter account rose 
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to nearly 12 000 during the year. 
The number of subscribers to DG Competition's electronic newsletters rose to over 21 000 in 
2018, while its paper publications in the EU Bookshop were viewed or downloaded 6 000 
times. 
6. THE SINGLE MARKET PROGRAMME 
Adapting to an increasingly digital environment is a major challenge for the enforcement of 
EU competition policy. New sophisticated IT tools and algorithms used by economic 
operators combined with an exponential increase in electronic communications, quantity of 
data and the number of documents on case files make many competition investigations 
increasingly complex and burdensome. The Commission's proposals for the next Multiannual 
Financial Framework (2021-2027) adopted in June 2018  included – for the first time - a 
Single Market Programme. If adopted, the Single Market Programme would enable the 
Commission to directly support competition policy development with an indicative budget of 
EUR 140 million dedicated to a Competition Programme. 
The funds allocated to the Competition Programme would help the Commission to detect and 
investigate infringements in an increasingly paperless world where the use of algorithms 
becomes more and more widespread. Moreover, these funds would increase the Commission's 
ability to manage case files containing ever growing data volumes. If adopted as part of the 
Single Market Programme, the Competition Programme would enable the Commission to 
modernise EU competition policy enforcement by investing in state-of-the-art IT tools, 
knowledge and expertise, as well as strengthen cooperation between the Commission and 
Member States’ competition authorities in all areas of EU competition law. Finally, the 
Competition Programme could be used to raise stakeholder awareness of EU competition 
policy.
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competitiveness of enterprises, including small and medium-sized enterprises, and European statistics and 
repealing Regulations (EU) No 99/2013, (EU) No 1287/2013, (EU) No 254/2014, (EU) No 258/2014, (EU) 
No 652/2014 and (EU) No 2017/826. See: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?qid=1540389285918&uri=CELEX%3A52018SC0320. 
 46 
II. SECTORAL OVERVIEW 
The Commission's competition policy actions in 2018 focused on a wide range of areas, with 
the common objective of making markets work better. Morever, EU competition policy 
supported several key EU policies and initiatives, including a connected Digital Single 
Market, an integrated and climate-friendly Energy Union, a Deeper and Fairer Internal Market 
as well as taking action against selective tax advantages. This section provides a sector-by-
sector overview of competition policy developments and enforcement activities that the 
Commission focused on in 2018.  
 1. ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT 
Overview of key challenges in the sector 
Completing the Single Market in the energy sector will bring significant benefits to Europe's 
consumers, businesses as well as the environment. Competition law enforcement in the 
energy sector plays a key role in removing obstacles to the free flow of gas and electricity 
across Member States, enabling decarbonisation, promoting interconnectivity and avoiding 
artificial market partitioning. Applying the competition rules contributes to market opening 
and safeguards that all market players can compete on fair and equal terms, regardless of their 
nationality. In other words, competition policy is essential to make the Energy Union function 
properly. 
In addition, competition policy contributes to fulfilling the EU's climate targets, including the 
decarbonisation of the power sector and the shift in the transport sector from polluting fossil 
fuels to alternative fuels in accordance with the Commission's mobility policy.
179
 To this end, 
the Commission authorises aid measures compatible with the internal market promoting the 
deployment of renewables, improve energy efficiency and stimulate demand for low emission 
vehicles for public and private transport. 
Promoting competition in the energy sector means, ultimately, empowering consumers, 
whether energy-intensive users such as big manufacturing plants, small companies or 
households. They can demand a fair deal and it gives energy consumers the confidence that 
the EU energy markets are working well. In addition, consumers throughout the EU will 
benefit from an integrated European Energy market that guarantees security of energy supply 
at affordable prices and a cleaner environment.  
Effective competition in the green economy 
By means of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), State aid rules also play a key role in 
delivering on climate objectives by lowering the indirect costs of the EU’s carbon market for 
the most electricity-intensive industries. The core principle of the ETS is that polluters should 
pay for their carbon emissions. However, outside of the EU, not all countries apply this 
principle. If enterprises were to delocalise some of their production outside the EU as a result 
of carbon costs, this would result in an increase of global carbon emissions. Because 
electricity generators do not receive free allowances, they have to buy them, thereby 
increasing the electricity price for consumers. To this end, Member States may partially 
compensate electricity-intensive consumers for the indirect costs resulting from the ETS.  
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  “E-mobility” means using energy from renewable sources, use of hydrogen and natural gas for low emission 
vehicles, as well as the introduction of the necessary infrastructure to enable this shift. See: 
https://ec.europa.eu/transport. 
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In 2012, the Commission adopted Guidelines setting the conditions under which Member 
States can grant such partial compensation regarded as constituting State aid for the trading 
period 2012-2020. On 14 March 2018, the Council and the Parliament adopted a revised ETS 
Directive for the period 2021-2030. It underlines that Member States should seek to limit their 
compensation to 25% of their ETS auction revenues. The Commission therefore launched on 
20 December 2018 the revision process of the ETS State aid Guidelines.  
On 18 December 2018, a political agreement was reached on the Clean Energy for All 
Europeans Package.
180
 When adopted, the Package will constitute an important step towards 
the decarbonisation of the European energy system. Future capacity mechanisms will 
incorporate new caps regarding the carbon emissions of fossil fuel origin. Thus, the Package 
introduces a new market design to create the right investment incentives and to enable further 
development of renewables in the electricity sector. 
In 2018, the enforcement of State aid rules in the renewable energy and energy efficiency 
fields remained high. The Commission approved 21 renewables and combined heat and 
power support schemes. As a result, almost all Member States have now received State aid 
clearance for their renewables and combined heat and power support schemes and brought 
them in line with the 2014 Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy. 
In particular, an increasing number of Member States are granting support for the production 
of renewable energy through competitive and technology neutral tenders and integrating 
renewables installations in the electricity market. This has resulted in lower cost for 
consumers in the electricity system as a whole. As an example, the first technologically 
neutral tender in Denmark held under the scheme approved in 2018 delivered record low 
prices, with both solar and on-shore wind projects winning support. 
In 2018 the Commission approved a scheme to support the acquisition of low emission 
battery electric and hybrid public transport buses in Germany,
181
 and a budget increase for a 
similar Portuguese scheme approved in 2016.
182
 Both measures include support for the 
infrastructure necessary to operate the buses. In addition, it approved a German scheme to 
incentivise the retrofitting of diesel buses used in public transport with devices that 
significantly reduce their nitrogen oxides emissions.
183
 
Effective competition in electricity markets 
To address concerns about the free flow of electricity, on 7 December 2018 the Commission 
adopted a decision rendering legally binding commitments offered by German grid operator 
TenneT
184
 to increase cross-border flows of electricity between Denmark and Germany. The 
Commission was concerned that TenneT may have infringed EU antitrust rules by 
systematically limiting southward capacity at the electricity interconnector between Western 
Denmark and Germany. This conduct prevented the export of cheap electricity from the 
Nordic countries, where it is largely generated from renewable energy sources (mostly wind 
and hydro) to Germany, leading to less competition between electricity producers on the 
German wholesale market and thus higher electricity prices. Following a market test, the 
Commission accepted commitments, proposed by TenneT, and made them legally binding: 
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See: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-strategy-and-energy-union/clean-energy-all-europeans. 
181  
See: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/269473/269473_1980325_81_2.pdf. 
182  
See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-3521_en.htm. 
183  
See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-6414_en.htm. 
184  
Case AT.40461 – TenneT. See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-6722_en.htm. 
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 TenneT has committed to make available the maximum capacity compatible with the 
safe operation of the interconnector and, in any event, will guarantee a minimum 
hourly capacity of 1,300 megawatts on the interconnector (around 75% of its 
technical capacity). Following expansion of the interconnector between Western 
Denmark and Germany, TenneT will increase the guaranteed hourly capacity.  
 TenneT can reduce the capacity offered below the minimum guaranteed level only in 
a very limited number of exceptional circumstances, when no other option is available 
to ensure the security of the high-voltage electricity network.  
The commitments will remain in force for nine years and a trustee will be in charge of 
monitoring TenneT's compliance with the commitments.
185
 
Moreover, on 17 April 2018 the Commission made legally binding measures submitted by 
Greece to ensure fair access to lignite-fired power generation for the competitors of Public 
Power Corporation (PPC)
186
 the incumbent electricity operator. In 2008 the Commission 
found that Greece had infringed competition rules by giving the state-owned electricity 
incumbent, PPC, privileged access rights to lignite, and called on Greece to propose measures 
to correct the anti-competitive effects of that infringement. Due to appeals at both the General 
Court and the Court of Justice, such corrective measures had not been implemented so far. 
With the 2018 decision, the Commission concluded that the amended final version of the 
remedies submitted by Greece on 19 January 2018 fully addressed the infringement identified 
by the Commission in its 2008 Decision, while also taking into account Greece's 
environmental objectives and current market circumstances. The remedies should remove the 
privileges created by the special access rights granted to PPC. In particular, the remedies 
provide that PPC will divest the lignite-fired units of Meliti (including the licensed unit of 
Meliti 2) and Megalopoli 3 and 4. The assets to be divested will allow the purchasers to 
compete immediately and more effectively in the Greek wholesale electricity market. PPC has 
launched a tender procedure for the divestment of the plants which should be completed in 
2019. 
In 2018 the Commission analysed several mergers in the electricity sector. For example, it 
approved the Fortum/Uniper merger.
187
 The Transaction mainly concerned the generation and 
wholesale of electricity in the Nordic countries, in particular through hydro power. The 
Commission also assessed various energy-related activities, such as the financial trading, 
retail supply of electricity and district heating, as well as energy production-related services. 
In this case, the analysis carried out by the Commission revealed that competition in those 
countries is healthy, also as a result of the high level of interconnectivity between different 
countries in the Nordic area. 
Ensuring reliable electricity supplies 
Capacity mechanisms are measures taken by Member States to ensure that electricity supply 
can match demand in the medium and long term. Capacity mechanisms are designed to 
support investment to fill the expected capacity gap and ensure security of supply. Typically, 
capacity mechanisms offer additional rewards to capacity providers, on top of income 
obtained by selling electricity on the market in return for maintaining existing capacity or 
investing in new capacity needed to guarantee security of electricity supplies. However, 
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See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-6722_en.htm.  
186
  See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-3401_en.htm. 
187
  See: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m8660_525_3.pdf. 
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capacity mechanisms cannot substitute electricity market reforms at national and European 
levels. In parallel, Member States must implement market reforms to address regulatory 
failures that undermine the incentive for energy operators to invest in energy capacity in 
accordance with the decarbonisation objectives of the EU.  
In its 2016 report of the Sector Inquiry on Capacity Mechanisms,
188
 the Commission 
concluded that capacity mechanisms can affect the generation mix and in particular interact 
with instruments aimed at fostering decarbonisation. To promote non-fossil based capacity, 
the Commission recommended that eligibility or allocation criteria for capacity mechanisms 
allow renewables and demand-side operators to compete alongside other capacity. Otherwise, 
capacity mechanisms may risk jeopardising decarbonisation objectives while pushing up the 
price for security of supply. 
In 2018, the Commission approved seven electricity capacity mechanisms (in Belgium, 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy and Poland).
189
 In its assessment, the Commission verified 
that the capacity mechanisms met strict criteria under EU State aid rules, in particular the 
Commission’s 2014 Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy.190 In 
parallel, Member States must implement market reforms to address regulatory failures that 
undermine the incentive for energy operators to invest in electricity capacity.   
Effective competition in gas and oil markets  
The purpose of antitrust enforcement in the gas sector is to achieve more competitive markets 
in Europe, thereby offering citizens and businesses arbitrage opportunities and greater choice 
at lower prices. 
The case concerning Central and Eastern European gas markets is a good example of the 
efforts made by the Commission to facilitate cross-border flows of energy between Member 
States. On 24 May 2018, the Commission adopted a decision rendering legally binding on 
Gazprom commitments that address the Commission's competition concerns and enable the 
free flow of gas at competitive prices in Central and Eastern European gas markets, to the 
benefit of European consumers and businesses. Gazprom appears to be the dominant gas 
supplier in a number of Central and Eastern European countries. The Commission was 
concerned that Gazprom may have breached EU antitrust rules by pursuing an overall strategy 
to partition gas markets along national borders in eight Member States (Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia) and that this strategy 
may have enabled Gazprom to charge higher gas prices in five of these Member States 
(Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland). The Commission decision put an end to 
this behaviour by Gazprom. Furthermore, it imposed on Gazprom a detailed set of rules that 
will significantly change the way Gazprom operates in Central and Eastern European gas 
markets: 
 No more contractual barriers to the free flow of gas: Gazprom has to remove any 
restrictions placed on customers to re-sell gas cross-border. 
 Obligation to facilitate gas flows to and from isolated markets: Gazprom will enable 
gas flows to and from parts of Central and Eastern Europe that are still isolated from 
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 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/energy/capacity_mechanisms_final_report_en.pdf 
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  See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-682_en.htm., and 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/energy/state_aid_to_secure_electricity_supply_en.html. 
190
  See: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52014XC0628(01). 
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other Member States due to the lack of interconnectors, namely the Baltic States and 
Bulgaria. 
 Structured process to ensure competitive gas prices: Relevant Gazprom customers are 
given an effective tool to make sure their gas price reflects the price level in 
competitive Western European gas markets, especially at liquid gas hubs. 
 No leveraging of dominance in gas supply: Gazprom cannot act on any advantages 
concerning gas infrastructure, which it may have obtained from customers by having 
leveraged its market position in gas supply. 
Combined, these obligations address the Commission's competition concerns and achieve its 
objectives of enabling the free flow of gas in Central and Eastern Europe at competitive 
prices. If Gazprom breaks any of these obligations, the Commission can impose a fine of up 
to 10% of the company's worldwide turnover, without having to prove an infringement of EU 
antitrust rules.
191
 
On 17 December 2018, the Commission fined Bulgarian Energy Holding (BEH),192 its gas 
supply subsidiary Bulgargaz and its gas infrastructure subsidiary Bulgartransgaz (the BEH 
group) EUR 78 million for blocking competitors' access to key gas infrastructure in Bulgaria. 
BEH is the incumbent state-owned energy company in Bulgaria. It is vertically integrated 
meaning that BEH supplies gas and its subsidiaries own or control key gas infrastructure in 
Bulgaria. The Commission found that the BEH group was dominant in the Bulgarian gas 
supply and gas infrastructure markets and that, between 2010 and 2015, the BEH Group 
blocked the access to key gas infrastructure, which it owned or controlled. This infrastructure 
is indispensable for supplying gas on the Bulgarian wholesale gas market and consists of:  
 The domestic Bulgarian gas transmission network,  
 The only gas storage facility in Bulgaria and  
 The only import pipeline bringing gas into Bulgaria, which was fully booked by BEH.  
 
Without access to this essential infrastructure, it was impossible for potential competitors to 
enter the Bulgarian wholesale gas market, and they were therefore prevented from competing 
with BEH, which was ensured of a monopoly in gas supply in Bulgaria. The Commission 
concluded that this behaviour by the BEH group infringed Article 102 (TFEU), which 
prohibits the abuse of a dominant market position.  
To address concerns that Transgaz,193 the gas network operator in Romania, might be 
hindering the free flows of gas from Romania, on 21 September 2018 the Commission 
launched a market test on draft commitments submitted by Transgaz. The commitments are 
intended to enable natural gas exports from Romania to other Member States, in particular 
Hungary and Bulgaria. The Commission was concerned that Transgaz may have restricted 
exports from Romania and breached EU competition rules that prohibit the abuse of a 
dominant market position. To address the Commission's concerns, Transgaz offered 
commitments that would allow commercially meaningful export capacities from Romania to 
be made available for the first time. The Commission has received the replies to the market 
test and is currently considering them.  
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See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-3921_en.htm. 
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See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-6846_en.htm.  
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 Case AT.40335 - Romanian gas interconnectors. See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-
5861_en.htm. 
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Finally, concerning mergers in the gas sector, following the abandonment of the proposed 
acquisition of the Greek gas transmission system operator DESFA by the State Oil Company 
of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR)
194
 by the Parties to that transaction, the Greek authorities 
issued a new tender which included an unbundling requirement, thus addressing the concerns 
raised by the Commission when opening the in depth investigation in SOCAR/DESFA. The 
tender was won by Italian company SNAM and the Commission reviewed and approved the 
acquisition of DESFA by SNAM. 
 2. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AND MEDIA  
Overview of key challenges in the sector 
In 2018, competition policy and enforcement continued to contribute to the implementation of 
the Digital Single Market Strategy,
195
 one of the priorities of the Commission, by means of a 
number of investigations in the information, communication and media sectors. 
Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges  
Addressing restrictions to cross-border and online sale of goods and digital products 
As announced in the Final Report of the e-commerce sector inquiry adopted in May 2017,
196
 
the Commission is targeting enforcement of the EU competition rules at the most widespread 
business practices that have emerged or evolved as a result of the growth of e-commerce and 
that may negatively impact competition and cross-border trade and hence the functioning of a 
Digital Single Market. 
 
On 24 July 2018, the Commission fined, in four separate decisions, consumer electronics 
manufacturers Asus, Denon & Marantz, Philips and Pioneer
197
 for imposing fixed or 
minimum resale prices ("resale price maintenance”) on their online retailers for widely used 
consumer electronics products such as kitchen appliances, notebooks and hi-fi products.  
 
The four manufacturers intervened particularly with online retailers, who offered their 
products at low prices. If those retailers did not follow the prices requested by manufacturers, 
they faced threats or sanctions such as blocking of supplies. Many, including the biggest 
online retailers, use pricing algorithms which automatically adapt retail prices to those of 
competitors. In this way, the pricing restrictions imposed on low pricing online retailers 
typically had a broader impact on overall online prices for the respective consumer electronics 
products. Moreover, the use of sophisticated monitoring tools allowed the manufacturers to 
effectively track resale price setting in the distribution network and to intervene swiftly in 
case of price decreases. The price interventions limited effective price competition between 
retailers and led to higher prices with an immediate effect on consumers. In addition, Pioneer 
limited the ability of its retailers to sell cross-border to consumers in other Member States in 
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  Case M.7095 – Soca /Desfa (notification withdrawn). See: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m8953_141_3.pdf. 
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  Communication of 6 May 2015 from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Digital Single Market Strategy for 
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  Cases AT.40465 - Asus, AT.40469 - Denon & Marantz, AT.40181 - Philips and AT.40182 - Pioneer. See: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4601_en.htm. 
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order to maintain different resale prices in different Member States, for example by blocking 
orders of retailers who sold cross-border. 
 
All four companies cooperated with the Commission by providing evidence with significant 
added value and by expressly acknowledging the facts and the infringements of EU 
competition rules. The fines totalling over EUR 111 million were in all four cases reduced 
due to the companies' cooperation with the Commission. 
 
On 17 December 2018, the Commission imposed a fine of EUR 40 million on Guess,198 a 
US-based clothing manufacturer and retailer. The Commission found that Guess' distribution 
agreements restricted authorised retailers from (i) using the Guess brand names and 
trademarks for the purposes of online search advertising; and (ii) selling online without a prior 
specific authorisation by Guess. The company had full discretion for this authorisation, which 
was not based on any specified quality criteria. Moreover, the distribution agreements 
restricted authorised retailers from (iii) selling to consumers located outside the authorised 
retailers’ allocated territories;  (iv) cross-selling among authorised wholesalers and retailers; 
and (v) independently deciding on the retail price at which they sell Guess products. Selective 
distribution systems must comply with the EU competition rules. In particular, consumers 
must be free to purchase from any retailer authorised by a manufacturer, including across 
national borders. At the same time, authorised retailers must be free to offer the products 
covered by the distribution contract online, to advertise and sell them across borders, and to 
set their resale prices. 
The Commission granted Guess a 50% fine reduction in return for its cooperation. Guess 
cooperated with the Commission beyond its legal obligation to do so, in particular by 
revealing an infringement of EU competition rules not yet known to the Commission (the 
prohibition to use Guess brand names and trademarks for the purposes of online search 
advertising). The company also provided evidence with significant added value and 
acknowledged the facts and the infringements of the EU competition rules. 
The Commission continued its investigation into Valve Corporation, owner of the Steam 
game distribution platform, and five PC video game publishers, Bandai Namco, Capcom, 
Focus Home, Koch Media and ZeniMax
199
 concerning potentially illegal bilateral agreements. 
The investigation focuses on whether the agreements in question require or have required the 
use of technology to (so-called activation keys) for the purpose of geo-blocking. In particular, 
an activation key can be devised to limit access to a purchased game only to consumers in a 
particular EU Member State. This practice may breach of EU competition rules by reducing 
parallel trade within the Single Market and preventing consumers from buying cheaper games 
available in other Member States. 
In 2018, the Commission continued three separate antitrust investigations against Nike, 
Sanrio and Universal Studios
200
 regarding potential barriers to online and offline cross-border 
trade, stemming from licensing practices implemented by the companies concerned. Nike, 
Sanrio and Universal Studios license the rights for some of the world's most well-known 
brands. Sports apparel manufacturer Nike is responsible for licensing of rights for, in 
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 Cases AT.40413 - Focus Home, AT.40414 - Koch Media, AT.40420 - ZeniMax, AT.40422 - Bandai Namco 
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and Case AT.40436 - Licensed merchandise – Nike. See: IP/17/1646 of 14 June 2017. See: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1646_en.htm. 
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particular, Fútbol Club Barcelona's merchandise. Sanrio is a licensor of rights for, in 
particular, Hello Kitty. Universal Studios is a licensor of rights for, in particular, the Minions 
and Despicable Me. The merchandising products concerned by the investigations are of a 
varied nature (mugs, bags, clothing, shoes, toys, etc.), but all carry one or more logos or 
images from a licensor. The three investigations aim to ascertain whether certain licensing 
and distribution practices of these companies illegally restrict traders from selling licensed 
merchandise cross-border and online within the EEA. 
The pay-TV investigation, opened in 2014, continued in 2018. The investigation relates to 
certain contractual clauses in the licensing agreements concluded between Sky UK and six 
major film studios (Disney, Fox, Paramount, NBCUniversal, Sony and Warner Bros). In a 
statement of objections, addressed to Sky and the six Hollywood film studios in 2015, the 
Commission took the preliminary view that such clauses restricted Sky UK's (and in some 
cases other broadcasters') ability to accept unsolicited requests from consumers located 
outside the UK and Ireland and, therefore, violate EU antitrust rules.  
In 2016, Paramount offered commitments, which the Commission accepted and made legally 
binding in the same year. The commitments provide that throughout the EEA Paramount shall 
remove the contractual restrictions from existing pay-TV licensing agreements and not 
(re)introduce them for a period of at least five years. Canal+, a French pay-TV broadcaster, 
brought an appeal against this decision. In December 2018, the General Court
201
 dismissed 
the appeal and held, among other things, that the Commission acted within the limits of 
Article 9 Regulation 1/2003 and that, in particular, the Commission’s decision respected the 
principle of proportionality. Furthermore, the General Court held that the passive sales 
restrictions in Paramount’s licensing agreements at issue represented restrictions by object. 
According to the judgment, the removal of these restrictions is consistent with the essential 
objective of the Treaty to establish a market without internal borders. 
In November and December 2018, Sky UK and four US film studios, namely Disney, NBC 
Universal, Sony, and Warner Bros., also offered commitments to address the Commission’s 
concerns. Like in the Paramount commitments, the five companies offered to remove 
throughout the EEA the contractual restrictions from existing pay-TV licensing agreements 
and not to (re)introduce them for a period of five years. The proposed commitments cover all 
future and current subsidiaries of the companies concerned.
202
 To verify the appropriateness 
of the proposed commitments, the Commission consulted market participants in November 
and December 2018.
203
 In the light of the results of the market test, the Commission 
considered that the commitments addressed its concerns in a satisfactory way.
204
 
Antitrust enforcement in technology markets 
The Commission's actions in technology markets aim to keep markets competitive, and 
maximise incentives to innovate.  
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 Notably, Disney's commitments cover its future subsidiary Fox. The Commission approved Disney's 
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On 24 January 2018, the Commission fined Qualcomm
205
 EUR 997 million for abusing its 
market dominance in LTE baseband chipsets. The decision found that Qualcomm prevented 
rivals from competing in the market by making significant payments to a key customer, 
Apple, on condition that it would not buy from rivals. This meant that Qualcomm's rivals 
were denied the possibility to compete effectively for Apple's significant business, no matter 
how good their products were. They were also denied business opportunities with other 
customers that could have followed from securing Apple as a customer. 
The Commission also continued its investigations against Qualcomm for charging prices 
below costs with a view to forcing competitors out of the market ("predatory pricing") and 
issued a Supplementary Statement of Objections.
206
  
On 18 July 2108, the Commission fined Google EUR 4.34 billion for breaching EU antitrust 
rules.
207
 The Commission found that Google had imposed illegal restrictions on Android 
device manufacturers and mobile network operators to cement its dominant position in 
general internet search. 
The Google Android case 
In its decision the Commission concluded that Google is dominant in: 
◦ the national markets for general internet search services throughout the EEA. The Commission based its 
finding on the fact that Google has shares of more than 90% in most EEA Member States and there are high 
barriers to enter these markets; 
◦ the worldwide market (excluding China) for licensable smart mobile operating systems. The Commission 
based its finding on the fact that Google has a market share of more than 95%, there are high barriers to entry  
and that significant resources are required to develop a successful licensable smart mobile operating system. 
Android is different from operating systems exclusively used by vertically integrated developers (like Apple 
iOS) which are not part of the same market because they are not available for licence by third party device 
manufacturers; and 
◦ the worldwide market (excluding China) for app stores for the Android mobile operating system. The 
Commission based its finding on the fact that Google's app store, the Play Store, accounts for more than 90% of 
apps downloaded on Android devices and that this market is characterised by high barriers to entry. Google's app 
store dominance is not constrained by Apple's App Store, which is only available on iOS devices. 
The Commission found that Google abused its market dominance by engaging in three separate types of 
practices, which all had the aim of cementing Google's dominant position in general internet search: 
◦ Illegal tying of the Google Search app and Google Chrome browser: Google offered its mobile apps and 
services to device manufacturers as a bundle, which included the Google Play Store, the Google Search app and 
the Google Chrome browser. In this way, Google ensured that its Google Search app and its mobile browser 
were pre-installed on practically all Android devices sold in the EEA. The Decision outlined a range of evidence 
that for search and browser, pre-installation constitutes a significant commercial advantage that cannot be offset 
through other means. 
◦ Illegal payments conditional on exclusive pre-installation of Google Search: Google granted significant 
financial incentives to some of the largest device manufacturers as well as mobile network operators on 
condition that they exclusively pre-installed Google Search across their entire portfolio of Android devices. The 
Decision outlined a range of evidence on how this significantly reduced the commercial possibilities for the pre-
installation or rival search providers.  
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◦ Illegal obstruction of development and distribution of competing Android operating systems: Google prevented 
device manufacturers from using any alternative version of Android that was not approved by Google (Android 
forks). To pre-install Google's proprietary apps on their devices, manufacturers had to have prior agreement from 
Google to run a device on an Android fork. This significantly reduced the commercial opportunity for devices 
running on Android forks to be developed and sold. 
Google's practices denied rival general internet search services the possibility to compete on the merits. The 
tying practices ensured the pre-installation of Google's search service and browser on practically all Google 
Android devices and the exclusivity payments strongly reduced the incentive to pre-install competing search 
engines. Google also obstructed the development of Android forks, which could have provided a platform for 
rival search engines to gain traffic.  
The Decision requires Google to bring its illegal conduct to an end in an effective manner within 90 days of the 
decision. At a minimum, Google has to stop and to not re-engage in any of the three types of practices. The 
Decision also requires Google to refrain from any measure that has the same or an equivalent object or effect as 
these practices. It is Google's sole responsibility to ensure compliance. The Commission is monitoring Google's 
compliance closely to make sure that the remedy is effective and does indeed comply with the Decision. 
Ensuring a pro-competitive telecoms framework  
One of the key actions under the second pillar of the Digital Single Market strategy is the 
review of the telecoms regulatory framework. On 14 September 2016 the Commission 
adopted three legislative proposals: a proposal for a Directive establishing the European 
Electronic Communications Code,
208
 which recasts the existing directives, a proposal for a 
Regulation establishing the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications 
(BEREC),
209
 which enhances the role of BEREC and of national regulatory authorities and a 
proposal for a Regulation on the promotion of Internet connectivity in local communities and 
public spaces (WiFi4EU).
210
 They were accompanied by two Communications: Connectivity 
for a European Gigabit society: Laying the foundations for a competitive Digital Single 
Market,
211
 which establishes a set of connectivity objectives for 2025, and 5G for Europe: An 
Action Plan,
212
 which sets out targeted actions with the aim of fostering 5G deployment in 
Europe.  
Political agreement on the proposals for the Electronic Communications Code and the 
Regulation establishing BEREC was reached in June 2018. The legal acts were adopted on 11 
December 2018.
213
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The agreed text of the Electronic Communications Code introduces a new objective of 
connectivity (that is to say investment) of very high capacity networks as an additional policy 
objective, alongside the other objectives of the framework, namely safeguarding competition, 
internal market and consumer protection. Indeed, stimulating competition not only drives 
investments but also results in lower prices, better quality and more choice. At the same time, 
investment is not an end in itself, as investment as such does not directly benefit consumers. It 
is the impact of investment on parameters of competition such as lower prices, better quality 
of service or greater adoption that translates into consumer benefits. 
Operators with Significant Market Power will continue to be obliged to provide access to their 
networks to other operators, where this is necessary for effective retail competition. De-
regulation is possible when competition is effective in a given telecoms market. The proposal 
also contains new elements which aim at stimulating investments, while safeguarding 
effective competition. For example access to civil infrastructure is incentivised and a 
framework rewarding co-investment in very high capacity networks is set up, encouraging 
fibre deployments from both incumbents and access seekers.    
Communication services provided by “over-the-top providers” (OTTs) such as Skype and 
WhatsApp  would fall within the proposed scope of the new Electronic Communications 
Code under the new heading of interpersonal communications service. OTTs are typically 
present at different levels of the value chain, as telcos own network infrastructure and OTTs 
do not. Regarding spectrum, the agreed draft Electronic Communications Code contains 
measures to enhance investment certainty (the co-legislators agreed on a minimum licence 
duration of at least 20 years, timely availability of spectrum in the market and enhanced co-
ordination of spectrum authorisation between regulators) and promote competition (such as a 
possibility to apply spectrum caps, spectrum reservation for new entrants or wholesale access 
obligations). The agreed text also maintains the role of national regulators and of BEREC, to 
ensure the consistent and predictable application of the telecoms rules. 
The Commission also adopted new Guidelines on Significant Market Power
214
 as part of the 
telecoms framework. They replace the previous ones adopted in 2002 on the basis of Article 
15(2) of the Framework Directive to provide guidance to national regulatory authorities for 
the analysis of markets and effective competition under the regulatory framework.
215
 After 15 
years, there was a need to review the SMP Guidelines to bring more clarity, in particular, on 
the criteria for the finding of joint dominance, in accordance with the European Courts' 
jurisprudence.  
Antitrust enforcement in the telecommunications sector 
In 2018 the Commission continued its investigation into a mobile network sharing agreement 
between the two largest operators in the Czech Republic, O2 CZ /CETIN and T-Mobile CZ.
216
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3539_en.htm. 
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The Commission investigates in particular whether the cooperation between O2 CZ/CETIN 
and T-Mobile CZ risks slowing down quality improvements in existing infrastructure, and 
delaying or hindering the deployment of new technologies, such as 4G/LTE and new services 
based on them, in particular in densely populated areas.  
Merger review in ICT and media  
In the telecommunications sector, the Commission reapproved in May, following a new 
investigation, the acquisition of Ziggo by Liberty Global, subject to conditions.
217
 Before the 
transaction, Ziggo and Liberty Global were separate cable TV operators providing mainly 
fixed telecommunications services, operating in different parts of the Netherlands. The 
Commission first approved this merger in 2014, subject to conditions, but the General Court 
annulled the approval in October 2017 on the ground that the Commission did not fully 
explain why the merger would not lead to vertical anti-competitive effects on the potential 
market for premium pay TV sports channels. The Commission reassessed the merger and its 
investigation confirmed the concern it had in 2014 that the merger would have increased 
Liberty Global's negotiating power vis-à-vis TV channel broadcasters, hindering innovation in 
the delivery of audio-visual content over the internet (the so-called over-the-top or "OTT" 
services). The renewed approval is again conditional upon the implementation of a 
commitments package. The reassessment also confirmed that there are no concerns for 
premium pay TV sports channels and this is fully motivated in the decision. 
Furthermore, the Commission unconditionally approved two mergers between a fixed and a 
mobile telecommunications services operator in Austria (T-Mobile Austria / UPC Austria)
218
 
and Sweden (Tele2 / Com Hem Holding).
219
 The impact of these transactions on the fixed and 
mobile telecommunications markets in Austria and Sweden was very limited. In particular, 
while both T-Mobile and UPC are active in Austria in the provision of internet access services 
for residential customers, UPC's fixed internet access products differ considerably from T-
Mobile's mobile broadband products. Similarly, although both Tele2 and Com Hem are active 
in Sweden in the provision of retail mobile telecommunications services, retail fixed internet 
access services and multiple play services, Com Hem has a marginal role in the provision of 
mobile services and Tele2's fixed telecommunication activities are limited. The Commission 
also found that each of the merged entities would continue to face significant competition 
from other players in Austria (such as A1 Telekom Austria and Hutchison Drei Austria) and 
Sweden (such as Telia, Telenor and Tre). Additionally, both in Austria and Sweden, the 
merged entities would not be able to use their market power to shut out or marginalise its 
fixed or mobile competitors by bundling fixed and mobile products. 
After an in-depth investigation,
220
 the Commission authorised on 27 November 2018 the 
merger between mobile network operators T-Mobile NL and Tele2 NL in the Netherlands.
221 
On 11 December 2018, the European Commission opened an in-depth investigation to assess 
Vodafone's proposed acquisition of Liberty Global's business in Czechia, Germany, Hungary 
and Romania under the EU Merger Regulation. The Commission is concerned the takeover 
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may reduce competition in Germany and Czechia.
222
  
In the IT sector, the Commission cleared in September 2018 Apple's acquisition of Shazam.
223
 
The merging firms offer mainly complementary services, with Apple operating "Apple 
Music", the second largest music streaming service in Europe and Shazam offering a leading 
music recognition application. The Commission had opened an in-depth investigation in April 
based on the concern that Apple would obtain access to commercially sensitive data about 
customers of Apple Music's competitors and to investigate whether those competitors would 
be harmed if Apple were to discontinue referrals from the Shazam app to them. The 
investigation showed that the merged entity would not be able to shut out competing 
providers of digital music streaming services. Access to Shazam's data would not materially 
increase Apple's ability to target music enthusiasts and any conduct aimed at making 
customers switch would only have a negligible impact. In addition, Shazam's application has 
a limited importance as an entry point to the music streaming services of Apple Music's 
competitors. Moreover, the integration of Shazam's and Apple's datasets on user data would 
not confer a unique advantage to the merged entity in the markets on which it operates 
because Shazam's data is not unique and Apple's competitors would still have the opportunity 
to access and use similar databases. While the transaction did not meet the turnover thresholds 
of the EU Merger Regulation, the Commission assessed the transaction after acceptance of a 
referral request from Austria, France, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Spain and Sweden.  
On 11 December 2018 the Commission approved, subject to conditions, the proposed 
acquisition of Gemalto by Thales,
224
 which combines the two largest suppliers of general 
purpose hardware security modules (GP HSM) used for enterprise key management solutions, 
both in the European Economic Area (EEA) and at global level. HSM is a dedicated hardware 
appliance running on encryption software to generate, protect, and manage encryption keys 
used to protect data in a secure tamper-resistant module. In July, the Commission had opened 
an in-depth investigation based on concerns that the merger could lead to higher prices and 
reduce choice and innovation for customers of hardware security modules. The Commission 
found that the proposed merger would lead to very high combined market shares in the GP 
HSM market and would eliminate the competitive constraints that Thales and Gemalto 
exercised on each other. The Commission also found that cloud service providers offering 
cloud-based HSMs did not provide a strong competitive constraint and were not expected to 
do so in the near future.  The approval is conditional on the divestment of Thales' GP HSM 
business. 
In October, the Commission unconditionally approved the acquisition by Microsoft of 
GitHub
225 a company active in the supply of tools used for developing and releasing software 
("DevOps tools"). Both Microsoft and GitHub provide access to platforms for software 
development and both provide code editors (computer programs designed specifically for 
editing source code) and integrated development environments (applications consisting of a 
code editor, as well as additional features such as intelligent code completion). The 
Commission found that the merged entity would continue to face significant competition from 
other players on both markets. The Commission also assessed whether there would be a risk 
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of weakened competition, if Microsoft were to leverage the popularity of GitHub's software 
development platform to boost its own sales of DevOps tools and cloud services, but found 
that Microsoft would not have the incentive to undermine the open nature of GitHub to the 
detriment of competing DevOps tools and cloud services as this would reduce the value of 
GitHub for developers, who are willing and able to switch to other platforms. 
In the media sector, in February 2018 the Commission conditionally approved Discovery's 
acquisition of Scripps,
226
 both providers of basic pay-tv channels to TV distributors. Scripps 
is particularly active in the UK, where it operates UKTV jointly with the BBC, and in Poland, 
via TVN. The companies' activities gave rise to only a limited overlap in the UK. However, 
there was a risk that Discovery's bargaining power vis-à-vis TV distributors in Poland would 
increase, because it would acquire channels that are particularly important in distributors' 
basic pay-tv channel packages, in particular TVN24, TVN's flagship news channel. Discovery 
would therefore have been able to impose the licensing of its whole TV channel portfolio and 
to increase its licensing fees to the detriment of Polish consumers and competition. To address 
these concerns, Discovery committed to making TVN24 available to TV distributors in 
Poland for a reasonable fee determined by reference to comparable agreements for a period of 
seven years. In parallel, the Commission rejected a request to refer the merger to the Polish 
competition authority, as the Commission was better placed to deal with this case and any 
competition concerns were fully addressed by the commitments. 
In October, the Commission unconditionally cleared the proposed acquisition by Sony of sole 
control and ownership over EMI Music Publishing (EMI MP).
227
 Sony already had joint 
control (together with Mubadala) of EMI MP since 2012 and therefore the transaction would 
not lead to any increase in market share in any of the markets where Sony and EMI MP are 
active. The Commission examined whether Mubadala had acted as a constraint on Sony's 
ability to leverage across both recording music and music publishing rights and, in particular, 
into the potential impact of the removal of this constraint. Because Sony/ATV already 
administers EMI MP's catalogue, the transaction does not change the competitive position of 
EMI MP. Moreover, the transaction would not materially increase Sony's bargaining power 
vis-à-vis online music platforms. 
In November 2018, the Commission approved, subject to conditions, the acquisition by 
Disney of the film and television studios and cable and international television businesses of 
Fox.
228
 These companies constituted two of the six major Hollywood film studios and were 
also providers of TV channels. In relation to production and distribution of films for release in 
movie theatres and distribution of content for home entertainment and licensing of films and 
other TV content, the Commission found that the merged entity would continue to face 
significant competition from other players, such as Universal, Warner Bros and Sony. 
However, the Commission found that the proposed transaction would raise competition issues 
in the market for the wholesale supply of "factual channels" (which broadcast documentaries, 
drama and scientific-themed entertainment programmes), such as National Geographic, 
because the transaction would have eliminated competition between two strong suppliers of 
such channels. Disney committed to divest its interest in the channels History, H2 and Crime 
& Investigation it controls in the EEA thereby fully removing the overlap between Disney's 
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and Fox's activities in the wholesale supply of factual channels in the EEA. 
In a separate decision of June 2018, the Commission had already cleared Comcast's proposed 
acquisition of Sky.
229
 Comcast and Sky competed with each other only to a limited extent in 
Austria, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the UK and Spain. The Commission found that pay-tv 
distributors will continue to have access to content from Comcast's competitors and multiple 
alternative channels with comparable programming and audiences in the relevant Member 
States. It is also unlikely that Sky would have the incentive to cease purchasing content from 
Comcast's competitors as it would reduce the quality of Sky's product offering. The 
Commission also rejected concerns that Sky could prevent competing channels from 
accessing its platform. 
State aid enforcement in ICT and media 
Broadband deployment 
The achievement of the European broadband targets,230 despite substantial progress, 
represents a significant challenge, in particular for the deployment of ultrafast networks.231 
Reaching the Digital Single Market connectivity objectives for 2020 and 2025 is estimated to 
require an overall investment of around EUR 500 billion over the coming decade, 
representing an additional EUR 155 billion over and above a simple continuation of the trend 
of current network investment and modernisation efforts of the connectivity providers.232  
Most of the financing for the upgrade and deployment of next-generation networks in the 
broadband sector comes from private companies. These tend to invest mostly in urban, highly 
populated areas which can assure rapid return on investment. As a result, in certain 
underserved, mostly rural areas public funds support the deployment of broadband networks, 
within the broader objectives of inclusion and economic development. State aid control seeks 
to ensure that such investments do not crowd out (planned) private investments and that 
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As indicated in the Communication, the Commission will reflect the foreseeable evolution of long-term 
demand when applying the "step change" approach of the Broadband State Aid Guidelines in conjunction 
with the strategic objectives set in this Communication, and will consider favourably efficient blended 
financing that contributes to lower the aid intensity and to reduce risks of distorting competition, as part of its 
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market/en/news/europes-digital-progress-report-2017 Next Generation Access (NGA) networks coverage 
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 Based on the study by Analysys Mason "Costing the new potential connectivity needs" (SMART 
2015/0068). See: https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/e81ae17f-9d27-4b68-
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 61 
downstream compatition remains possible over the subsidised network. 
Pro-competitive principles for public funding to support the deployment of broadband networks 
Where Member States provide funding or have discretion in the spending of European funds, a number of pro-
competitive principles apply, based on the State aid rules: 
i) Public support must be based on an identified need of investment, resulting from an appropriate mapping of 
infrastructure and market consultation, to avoid a crowding out of private initiatives (definition of the market 
failure). 
ii) Different technologies should be allowed to bid for the objective connectivity targets set (technological 
neutrality principle).  
iii) A competitive selection process has to take place to ensure the best offer for the best price.  
iv) To avoid a 'subsidy to monopoly', publicly funded projects have to be open to all users at fair, reasonable and 
appropriate conditions.  
These principles are also embedded in the General Block Exemption Regulation
233
 (GBER) which is intended 
particularly for fully underserved areas ('white' areas) and allows Member States to deploy broadband networks 
without State aid notification. In assessing measures which do require notification, Member States and selected 
operators must fulfil a number of conditions as specified in the Broadband State Aid Guidelines.
234
 
All Member States have adopted and/or updated their national and/or regional broadband 
strategies.
235 As proposed in the Commission Communication of 14 September 2016,236 
Member States have initiated a process to adapt their National Boadband Strategies to the new 
2025 connectivity strategic objectives proposed by the Commission. Extensive national and 
regional broadband schemes have been approved by the Commission during 2018, in 
particular for Lithuania,
237
 the Netherlands
238
 and Austria.
239
 Some Member States completed 
or modified former broadband schemes with additional investment in the roll-out of Next 
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Generation Access networks, in particular in Germany
240
 and the UK.
241
  
State aid for gigabit infrastructure – the Bavarian gigabit pilot project242 
Building on the EU's existing 2020 broadband targets, the Commission identified in its Gigabit Communication 
of 2016 the connectivity needs to build a European Gigabit society, where very high capacity networks enable 
the widespread use and development of products, services and applications in the Digital Single Market. 
In this context, in 2018, the European Commission approved under EU State aid rules a Bavarian project to 
deploy very high capacity networks in six municipalities. This was the first time the Commission looked at a 
support measure as envisaged in the objectives of the Gigabit Communication. The aid aims to bring very fast 
broadband access to customers in areas where the market has not provided them, in line with the EU broadband 
connectivity goals. The project represented a first step towards a future larger roll-out of such infrastructure in 
Germany. 
The new network will be capable of offering speeds of 200 megabits per second (Mbps) for households and 1 
gigabit per second (Gbps) for companies and public institutions. These transmission speeds are far above those 
that users have had so far in the target areas. The new networks will therefore bring about a significant 
improvement in line with the strategic objectives of the Gigabit Communication. 
In the period 2009-2018, the Commission approved State aid for broadband amounting to 
EUR 39 billion. The Member states effectively spent 30% of this amount, often with a co-
financing from European funds
243
 amounting to roughly EUR 3 billion. In the same period, 
Member States adopted 126 broadband State aid measures benefitting from the GBER. 
Media, culture and broadcasting 
In the media and broadcasting markets, State aid support measures may also be justified to 
overcome market failures and fulfil public service missions. In this area, the Commission 
relies on the guidance of the Cinema Communication
244
 and the Broadcasting 
Communication
245
 to ensure that support is well-designed to meet the underlying objectives of 
common interest while limiting negative effects on competition. 
In 2018, the Commission adopted nine decisions concerning media and cultural activities. The 
Commission notably approved an aid scheme designed by Sweden
246
 to support its media 
sector and aid schemes for Belgium,
247
 France
248
 and Germany
249
 to stimulate the 
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  Communication from the Commission on the application of State aid rules to public service broadcasting, OJ 
C 257 of 27.10.2009, p.1 to 14. See: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52009XC1027(01)&from=EN.  
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State aid case SA.49405 – Sweden - Media Aid, Commission decision of 22 October 2018. See: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_49405.  
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  State aid case SA.49947 – Belgium - Funds for videogames – Flanders, Commission decision of 28 May 
2018. See: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result&policy_area_id=3. 
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development and the promotion of educational and culturally valuable video games which 
would not have subsisted under normal market conditions. Video games have become a 
vibrant and successful commercial product. In this sector, the presence of market failure has 
to be assessed carefully, because the potential to distort competition in a well-functioning 
market is higher. As aid for video games is approved as cultural aid, the Commission 
undertakes a more particular assessment of the cultural characteristics of the games than for 
feature films.  
Since the inclusion of projects promoting culture and heritage conservation in the GBER in 
2014, Member States have taken the opportunity offered by the Exemption Regulation. In 
2018, 466 schemes were covered by Article 53 GBER related to aid for culture and heritage 
conservation and 77 schemes by Article 54 GBER related to aid schemes for audio-visual 
works
.250 
Spectrum migration of broadcasters  
In 2018 the Commission approved, under the EU State aid rules, German plans to compensate 
the direct costs incurred by operators of terrestrial television services to migrate from the 694-
790 MHz frequency band (the "700 MHz band") to lower frequencies. This migration follows 
a 2017 Decision
251
 by the European Parliament and the Council that imposed the availability 
of the 700 MHz band for the deployment of wireless broadband services by June 2020, 
therefore compelling the current users - among them the terrestrial television service 
providers - to liberate the frequency band. However, the Decision provides that Member 
States should ensure the availability of the sub-700 MHz band for terrestrial television 
services until 2030. It also allows for the possibility to compensate certain direct costs 
incurred by terrestrial television operators for the spectrum migration. The Commission 
assessed the aid measure and found that the aid is limited to the costs that are strictly 
necessary for the migration, and has no significant impact on trade and competition. 
Furthermore, the measure will contribute to the EU's objective of introducing 5G mobile 
services, while keeping terrestrial television services available for consumers.  
 3. FINANCIAL SERVICES 
Overview of key challenges in the sector 
The financial services sector has continued to stabilise. Generally, EU banks have reduced 
their legacy assets and are equipped with higher capital buffers. Banks have also limited their 
exposures to market risks, primarily by reducing their bond and derivative portfolios. As a 
consequence, they are more resilient in case of adverse conditions. The minimum requirement 
for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) as currently set with binding targets by the 
competent resolution authorities for the banks within their remit, will add to that resilience.  
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State aid case SA.50512 – France - Fonds d'aide aux jeux video, Commission decision of 21 August 2018. 
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  State Aid case A.51820 – Germany - Video games support – North Rhine Westphalia, Commission decision 
of 10 December 2018.See: 
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  There might be some overlap between the figures as schemes could be informed both under article 53 and 
article 54 (and potentially other articles of the GBER as well).  
251  
Decision (EU) 2017/899 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 on the use of the 
470-790 MHz frequency band in the Union. See: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32017D0899. 
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However, challenges remain. The level of non-performing loans is still too high for certain 
banks in some Member States.  There is still pressure on the banks' profitability due to the 
low-interest environment and tight interest margins. Also the insurance sector, in particular 
the life insurance sector, is affected by these conditions.  
The current legislative framework of the Banking Union, notably the Bank Recovery and 
Resolution Directive (BRRD),
252
 has been fully in force for two years. Although State support 
for banks and, consequently, the number of State aid cases have been reduced, there are still 
some legacy situations where support from the public budget for banks to exit the market or 
as a temporary buffer is necessary.  
Moreover, there is growing pressure from new types of financial institutions, as well as from 
so-called FinTech companies, re-shaping the interaction with customers in areas such as 
payments, lending and brokerage platforms. The financial sector is currently undergoing 
restructuring efforts with a higher focus on digital services. 
EU competition policy with its three enforcement instruments – antitrust, merger and state aid 
control - plays an important role in ensuring that competition takes place on fair and equal 
terms throughout the sector. The enforcement of the competition rules remains key to ensure 
fair competition that benefits consumers.  
This applies, for instance, to the area of payments, where the Commission closely monitors  
the ongoing technological change and the emergence of new financial service providers. The 
Commission intervenes, as in other areas, when it detects anti-competitive behaviour. 
Similarly, the Commission has continued to use its merger control instrument to ensure that 
mergers or joint ventures do not significantly impede effective competion. Finally, State aid 
control tackles cases of public support for financial service companies with a view to limit 
distortions of competition and to ensure, for instance, that non-viable banks exit the market 
and are not kept alive artificially.  
Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges  
Contribution of EU competition policy to innovation and fairness in payments 
The Commission continues to monitor the implementation of the Interchange Fee 
Regulation
253
 (IFR). The Commission contracted a study which was launched in September 
2018. The purpose of the study is to collect and analyse key qualitative and quantitative 
market information from all Member States on application of the Interchange Fee Regulation. 
The study is intended to inform the European Commission when preparing a Report to the 
European Parliament and to the Council on the application of the IFR. 
On 18 January 2018, the Commission published Regulatory Technical Standards254 (RTS) 
under the Interchange Fee Regulation, which establish the requirements for payment card 
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European Parliament and Council Directive 2014/59/EU of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the 
recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 
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European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) No 2015/751 of 29 April 2015 on interchange fees for 
card-based payment transactions, OJ L 123, 19.5.2015, p.1. See: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32015R0751.  
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  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/72 of 4 October 2017 supplementing Regulation (EU) 
2015/751 of the European Parliament and of the Council on interchange fees for card-based payment 
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schemes and processing entities to ensure independence in terms of accounting, organisation 
and decision making processes. The RTS became applicable from 7 February 2018. The RTS 
relate to the implementation of the IFR requirement on independence of card schemes and 
processing entities.  
On 7 February 2018, the General Court issued a ruling in the American Express case.
255
 
regarding the application of the Interchange Fee Regulation to three-party schemes. The 
General Court clarified that a three-party scheme that issues a payment instrument with a co-
branding partner or agent is considered to be a four-party scheme and thus subject to the 
relevant provions of the IFR irrespective of whether the co-branding partner or agent acts as 
an issuer. In most Member States credit cards are the main means of internet payment. But 
card payments over the internet can be cumbersome, expensive to merchants and insecure 
with high levels of fraud.
256
 Moreover, only 60 % of EU citizens possess such cards. The 
Payment Services Directive
257
 (PSD II) takes account of and regulates third-party providers 
(bank-owned and non-bank owned) which offer alternative means of internet payments (for 
example through credit transfers via the website of the consumer's bank, including the Single 
Euro Payment Area Credit Transfer system) or allow consumers to have a overall view on 
their financial situation and spending patterns across all their bank accounts.  
Implementation of the IFR and PSD II opens the door for more competition and innovation in 
the payments sector, to the benefit of consumers and merchants.  
Antitrust and cartel investigations in the financial services sector 
In 2018, the Commission continued its antitrust investigations in the financial sector, one of 
the Commission's priority areas to achieve a fairer and more integrated internal market. The 
Commission also continued to monitor competition in capital markets, in particular focussing 
on the markets for equity data and equity trading where high fees/prices persist. In the field of 
motor insurance, the Commission continued to investigate  allegations of breaches of Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU in the Irish market. Moreover, the Commission progressed with its 
investigation into Mastercard's cross-border acquiring rules, which allegedly prevent 
merchants located in countries with high interchange fees to seek lower-priced services from 
acquirers established in Member States with lower interchange fees.  
In addition, the Commission continued its antitrust investigations into Mastercard's, Visa 
Inc.'s and Visa International's
258
 multilateral interchange fees (MIFs) for transactions in the 
EEA made with cards issued outside the EEA (inter-regional MIFs). Inter-regional MIFs are 
not capped by the Interchange Fee Regulation. Those fees still represent a significant burden 
to European merchants and increase retail prices for all consumers. The Comission issued a 
Supplementary Statement of Objections to Visa Inc and Visa International on inter-regional 
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Estimated by the European Central Bank (ECB) to represent about two-thirds of total card fraud in the EU 
worth EUR 800 million in 2014. 
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European Parliament and Council Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of 25 November 2015 on payment services in 
the internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) 
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  These proceedings were closed as regards Visa Europe following its commitments, Case AT.39398 - VISA 
MIF, Commission decision of 26 February 2014. See: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39398/39398_9728_3.pdf. 
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MIFs in August 2017
259
 and the oral hearing was held in February 2018.  
In November 2018 Mastercard and Visa offered commitments to address the Commission’s 
competition concerns. Both card-schemes offered to reduce the current level of inter-regional 
MIFs to or below binding caps. Moreover, Mastercard and Visa agreed to publish all inter-
regional MIFs covered by the commitments in a clearly visible manner on their respective 
websites. To verify the appropriateness of the proposed commitments, the Commission 
consulted market participants on 5 December 2018.
260
 
As technology allows new services to emerge, such as electronic and mobile payments, with 
significant potential benefits for consumers and businesses notably in the Digital Single 
Market, the Commission has continued to monitor developments in the new payments 
services and the Commission continued antitrust investigation concerning allegations that 
online access to bank account information by competing non-bank owned service providers 
may be prevented in order to exclude such service providers from the market.
261
 It is 
important to ensure that new and innovative services have a fair chance to develop and that 
incumbents do not exclude new market entrants or attempt to secure substantive parts of 
markets for themselves. 
Merger investigations in the financial sector 
The Commission continued to ensure that concentrations in the financial services sector do 
not lead to consumers paying higher prices or being offered less choice. In 2018, the 
Commission dealt with a number of cases in the sector, in particular involving activities in 
insurance, banking and payments, which did not pose a competitive threat and could be 
approved without requiring remedies.
262
  
State aid investigations in the financial sector 
The general stabilisation of the financial sector has resulted in a reduction of State aid cases. 
Moreover, the Commission could close the monitoring of further ten banks with respect to 
commitment obligations resulting from previous State aid decisions. Despite this overall 
positive development, the EU banking sector still faces some challenges, and also in 2018 
banks asked for public support.  
In 2018, the Commission continued to apply the EU State aid rules for banks, in particular the 
2013 Banking Communication
263
 while ensuring close coordination with the authorities which 
are in charge of banking supervision and relate with the framework of the Banking Union
264
 
As regards ailing banks, the State aid rules distinguish those that can be restructured and 
return to viability from non-viable banks that have to exit the market.  
One of the current main concerns is the still high level of non-performing loans (NPLs) in 
some Member States. High NPL ratios weaken banks that are burdened by legacy losses and 
high provisions and render their attempts to generate sufficient income almost impossible. At 
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the same time, it is often very difficult for the affected banks to raise new capital on the 
market. 
Banks that are troubled by high NPLs ratios have, therefore, asked for aid to support their 
restructuring efforts, for instance, by hiving off NPLs. To limit distortions of competition, the 
Commission could, however, only approve support for a non-viable bank under the condition 
that it will exit the market. In 2018, for example, the Commission approved State aid for the 
sale of Cyprus' second largest bank, the Cyprus Cooperative Bank, and the winding down of 
the residual entity as liquidation aid.265 This allowed for the orderly market exit of the bank 
that had already received State support twice in the past.  
Further progress has also been made regarding guarantee schemes of some Member States. 
For example, the Italian guarantee scheme to facilitate the securitisation of non-performing 
loans (GACS), initially approved in February 2016, was prolonged for a second time on 31 
August 2018.266 Under the scheme, Italian banks, meeting certain conditions, will continue 
to be able to request a State guarantee on the lower-risk senior notes issued by private 
securitisation vehicles which help to finance the purchase of non-performing loan portfolios 
from them. The GACS mechanism is set up such to ensure that State guarantees on the senior 
notes continue to be remunerated at market terms according to the risk taken, that is to say in 
a manner acceptable for a private operator under market conditions. Since its entry into force 
until mid-November 2018, the scheme has been accessed 17 times, removing ca. EUR 51 
billion (gross book value) of non-performing loans from the Italian banking system, which 
corresponds to over 60% of the total reduction of non-performing loans in Italy during that 
period. 
As in previous years, State aid control in 2018 included legacy cases which preceded the entry 
into force of the BRRD. The Commission monitored the Member States' compliance with 
their commitments given in the context of previous decisions. When an additional  assessment 
was required, the Commission adopted an additional decision. This happened in the case of 
the German HSH Nordbank where the Commission in 2016 approved the bank's guarantee 
ceiling - which was re-increased in 2013 back to the level of 2011 – but adopted an additional 
decision assessing Germany's compliance with its commitment to split the bank and either 
privatise the operational subsidiary or, in case of a failed sale, to cease new business and 
divest its assets.
267
 
 4. TAXATION AND STATE AID  
Overview of key challenges on tax evasion and avoidance and fiscal aid 
The focus the Commission has put on fighting tax evasion and tax avoidance echoes the 
priorities set by President Juncker in his Political Guidelines and which are also reflected in 
his Mission Letter to Commissioner Vestager. That is also in line with efforts at the 
international level, namely by the OECD, to tackle tax base erosion and profit shifting to 
better align the right to tax with economic activity.
268
 State aid investigations into Member 
States' tax ruling practices, which began in 2013, before the Luxleaks revelations, are one of 
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 OECD (2013) Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
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the tools the Commission has at its disposal to ensure that companies pay the taxes they owe 
in the Member States where they generate economic value. 
Tax evasion and avoidance can be the result of aggressive tax planning strategies, in so far as 
they shift profits to low or no-tax locations where there is little or no economic activity, 
resulting in little or no overall corporate tax being paid. Aggressive tax planning can be 
pursued by making use of preferential tax schemes, or by requesting individual tax rulings. 
They all have in common that they result in a loss of tax revenue in the Member State where 
economic value is generated but not taxed, and in Europe as a whole because the tax 
eventually paid is less than it would have been if the profits had not been shifted. 
The side effects of aggressive tax planning for the EU are particularly negative: first, it results 
in undue tax reliefs that distort competition by granting advantages only to selected 
companies; second, it involves an issue of social equity as the revenues foregone from 
untaxed multinationals need to be compensated, which normally shifts the burden to the less 
mobile income of SMEs and labour and third, from the perspective of the dislocation of 
activities, aggressive tax planning can present a threat to the sustainable growth of the internal 
market if some Member States were to offer exit points for European profits of multinationals 
in exchange for creating jobs on their territory and a limited tax payment. 
Tax legislation and tax collection are competences of the Member States. However, even in 
this area where the Member States enjoy fiscal autonomy, any national tax measures adopted 
have to comply with internal market rules and, amongst others, abide by competition law.
269
 
Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges 
State aid investigations and decisions concerning aggressive tax planning 
Throughout 2014-2018, the Commission has continued to gather information on tax planning 
practices, enquiring into the tax rulings practice and possible fiscal aid schemes of all 
Member States. The enquiry is aimed at clarifying allegations that tax rulings may constitute 
State aid and to allow the Commission to take an informed view of the practices of all 
Member States. Overall the Commission has looked into more than 1 000 rulings. 
Financing companies provide financial services intra-group and their profit is the remuneration 
for their financing activities. This remuneration has to be in line with the arm's length principle. 
This issue has been one of the key areas since the Commission started looking into the tax 
ruling practices of Member States. The Working Paper published as part of this review in June 
2016 indicated concerns that some tax rulings for financing companies endorse very low 
margins and a low taxable base.
270
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In this context, the Commission supported Luxembourg and Cyprus to amend their tax rules in 
order to avoid undue advantages to financing companies. Luxembourg amended its rules on 
financing companies at the end of 2016, by way of an administrative circular.
271
 These rules 
entered into effect as of 1 January 2017. Similarly, with a circular dated 30 June 2017, Cyprus 
introduced changes to their national rules to make them more stringent as regards the tax 
treatment of financing companies. Additional changes were made by Cyprus on 3 September 
2018 on the rules on non-return capital contributions. On 21 December 2018, Luxembourg 
addressed certain issues with regard to Art. 22bis LIR272 and Art. 16 StAnpG.273  
Important cases 
On 20 June 2018, the Commission adopted a decision requiring Luxembourg to recover a 
selective tax advantage granted to Engie
274
 by way of several tax rulings amounting to more 
than EUR 120 million. 
Luxembourg – The Engie decision  
In 2008 and 2010, respectively, Engie implemented two complex intra-group financing structures in 
Luxembourg. These involved triangular financing transactions where two holdings of the Engie group would 
provide financing via intermediary companies to two subsidiaires, Engie LNG Supply and Engie Treasury 
Management, in the form of highly complex convertible loans. 
Subsequent tax rulings issued by the Luxembourg tax administration from 2008 endorsed a tax treatment where 
the same financing transaction was treated as debt at the level of Engie LNG Supply and Engie Treasury 
Management and equity at the level of the holdings. According to the tax rulings, Engie LNG Supply and Engie 
Treasury Management are allowed to deduct annually from their tax base the interest related to the convertible 
loans, which in practice amounted to more than 99% of their profit. That interest is however paid only at 
conversion and in the form of shares to the intermediaries, that would pass on the shares to the holdings. The 
holdings would then cancel the shares to cash the profit made by Engie LNG Supply and Engie Treasury 
Management, which would remain tax-exempt in application of the participation exemption. The result is that 
Engie did not pay any tax on more than 99% of the profit generated by Engie LNG Supply and Engie Treasury 
Management in Luxembourg. 
The Commission concluded that the tax rulings endorsed an inconsistent tax reatment of the same financing 
transaction leading to non-taxation at all levels. This is a more favourable treatment than under the standard 
Luxembourg tax rules, which exempt from taxation income received by a shareholder from its subsidiary, 
provided that income is in general taxed at the level of the subsidiary. Luxembourg did not provide any valid 
justification for this derogation. Therefore, the tax treament granted to Engie constitutes a selective advantage.  
The Commission estimates that this unfair tax advantage amounted to up to EUR 120 million corresponding to 
the profit generated by Engie LNG Supply in the period between 2009 and 2014 and exempted at the level of the 
holding after the partial conversion of the convertible loan in 2014. As regards Engie Treasury Management, its 
profits will have to be taxed in line with standard Luxembourg tax rules, as soon as the loan is converted. 
On 19 September 2018, the Commission decided that the non-taxation of certain McDonald's
275
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profits in Luxembourg did not lead to illegal State aid, as it was in line with national tax laws 
and the Luxembourg-United States Double Taxation Treaty. 
Luxembourg – The McDonald’s decision  
McDonald's Europe Franchising is a subsidiary of McDonald's Corporation, based in the United States. The 
company is tax resident in Luxembourg and has two branches, one in the United States and the other in 
Switzerland. In 2009, McDonald's Europe Franchising acquired a number of McDonald's franchise rights from 
McDonald's Corporation in the United States, which it subsequently allocated internally to the US branch of the 
company. As a result, McDonald's Europe Franchising received royalties from franchisees operating 
McDonald’s fast food outlets in Europe, Ukraine and Russia for the right to use the McDonald's brand.  
McDonald's Europe Franchising also set up a Swiss branch responsible for the licensing of the franchise rights to 
franchisors and through which royalty payments flowed from Luxembourg to the US branch of the company. 
The tax rulings given by the Luxembourg authorities confirmed that McDonald's Europe Franchising was not 
due to pay corporate tax in Luxembourg on the grounds that the profits were to be attributed to the branch in the 
US. This was justified by reference to the Luxembourg-US Double Taxation Treaty, despite the fact that the US 
did not recognise the US branch of McDonald's as a taxable entity. 
Following an in-depth investigation and after having thoroughly considered the Luxembourg authorities' and 
McDonald's arguments in response to the opening decision, in particular as regards the correct application of the 
Luxembourg – US Double Taxation Treaty by the Luxembourg tax authorities, the Commission found that its 
concerns under EU State aid rules raised in the opening decision were unfounded. In particular, the Commission 
concluded that Luxembourg had not misapplied the Luxembourg – US Double Taxation Treaty and that the 
contested tax rulings therefore did not selectively favour McDonald's Europe over other companies that are in a 
similar legal and factual situation.  
In addition, the Commission adopted on 19 December 2018276 a final decision on the 
corporate income tax regime (including the tax ruling practice) in Gibraltar. The Commission 
found that the exemption for interest and royalties (between 2011 and 2013) under the 2010 
Corporate Tax Act was designed to attract multinationals and it effectively reduced the tax 
bill of a limited number of companies belonging to multinational groups. In addition, the 
investigation also confirmed that five rulings granted in 2011 and 2012 by the Gibraltar tax 
authorities to large multinationals involve illegal state aid, as they continued to exempt 
interest and royalties from taxation even after Gibraltar adopted legislative amendments to 
bring these types of income within the scope of taxation. With its decision, the Commission 
confirmed that these measures involve illegal and incompatible aid and ordered recovery of 
the tax foregone. 
In the context of that case, the Commission also supported Gibraltar in taking steps to provide 
clarification and guidance on their tax rules in order to mitigate risks of cross-border tax 
avoidance and prevent that potential discretion exercised by the tax authorities in granting tax 
rulings results to undue State aid. To this end, in October 2018, the Gibraltar authorities 
introduced changes to their Income Tax Act
277
 and adopted Guidance notes on territoriality
278
 
and the tax ruling procedure.
279
 
Fight against discriminatory tax schemes and measures sheltering national companies from 
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competition in the internal market  
Beyond the cases involving tax rulings, the Commission remains vigilant to ensure that Member 
States do not use fiscal tools to unduly favour certain companies/sectors and shelter national 
companies from competition in the internal market. 
With regard to the investigation into fiscal aid to ports, further to the negative decisions 
adopted in January 2016
280
 (Dutch seaports) and July 2017 (Belgian281 and French
282
 ports), 
the Commission initiated in April 2018 the cooperation procedure with regard to the corporate 
tax exemptions benefitting ports in Spain and Italy. The Commission's action is consistent 
with the need to ensure that all companies pay their fair share of taxes and that no sector or 
company of a certain type unduly receives a more favourable corporate tax treatment. Ports 
are essential to the EU economy and the Commission does not prevent Member States from 
providing aid to their ports, for instance when this is necessary to develop port infrastructure. 
However, corporate tax exemptions provide a bigger advantage to those beneficiaries who are 
most profitable. They are neither transparent, nor limited or targeted at financing activities or 
investments which are necessary and justified by objectives of common interest.  
More generally, thoughout 2018, the Commission provided guidance to Member States and 
helped them designing tax measures that comply with State aid rules, for example health 
related taxes
283
 or real estate taxes.
284
 
 5. BASIC INDUSTRIES AND MANUFACTURING 
Overview of key challenges in the sector 
Manufacturing is important to the EU economy as a driver of growth and employment. Close 
to 30 million people, that is, more than 20% of the European workforce is active in the sector. 
Substantial advancements in automatisation and the growing widespread use of robotics in 
many industries in the past decades have led to significant restructuring and job losses across 
Europe. The manufacturing sector faces additional challenges, due to the relocation of jobs to 
countries with lower labour costs and the rise of global supply chains with producers located 
outside the EU. Moreover, high energy prices and low productivity growth as compared to the 
OECD average are hampering the competitiveness of European companies. While new 
technologies and digitisation help to increase efficiencies and reduce costs, these techniques 
are also available to competing economies. 
The EU’s renewed industrial policy strategy285 aims to address these challenges by boosting 
investment in a smart, innovative and sustainable industry. Enforcing the competition rules in 
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  Case SA.25398 Corporate tax exemption of Dutch public enterprises, Commission decision of 21 January 
2016. See: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_25338.   
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  Case SA.38393 Ports taxation in Belgium, Commission decision of 27 July 2017. See: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_38393.  
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  Case SA.38398 Ports taxation in France, Commission decision of 27 July 2017. See: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_38398.  
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  Case SA.45862 NL_BZK_CSDO_LB – the Netherlands. See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-
3521_en.htm. 
284  
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  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the regions and the European Investment Bank of 
13.9.2017 “Investing in a smart, innovative and sustainable Industry”. See: https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:c8b9aac5-9861-11e7-b92d-
01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_1&format=PDF. 
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the manufacturing sector contributes to these objectives, in particular by ensuring that firms 
can compete on fair and equal terms in the internal market. In addition the State aid rules are 
used to steer public funding towards research, training and energy efficiency. Only innovative 
companies with a sustainable business plan can deliver smart goods and services at 
competitive prices for European consumers and businesses. Improving companies’ efficiency 
and long-term competitiveness at home also makes them fit for competing in the global 
market place. 
Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges 
Antitrust investigations in basic industries 
Basic manufacturing and consumer goods industries continue to represent a significant share 
of the Commission's enforcement practice. In 2018, the Commission continued its lines of 
action (including individual case work, market surveillance and advocacy) in these sectors, 
including for example, those in the motor vehicle and consumer goods sectors. The EU's high 
value-added manufacturing industry requires access to basic materials at affordable prices that 
reflect international cost conditions. In 2018, the Commission actively monitored the markets 
for these inputs to ensure that firms have adequate access in a healthy and competitive 
environment.  
Merger investigations in basic industries and manufacturing 
The Commision’s main merger investigations in basic industries concerned notably the steel 
sector, as well as a broad range of other sectors, including the manufacture of machinery and 
components for aircrafts, robotic cleaners for swimming pools, construction material, paper 
and paperborad, as well as pet food. 
Amongst those investigations, most noteworthy is the one into the acquisition of Ilva by 
ArcelorMittal.
286
 The merger combined ArcelorMittal, the largest producer of flat carbon steel 
in Europe and worldwide, with the main assets of Ilva, notably its steel plant in Taranto, Italy, 
which is Europe's largest single-site integrated flat carbon steel plant. Both companies are 
significant producers in Europe of hot rolled, cold rolled and galvanised flat carbon steel. 
ArcelorMittal has a wide production network across the EEA and Ilva has major production 
assets in Italy.  
After an in-depth investigation, where the Commission identified competition concerns, it 
made the clearance decision conditional on the divestiture, proposed by ArcelorMittal, of an 
extensive remedy package to preserve effective competition on European steel markets to the 
benefit of consumers and businesses. 
Steel is a critical input for many EU industries and for products used every day. The 
Commission’s intervention ensured that ArcelorMittal's acquisition of Ilva, creating the by far 
largest steelmaker in Europe, does not result in higher steel prices – at the expense of 
European industries, the people they employ and consumers. ArcelorMittal proposed to sell a 
number of steel plants throughout Europe to one or more buyers, who will run them to 
compete with ArcelorMittal on a lasting basis. This will preserve effective competition on 
European steel markets. It goes hand in hand with decisive EU action to protect the European 
steel industry from unfair trade distortions from third countries. 
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On 13 July 2018, the Commission opened an in-depth investigation of the proposed 
acquisition of Alstom by Siemens, under the EU Merger Regulation.
287
 The mobility division 
of Siemens offers a broad portfolio of trains (rolling stock), rail automation and signalling 
equipment, as well as rail electrification systems. Alstom is active worldwide in the rail 
transport industry, offering a wide range of rolling stock (from high-speed trains to metros 
and trams) as well as signalling and rail electrification systems. On 6 February 2019, the 
Commission prohibited the proposed transaction under the EU Merger Regulation.
288
 The 
proposed transaction would have combined the two largest suppliers of trains and signalling 
solutions in the EEA, not only in terms of size of the combined operations, but also in terms 
of their geographic footprint. The Commission considered that the merger would have 
reduced competition in the supply of several types of trains and signalling systems in the 
EEA. 
State aid investigations in basic industries 
Economic growth is only possible where efficient and innovative companies have room to 
expand. To make this happen, less efficient companies with outdated products have to leave 
the market. Subsidising inefficient companies interferes with this process and may 
significantly slow down economic growth. The State aid rules on industrial restructuring 
ensure that public funding goes to companies that are addressing their problems in order to 
become viable on their own.   
In 2018, the Commission concluded its in-depth investigation into the restructuring of the 
Romanian petrochemical company Oltchim.
289
 The Commission found that Oltchim received 
around EUR 335 million of incompatible aid from Romania since the company’s failed 
privatisation in September 2012. This gave the company an unfair economic advantage over 
competitors, who have to work without such subsidies. Oltchim now needs to pay back the 
money to the Romanian State to make up for the distortion of competition created by the aid. 
At the same time, the Commission made sure that the sale of Oltchim’s assets was carried out 
at market conditions and thus none of the past aid was passed on to the buyers. Indeed, After 
the Commission opened its in-depth investigation in April 2016, Romania amended the terms 
of sale, in particular allowing interested investors to bid for any one of nine asset bundles. 
This increased the likelihood of a successful sale as well as the proceeds from the asset sale 
and dispelled the Commission’s initial doubts.    
In May 2018, the Commission also opened an in-depth investigation into the restructuring of 
CNU
290
, a Romanian company active in the mining of uranium and its processing into nuclear 
fuel. After a rescue loan of around EUR 13 million to keep the company afloat, which the 
Commission temporarily approved in 2016, Romania intends to grant around EUR 95 million 
of restructuring support to CNU. The Commission’s investigation aims to ensure in particular 
that the company addresses the problems that caused its difficulties and becomes viable in the 
long-term without continued State support.  
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Case M.8677 - Siemens /Alstom. See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4527_en.htm. 
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 Case M.8677 – Siemens / Alstom.  Decision of 6 February 2019. Not yet published. See: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-881_en.htm. 
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  Case SA.36086 Potential aid to Oltchim, Commission decision of 17 December 2018, see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_36086; and IP/18/6845, see: 
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Case SA.48394 Restructuring of National Uranium Company (Companiei Nationale a Uraniului CNU), see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_48394; and IP/18/3733, see: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-3733_en.htm. 
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Moreover, in November 2018, the Commission requested Romania to recover around EUR 60 
million of from the State-owned electricity and heat producer CE Hunedoara.291 The 
company was incorporated in November 2012 with assets of other failed and dissolved State-
owned companies and had in turn been in financial difficulties as from 2013. Following 
rescue aid approved in April 2014 and not reimbursed after a six-month period, the 
Commission found that CE Hunedoara’s restructuring plan was not capable of making the 
company viable without continued State support after the restructuring period. CE Hunedoara 
had also received three other State loans that it could not have obtained on the market. 
Moreover, Hunedoara was not sufficiently contributing with market-based revenues or 
finance to the cost of restructuring and no measures to limit the distortions of competition 
caused by the aid were put in place. The Commission therefore concluded that the State aid 
through public loans did not meet the compatibility conditions under the Rescue and 
Restructuring Guidelines.  
 6. AGRI-FOOD INDUSTRY  
Overview of key challenges in the sector 
While most firms in the European food sector benefit from operating in the EU internal  
market, others face challenges operating in this market and in a globalised world. EU farmers, 
food manufacturers and retailers should get more out of their access to the internal market and 
the ensuing possibility ability to buy and sell produce across EU borders. EU competition 
policy contributes to this process. 
Challenges for European farmers operating in the internal market 
Farmers are particularly vulnerable to the challenges raised by globalisation and their 
functioning in a larger internal market for a number of reasons. European farmers are facing 
(i) more competition from other farmers inside as well as outside Europe, (ii) higher demands 
from end consumers in terms of quality, variety and traceability, and (iii) higher investments 
needs linked to initiatives towards a greener and more sustainable agriculture. 
 
The European agricultural sector has certain structural characteristics which make it more 
difficult to cope with these challenges. First, agricultural producers are the least concentrated 
level of the food supply chain in the EU. They are mostly small or grouped into small 
cooperatives and other types of producer organisations. In contrast, their input suppliers and 
customers (processors, wholesalers and retailers) are often much larger and more 
concentrated, giving them more bargaining power in their negotiations with farmers.
292
 
Second, unforeseeable natural elements (such as adverse weather conditions and diseases) can 
significantly alter production, resulting in volatility of production and prices. 
 
European farmers can manage these challenges better by their integration into larger producer 
organisations where these organisations aggregate supply (in terms of both volumes and 
variety of products), offer supporting services and add value through processing. Such 
integration can provide more stability and risk-management, scale to reach more customers, 
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  There are approximately 11 million farms in the European Union which produce agricultural products for 
processing by about 300 000 enterprises in the food and drink industry. The food processors sell their 
products through some 2.8 million enterprises within the food distribution and food service industry, 
delivering food to the EU's 500 million consumers. See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/food-
farming-fisheries/farming/documents/factsheet-food-supply-chain_march2017_en.pdf. 
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flexibility, more value and more bargaining power. 
Opportunities and challenges posed by increased retail concentration in the internal market  
Chains of retailers have developed sophisticated distribution systems and varied store 
formats that supply wide arrays of products to customers. Many such chains have opened 
shops in other Member States than their home market, hereby bringing a different business 
model and more competition to other markets. On the one hand, consumers often value the 
offer of different products, a wider choice and variety coming from other markets, 
especially when this goes along with lower prices. On the other hand, the increasing 
concentration of retailers (through internal growth, mergers/acquisitions and/or the 
formation of buying alliances) continues to worry certain trading partners, especially 
smaller operators. In particular, they question whether large retail chains have obtained too 
much bargaining power (in the bilateral negotiations with their suppliers) and buyer power 
(in the market overall). 
 
Challenges for the optimal functioning of the EU internal market 
There are challenges to the EU internal market itself, restricting competition at all levels of 
the food supply chain. 
 
Operators in some national markets sometimes agree on excluding operators from other 
Member States and give preference to domestic products even though this preference is not 
based on objective criteria (quality, specific traits, etc.) of the products. These types of 
discrimination based on nationality are hurting the fundamental principle of the EU to give a 
fair chance to all producers inside the EU independently of their origin. 
 
Further, international food manufacturers, for years already present with equal or similar 
brands in different Member States reportedly try to compartmentalise the Internal Market by 
preventing or hindering retailers from bringing products from lower-priced markets into 
higher-priced markets. 
Contribution of EU competition policy to make the internal market work better 
Making farmers more competitive in the EU internal market 
In previous years, several legislative initiatives aimed to help European farmers to better cope 
with the challenges posed by the internal market and globalisation, to increase the 
competitiveness of the EU agricultural sector and to strengthen the bargaining power of 
smaller agricultural producers have been introduced. Several derogations from the 
competition rules were granted to the EU agricultural sector through the CMO Regulation.
293
 
For instance, the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy in 2013 introduced derogations 
to antitrust rules for certain agricultural sectors (olive oil, beef and veal, and arable crops) and 
to manage crisis situations. These sector-specific derogations were deleted in 2018 when the 
Council and the European Parliament amended the application of the competition rules to the 
agricultural sector through the “Omnibus Regulation”294 by creating a horizontal provision, 
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  The CMO Regulation is the European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of 17 
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  Regulation No. Regulation (EU) 2017/2393 of 13 December 2017. See: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2017.350.01.0015.01.ENG.  
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which allows recognised producer organisations and their associations to engage in practices 
such as production planning and contractual negotiations, in derogation from Article 101 
TFEU. 
In June 2018 the Commission published proposals for the CAP 2020 reform. These proposals 
do not contain any possible modifications of the competition rules applicable in the 
agricultural sector.
295
  
Analysis and reporting  
 
a) Study on producer organisations and their activities in the olive oil, beef and 
veal and arable crops sectors 
 
In order to understand better the challenges of farmers in the supply chain and to help them to 
become more efficient, the Commission launched an external study. In June 2018 the 
Commission published the Study on producer organisations and their activities in the olive 
oil, beef and veal and arable crops sectors.
296
 In these sectors there are overall five times more 
unrecognised producer organisations/associations of producer organisations than those 
formally recognised by Member States under EU legislation.  
 
The study revealed that the main motivating factors for farmers to set up a producer 
organisation or an association of producer organisations are (i) to improve access to markets 
due to an increased volume and (ii) to improve the position of the members in negotiations 
with buyers. Furthermore, according to the study the main benefits for members in a Producer 
Organisation/an Association of producer organisations are (i) improved market access and 
price stability and (ii) reduced costs and economies of scale. 
 
The study also shows that two-thirds of producer organisations and associations of producer 
organisations carry out contractual negotiations and other commercialisation-related activities 
(commercialisation strategies and the planning of quantities). More than 90% of the entities 
that carry out these commercialisation-related activities also carry out common efficiency-
enhancing activities, such as quality control, distribution/transport, and procurement of inputs, 
as was foreseen by the sector-specific derogations from competition rules for these sectors. 
Most producer organisations carry out these efficiency-enhancing activities because they 
consider that they improve their position in negotiations with buyers and because they reduce 
the costs of the members.  
b) Report on the application of competition rules in the agricultural sector 
In October 2018, the Commission published the Report on the application of competition 
rules in the agricultural sector.
297
 
EU competition authorities have carried out around 170 investigations in the agricultural 
sector. More than a third of these concerned processors of agricultural products. The report 
found that the enforcement work of EU competition authorities benefitted farmers with better 
deals for their products. In particular, the report identifies several instances of European 
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competition authorities stopping and sanctioning practices employed by large buyers that 
aimed at reducing prices paid to farmers. Furthermore, the work of EU competition 
authorities also helped farmers improve their conditions with cooperatives. 
One of the key findings of the report is a new trend of national initiatives to restrict imports of 
specific agricultural products from other Member States. Several NCAs (as well as the 
Commission in its 2015-2016 enquiry into the dairy sector in several Member States) have 
investigated and stopped a number of collective agreements, where for instance farmers in a 
given Member State attempt to hinder sales by farmers from other Member States.  
Tackling the challenges of increased retail concentration and unequal bargaining power in 
the EU Internal Market 
 
On 30 April 2019, the Directive on unfair trading practices in business-to-business 
relationships in the food supply chain entered into force. The Directive is based on a 2018 
Commission proposal aiming to tackle at EU level the imbalances of bargaining power 
throughout the food supply chain by banning the most damaging unfair trading practices 
imposed by buyers with strong bargaining power on small suppliers, in particular small 
farmers.
 298
 
 
The list of unfair trading practices in the Commission proposal was carefully tailored based 
on input from DG Competition’s Chief Economist, in order not to prevent trading partners 
from engaging in efficiency-enhancing agreements or trading conditions.
299
 The scope of 
protection was designed to avoid protecting businesses that have sufficient bargaining power 
to fend for themselves. Protecting businesses with bargaining power in the food supply chain 
through rules on unfair trading practices would not benefit farmers. 
Member States will be able to maintain or introduce stricter national rules as the proposed 
Directive only introduces minimum harmonisation at EU level. 
 
Preventing market segmentation and trade restrictions by food manufacturers in the EU 
Internal Market 
Following the adoption of the Statement of Objections in November 2017,
300
 the Commission 
continued in 2018 its investigation of AB InBev’s apparent strategy to allegedly prevent 
supermarkets and wholesalers from buying its most popular beer brands in Belgium at lower 
prices in the Netherlands and France and from importing them into Belgium. AB InBev’s 
practices, which may prevent the free trade of goods in the EU Internal Market, may result in 
a violation of Article 102 TFEU. 
Merger investigations in the agri-food industry  
In 2018, the agri-food sector was characterised by the continuation of the consolidation wave 
of agro-chemical players. Following the conditional clearances of Dow/Dupont and 
ChemChina/ Syngenta in 2017, the Commission took again a rigorous stance in the 
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release IP-17-5041 en.htm. 
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assessment of the proposed acquisition of Monsanto by Bayer,
301
 thereby ensuring that 
farmers in Europe continue to benefit from innovative inputs at competitive prices.  
Bayer is a German company, active in pharmaceuticals, consumer health, agriculture (through 
its Bayer Crop Science division) and animal health. Monsanto was a US agriculture company 
that produced seeds for broad acre crops, fruits and vegetables. It also produced plant 
biotechnology traits and supplied pesticides. Monsanto was perhaps most known for its 
glyphosate herbicide, sold under the "Roundup" brand, and the development of genetically 
modified crops. There was a degree of complementarity between Bayer, a leading player in 
crop protection, particularly in Europe, and the Monsanto businesses, the world’s leading seed 
supplier, with its main markets in the Americas. The acquisition of Monsanto by Bayer 
created the biggest integrated agrochemical, trait and seed player worldwide and was viewed 
by some commentators and interested observers as transformative for the industry. 
After a comprehensive in-depth investigation, the Commission identified likely harmful 
effects of the concentration on product and innovation competition in several seeds, traits, 
pesticides and digital agricultural markets. Bayer offered far reaching remedies comprising 
the divestiture of its entire seeds and traits business, its glufosinate business and its digital 
agriculture efforts, which addressed all competition concerns including those related to 
innovation. This remedy package was sold to BASF, which the Commission approved as a 
suitable buyer. In the review of the Bayer/Monsanto transaction, the Commission closely 
cooperated with many competition authorities around the world. 
 7. PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH SERVICES SECTOR  
Overview of key challenges in the sector  
The pharmaceutical sector and the health sector are of particular societal and economic 
importance. Health and access to effective and affordable medicines are key concerns for the 
general public. The economic crisis, demographic evolution and changes in the types of 
diseases affecting EU citizens have put significant constraints on public health budgets. 
Public spending on healthcare overall has over past decades increased to between 5.7% and 
11.3% of GDP in the different Member States,
302
 and is expected to grow further. Spending 
on pharmaceuticals constitutes a significant share of government spending on healthcare.
303 
 
On 28 January 2019, the Commission published a report to the Council and the European 
Parliament entitled “Competition enforcement in the pharmaceutical sector (2009-2017) - 
European competition authorities working together for affordable and innovative 
medicines".
304 
This report provides an overview and examples of how the Commission and 
the national competition authorities of the 28 Member States have enforced the EU antitrust 
and merger rules in the pharmaceutical sector over the period 2009-2017. The pharmaceutical 
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sector requires close competition law scrutiny. The report explains, in response to concerns 
expressed by the Council and the European Parliament, how enforcing competition law 
specifically helps to safeguard EU patients’ access to affordable and innovative medicines. 
Since the conclusion of the Commission inquiry into the pharmaceutical sector in 2009,  
NCAs have adopted a wide range of antitrust decisions against pharmaceutical companies. 
These imposed sanctions (fines over EUR 1 billion in total) and made binding commitments 
to remedy anti-competitive behaviour. In its task of overseeing that pharmaceutical markets 
do not get overly concentrated due to mergers, the Commission in this period reviewed more 
than 80 transactions. In 19 cases competition concerns were detected, and the Commission 
cleared these mergers only after the companies offered to address concerns and to modify the 
transaction.   
Ensuring access to innovative, high quality healthcare and medicines at competitive prices is 
an important objective in competition law enforcement in the pharmaceutical and health 
services sectors. Innovation can lead to increased healthcare benefits flowing from R&D into 
novel treatments and more efficient technologies which may reduce the cost of treatments, for 
example, by developing production processes that make it viable for cheaper medicines to be 
commercially produced. Competition law enforcement can complement the regulatory 
framework that exists in this sector. 
The Commission’s competition enforcement on pharmaceutical and health markets fosters 
both dynamic competition, which leads to more innovative medicines, and effective price 
competition, which contributes to more affordable medicines and treatments.  
Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges  
Antitrust enforcement in the pharmaceutical sector 
The Commission is actively monitoring and screening markets for diverse competition issues 
concerning pharmaceuticals. In 2018, the Commission initiated proceedings in two cases 
where it is investigating firms suspected of preventing or reducing  consumers’ access to 
effective, innovative and affordable medicines.  
The first case concerns the Commission's formal antitrust proceedings against Aspen 
Pharma
305
 for a suspected abuse of a dominant position infringing Article 102 TFEU. The 
Commission investigates allegations that Aspen may have imposed unfair and excessive 
prices for a range of cancer medicines in all countries in the EEA except Italy.
306
 
The second case concerns the Commission's investigation into so-called pay-for-delay 
practices for the market entry of generic modafinil (a sleeping disorder medicine). A 
Statement of Objections was sent to Teva regarding an agreement with Cephalon. According 
to the agreement, Teva undertook not to sell its generic modafinil products in the EEA.
307
 The 
Commission is in the process of concluding its investigation in the course of 2019. 
Merger review in the pharmaceutical sector 
The Commission continued its careful review of mergers in the pharmaceutical sector, to 
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ensure availability of affordable medicines to patients across Europe, and to protect 
innovation and choice for consumers. On 20 November 2018, the Commission approved the 
acquisition of Shire by Takeda Pharmaceutical Company308, subject to the divestment of a 
biologic treatment product under development by Shire to treat inflammatory bowel disease. 
The Commission had identified the risk that that Takeda would be unlikely to continue 
developing Shire's new drug, causing a serious loss of innovation on a market where patients 
currently have few treatment options available to them.   
State aid actions in the health services sector 
The Commission did not adopt any State aid decisions in the field of healthcare services in 
2018. In February 2018, however, the General Court annulled a Commission Decision from 
2014 concerning funding measures to public health insurance companies in Slovakia.309 
Although the General Court confirmed the Commission’s finding that the Slovak compulsory 
health insurance system had predominant social, solidarity and regulatory features, the 
General Court nevertheless rejected the Commission’s conclusion that the insurance 
companies in question did not constitute undertakings within the meaning of Article 107(1) 
TFEU on the ground that their activities were not economic in nature. The Commission has 
appealed the judgment before the Court of Justice (pending case C-262/18 P).  
 8. TRANSPORT AND POSTAL SERVICES 
Overview of key challenges in the sector 
The transport and postal services sectors account for approximately 5% of the EU 
economy,310 and their performance can have many beneficial effects for other sectors of the 
European economy. Transport is the key to both an integrated internal market and to an open 
economy integrated into the world economy. In the postal sector parcel services are supplied 
by competitive transnational suppliers while other services are mostly in the hands of national 
postal operators often depending on compensation from their government.
311
  
In 2018, the Commission used its competition tools to keep the transport and postal markets 
open and competitive, and to facilitate entry. It also continued to facilitate State aid that 
enabled interoperability between different modes of transport and a modal shift to more 
environmentally-friendly modes of transport, as well as State aid for modern infrastructure.  
Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges 
Merger review in air transport 
The air transport sector is still very fragmented. In the EU there are more than 150 airlines 
offering scheduled air passenger transport. The five largest airlines in the EU, comprising 
Lufthansa, Air France / KLM and the International Consolidated Airlines Group ("IAG" is the 
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  M. 8955 - Takeda/Shire, See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-6497_en.htm. 
309
  Case T-216/15 Dôvera zdravotná poist’ovňa v Commission, Judgment of the General Court of 5 February 
2018, see: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=T-216/15.  
310 
 See EU transport in figures Statistical pocketbook (2017). See: http://ec.europa.eu/transport/facts-
fundings/statistics/doc/2017/pocketbook2017.pdf, p.19; prepared by the Commission with around EUR 664 
billion in Gross Value Added (GVA) at basic prices, the transport and storage services sector (including 
postal and courier activities) accounted for approximately 5 % of total GVA in the EU-28 in 2016 (or 4.5 % 
excluding postal and courier services). 
311
  It should be noted however, that the third postal Directive (2008/6/EC) introduced full opening of the 
Member States' postal markets, allowing new operators and services. 
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parent company of Aer Lingus, British Airways, Iberia, and Vueling), Ryanair and easyJet  
account for around 50 % of the EU market. In contrast, in the United States, the three legacy 
carrier groups American Airlines, Delta and United together with the low cost carrier 
Southwest jointly control more than 80 % of the United States market. The need for further 
consolidation was underpinned by the financial difficulties encoutered by two medium-sized 
European airlines, WOW and Flybe, which were looking for a strong partner to continue their 
development.  
In this context, the Commission reviewed the acquisition of sole control over LaudaMotion by 
the air carrier Ryanair.
312
 LaudaMotion is the company through which Mr Niki Lauda re-
acquired in January 2018 the assets of NIKI, the leisure air carrier he founded in 2003 and 
which was then later integrated into Air Berlin. The assets of NIKI were for sale because in 
December 2017 Lufthansa decided not to acquire NIKI and NIKI immediately filed for 
insolvency. As for the two mergers involving Air Berlin's assets that the Commission 
reviewed in 2017,
313
 the Commission investigated the impact of the transaction from two 
angles. First, the Commission assessed the effects of the transaction on the market for air 
transport of passengers, more specifically on the routes from German, Austrian and Swiss 
airports to leisure destinations in the Mediterranean and Canary Islands, where the activities 
of Ryanair and LaudaMotion overlap. Second, the Commission examined whether 
LaudaMotion's portfolio of airport slots to be acquired by Ryanair at different airports would 
allow Ryanair to prevent competitors from entering or expanding their presence at these 
airports. Control over a large slot portfolio at congested airports can result in higher barriers 
to entry for airlines wanting to operate to and from these airports, which in turn could result in 
higher fares for passengers. As no serious doubts arose either on the overlap routes or through 
the acquried slots, the Commission cleared the takeover unconditionally.   
In 2018, in the framework of commitments attached to previous clearance decisions, a 
number of new applications highlighted increased interest in slots made available under the 
Commission commitments. In particular, the Commission received requests for additional 
slots by Flybe on the route connecting London Heathrow to Edinburgh,
314
 and by easyJet  on 
two routes connecting London Gatwick to Belfast and Dublin.315 Furthermore, Transavia 
requested additional slots at Ibiza for the city pair Paris-Ibiza under the commitments given 
by Iberia in the framework of the Commission clearance decision of Iberia's takeover of 
Clickair and Vueling.
316
  
Antitrust enforcement in the aviation sector 
On 23 November 2018, the Commission opened proceedings under Article 101 TFEU against 
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  Case M.8869 Ryanair/LaudaMotion, see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_8869.  
313
  Cases M.8633 Lufthansa/Certain Air Berlin assets and M.8672 easyJet/Certain Air Berlin assets. 
314
  Case M.6447 IAG/bmi, Commission decision of 12 November 2018 concerning the assessment of the 
viability of the Applicant and evaluation of its formal bid pursuant to Clause 1.4.9 of the Commitments 
attached to the Commission decision of 30 March 2012 in case M.6447 – IAG/bmi.  
315  
Case M.7541 IAG/Aer Lingus, Commission decision of 12 November 2018 concerning the assessment of the 
viability of the applicant and evaluation of its formal bid pursuant to Clause 2.26 of the Commitments 
attached to the Commission decision of 14 July 2015 in case M.7541 – IAG/Aer Lingus.  
316 
Case M. 5364 Iberia/Clickair/Vueling, Commission decision of 12 November 2018 concerning the 
Assessment of the viability of Applicants and evaluation of their formal bids pursuant to Clause 1.4.9 of the 
commitments attached to the Commission decision of 9 January 2009 in case M. 5364 -  
Iberia/Clickair/Vueling.   
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computerised reservation systems
317
 providers Amadeus and Sabre. The Commission suspects 
that certain terms in Amadeus' and Sabre's agreements with airlines and travel agents may 
restrict competition for the provision of ticket distribution services, by limiting the ability of 
airlines and travel agents to use alternative suppliers of these services. 
On 30 October 2018, the Commission decided to close its antitrust investigation into a 
codeshare agreement between Brussels Airlines and TAP Air Portugal relating to the 
Brussels-Lisbon route. Following a thorough analysis of all relevant evidence, including the 
parties' responses to the Commission's statement of objections, the Commission concluded 
that there were insufficient grounds to confirm its initial concerns. 
In early 2018, the Commission received an application from the airline Norwegian for take-
off and landing slots at Amsterdam Schiphol and New York JFK airports, pursuant to the 
Commission's 2015 commitments decision relating to the Skyteam transatlantic joint venture. 
The Commission decided that Norwegian satisfied the conditions for the award of slots, and 
the Skyteam joint venture parties accordingly released three weekly slots at these two airports, 
enabling Norwegian to provide a daily service between Amsterdam Schiphol and New York 
JFK.  
State aid to airports and airlines 
On 10 December 2018, the Commission adopted a communication prolonging until 2024 the 
specific regime for operating aid for airports with up to 700 000 passengers per year in the 
Aviation Guidelines adopted in 2014. The prolongation will provide legal certainty to airports 
with less than 700 000 passengers per year, and will align the period concerning operating aid 
for all airports.
318 
 
In addition, the Commission continued to apply the 2014 Aviation Guidelines. In 2018, the 
Commission adopted several decisions in cases involving operating aid to airports,
319
 or the 
operation of an airport as a service of general economic interest.
320
 The Commission also 
opened proceedings in relation to marketing agreements at Montpellier airport,
321
 and in 
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  Computerised Reservation Systems ("CRS"), also known as Global Distribution Systems ("GDS") provide a 
technical interface between, on one side, airlines and other travel service providers, such as rail operators, 
and, on the other side, travel agents (both online and brick-and-mortar). The CRSs aggregate fare, schedule 
and availability information provided by the airlines and supply it to the travel agents, enabling them to 
search for, compare, reserve and book flights, The CRSs give travel agents access to the services of hundreds 
of airlines worldwide and provide airlines with a distribution channel to thousands of travel agents 
worldwide. 
318
  See: http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/index.cfm?fuseaction=list&coteId=3&documentType 
=COMMUNICATION_FROM_COMMISSION&version=ALL. 
319  
Case SA.46945 Erfurt-Weimar Airport, Commission decision of 15 November 2018, see:  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_46945; Case SA.49709, 
Rostock Airport, Commission decision of 13 September 2018, see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_49709. 
320
  Case SA.49482 Highlands and Island Airports Limited - Sumburgh Airport, Commission decision of 25 May 
2018, see: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_49482. Case 
SA.49331 SGEI compensation for Bornholm Airport,  Commission decision of 16 April 2018, see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_49331; Case SA.49203 SGEI 
Compensation for Bacau Airport, Commission decision of 6 September 2018, see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_49203. 
321  
Case SA.47867 Aide présumée en faveur de Ryanair à l'aéroport de Montpellier, Commission decision of 5 
July 2018, see : http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_47867. 
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relation to marketing agreements and potential aid to the airport at Frankfurt-Hahn.
322
  
The Commission intervened in many occasions to support Member States to ensure that 
investments or changes in concessions they are planning at public airports are market 
conform. These interventions generally require in-depth business and/or legal analyses, but 
are not necessarily the object of a Commission's decision. They are thus less publicized than 
cases subject to a decision. Nevertheless they contribute substantially to the promotion of 
market-conform practices. 
On 12 December 2018, the Commission adopted a decision finding that the twenty-year 
extension of the concession for Athens International Airport 
323 
does not constitute State aid. 
In April 2018, following complaints, the Commission also opened a formal investigation 
procedure into a EUR 900 million bridging loan granted by Italy to its flag carrier Alitalia.
324
 
The company has been in financial difficulties for several years and is currently looking for 
an investor. The investigation aims to establish whether the loan was granted on market terms 
or whether it involves State aid within the meaning of the EU rules. In the latter case, the loan 
needs to be in line with EU rules on the rescue and restructuring of companies in difficulty, to 
ensure that inefficient companies are not artificially kept alive with continued State support.  
Antitrust enforcement in maritime transport  
The Commission began a review of Commission Regulation 906/2009 ("the Consortia Block 
Exemption Regulation"),325 with a view to informing its decision on the future of the 
Regulation in view of its statutory expiration on 25 April 2020.326 On 7 May 2018, the 
Commission invited the public to comment on the evaluation Roadmap and on 27 September 
2018 the Commission launched a 12-week public consultation on the Regulation, inviting the 
public to respond to a questionnaire or otherwise make its views known.
327 
In addition, 
targeted questionnaires were sent to groups of major stakeholders (shipping companies, 
customers and ports) and the Competition authorities of the Member States were invited to 
contribute.  
Merger review in maritime transport 
The global container shipping industry is undergoing a period of change, in reaction to the 
challenges it has been facing in recent years. The sector is characterised by overcapacity, 
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  Case SA.43260 Alleged aid to Frankfurt Hahn Airport and Ryanair, Commission decision of 26 October 
2018, see: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-6222_en.htm. 
323
  See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-6785_en.htm.  
324
  Case SA.48171 Complaints against alleged State aid in favour of Alitalia, Commission decision of 
23/04/2018, see: at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/274312/274312_1991247_21_2.pdf; and 
IP/18/3501, see: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-3501_en.htm.   
325
  Council Regulation 246/2009 provides that, in accordance with the provisions of Article 101(3) TFEU, the 
Commission may, by way of Regulation, exempt consortia agreements from the application of Article 101(1) 
TFEU for a period limited to five years with the possibility of prolongation. Accordingly, in 2009 the 
Commission adopted the Consortia Block Exemption Regulation which sets the specific conditions for the 
exemption of consortia agreements. These conditions notably aim at ensuring that customers enjoy a fair 
share of the resulting benefits. 
326  
Liner shipping services consist of the provision of regular, scheduled maritime cargo transport on a specific 
route. They require significant levels of investment and therefore are regularly provided by several shipping 
companies cooperating in "consortia" agreements. Consortia can lead to economies of scale and better 
utilisation of the space of the vessels. 
327  
For the Roadmap, consultation documents and further information on the evaluation, see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2018_consortia/index_en.html.  
 84 
resulting from several carriers' expansion and investment in ultra-large vessels in recent years, 
and a slow recovery of demand following the economic crisis. Also as a means to improve 
their efficiency and reduce their operating costs, container shipping companies do not only 
provide services individually, but they have also put in place operational agreements, such as 
consortia or alliances, with other shipping companies that allow them to combine their vessels 
and offer a joint service.  
A wave of consolidation can be observed, which started in 2014 with the merger of Hapag-
Lloyd and CSAV
328
 and intensified in 2016 and 2017. In 2018, the Commission assessed the 
acquisition of control over Container Finance Ltd Oy, of Finland, by the French group CMA 
CGM.
329
 Both CMA CGM and Container Finance provide intra-European door-to-door 
multimodal transport services and, to a lesser extent, container terminal services and freight 
forwarding services. Due to its limited structural impact on these services in the EEA, the 
Commission cleared the merger without conditions.  
Moreover, the Commission investigated the (reverse) vertical integration of Unifeeder, of 
Denmark, into the DP World group, based in the United Arab Emirates.
330
 Unifeeder is active 
in the provision of maritime transportation services for containerised goods including feeder 
services (transport of cargo between hub ports and out-ports) and short sea services (transport 
of cargo from point to point). Unifeeder operates primarily in Northern Europe and the 
Mediterranean. DP World is a global marine terminals operator. 
The Commission analysed whether the vertically integrated entity would have the ability and 
incentive to foreclose customers. The Commission considered that, even if Unifeeder's feeder 
volumes were re-routed to DP World's terminals in Belgium, France, the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom, or Cyprus, this would only have a limited impact on the capacity utilisation 
of DP World's rivals for terminal services. The majority of the respondents to the 
Commission’s market investigation did not foresee any significant negative impact on their 
companies due to the proposed transaction. For these reasons, the Commission concluded that 
the implementation of a customer foreclosure strategy by Unifeeder in Belgium, France, the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, or Cyprus would be unlikely to have overall negative 
effects on effective competition. The transaction was cleared without conditions. 
State aid enforcement in the maritime transport sector 
In 2018, the Commission continued to ensure compliance with the Maritime State aid 
Guidelines.
331
 The aim of those Guidelines is to maintain the European maritime sector's 
competitiveness. The Commission is determined to ensure consistency and equal treatment 
throughout the EU while at the same time making sure that the beneficial tonnage tax regimes 
do not contravene internal market rules.  
In order to support that objective and ensure compliance with the Commission's current 
interpretation of the Maritime State aid Guidelines, the Commission organized two technical 
meetings on the enforcement of the 2004 Guidelines on State aid to Maritime Transport with 
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  Case M.7268 CSAV/HGV/Kühne Maritime/Hapag-LLoyd, Commission decision of 11 September 2014, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7268_1503_2.pdf.  
329
  Case M.9016 CMA CGM/Container Finance, Commission decision of 22 October 2018, will become 
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_merger_by_date. 
330  
Case M.9093 DP WORLD INVESTMENTS / UNIFEEDER, Commission decision of 4 December 2018, will 
become available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_merger_by_date.  
331
  Communication from the Commission, Community guidelines on State aid to maritime transport, OJ C 13, 
17.01.2004, p. 3. See: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52004XC0117(01). 
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the Member States and sector representatives (both ship owners and seafarer representatives) 
on 13 and 21 June 2018 respectively. In these meetings, the Commission described the 
technical standards that it had progressively developed to ensure compliance with the 
objectives of the Maritime Guidelines and with the internal market rules as a response to 
questions of interpretation which arose over time regarding certain provisions of the guidelines.  
Moreover, on 6 April 2018, the Commission approved the first tonnage tax and seafarer 
scheme put in place by Portugal.332 The Commission found that the scheme would encourage 
ship registration in Europe and contribute to the competitiveness of maritime transport while 
preserving employment in the sector and promoting high environmental standards.  
On 12 July 2018, the Commission also approved State aid to five ferry connections between 
Croatian islands and the mainland to be operated as  services of general economic interest.333 
The aid will be granted to maritime companies selected through public tenders and will cover 
the difference between revenues from ferry tickets and the cost of operating the ferries 
regularly so as to allow the islands' inhabitants to commute daily to work or study, as well as 
to transport vehicles and supplies to and from the islands. The Commission found that the aid 
is necessary to ensure operation of the routes with adequate frequencies over the whole year, 
since ticket revenues exceed the cost of the ferry operations only during the summer peak 
season. 
On 12 October 2018, the Commission approved the extension of an existing Danish tonnage 
tax scheme to new types of vessels334 (guard vessels, vessels servicing off-shore installations, 
and vessels for raising, repairing and dismantling wind turbines). The Commission considered 
that these types of vessels are involved in maritime activities that are subject to the same legal 
requirements and competitive conditions as maritime transport. The Commission also took 
into account commitments from Denmark to amend certain aspects of its existing tonnage tax 
scheme to align it with the Commission's current interpretation of the Maritime Guidelines 
(notably regarding ancillary services and bareboat chartering out activities). 
Furthermore, the Commission approved the prolongation of the Dutch scheme
335
 and the 
prolongation and extension of the French scheme
336
 for the reduction of social contributions 
for seafarers subject to the commitment by the Netherlands and France to open their schemes 
to all EEA-flagged vessels. 
Antitrust enforcement in the rail sector 
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  Case SA.48929 (2018/N) - Portugal - Tonnage Tax and Seafarer Scheme. See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-18-2842_en.htm. 
333 
Cases SA.48119 (2017/N) and SA.49523 (2017/N) – Croatia –SGEI – scheduled coastal maritime public 
transport on the ferry routes Nos 431, 432, 632 and 635. See:  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_48119. 
and http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_49523.  
334
  Case SA.45300 - Denmark - Amendment of the Danish Tonnage Tax scheme (Extension of the tonnage tax 
scheme to cover a number of specialized vessels). See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-
6107_en.pdf.    
335  
Case SA. 46727 – The Netherlands - Prolongation of the extension of reduced remittances for maritime 
navigation to commercial cruising vessels, Commission decision of 7 November 2018, OJ C 462 of 21 
December 2018, p.1.  
336  
Case SA. 46309 – France – Modification du régime d’allègement des charges sociales patronales des 
entreprises d’armement maritime, Commission decision of 20 December 2018. See: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/midday-express-20-12-2018.htm.   
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On 25 September 2018 the Commission adopted a Statement of Objections against the Slovak 
rail company ZSSK337 for obstruction of a Commission inspection. The Commission carried 
out inspections at the ZSSK premises in June 2016. The inspection focussed on whether  
ZSSK had entered into anti-competitive agreements aimed at excluding its competitors on the 
rail passenger market, in breach of EU antitrust rules.  
 
In the Statement of Objections, the Commission took the preliminary view that ZSSK may 
have obstructed the inspection by providing incorrect information about the location of the 
laptop of one of its employees and by failing to provide requested data from this laptop by 
allowing its re-installation. Therefore, ZSSK may not have fulfilled its obligation to comply 
with the inspectors’ requests under Regulation 1/2003. 
 
Rail and intermodal State aid enforcement  
In 2018, the Commission approved a number of schemes supporting rail and intermodal 
transport, which aim to support the transfer of cargo from the road to the safer and more 
environmentally friendly rail transport modes.
338
 
Moreover, the Commission continued its investigation into State measures in favour of the 
ailing state-owned Romanian rail freight operator CFR Marfa, opened in December 2017 
following a complaint by the Association of Romanian Private Rail Freight Operators.
339
 
Since the liberalisation of the Romanian rail freight transport market in 2007, numerous 
private operators have successfully entered the market, which is highly competitive. It is 
therefore particularly important that public interventions do not relieve selected companies 
from normal business costs that their competitors have to bear. The Commission’s 
investigation focuses on a debt-to-equity swap of around EUR 360 million as well as the non-
collection of social security debts, taxes and debts towards the public rail infrastructure 
manager CFR Infrastructure. The Commission will examine whether these measures have 
procured CFR Marfa an unfair economic advantage over its competitors.   
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  Case AT.40565 ZSSK procedural case. See: IP/18/5905 of 25 September 2018 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-18-5905_en.htm.  
338  
Case SA.49153 - Czechia - Aid for intermodal transport units, Commission decision of 15 May 2018, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_49153; Case  
SA.49518 - United Kingdom - Freight Facilities Grant, Commission decision of 15 October 2018, available 
at  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_49518; Case SA.49749 - 
Sweden - Environmental compensation for rail freight transport, Commission decision of 20 April 2018, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_49749; Case 
SA.50165  - Germany - Support for the promotion of energy efficiency in rail transport, Commission 
decision of 26 July 2018, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_50165; Case SA.50217 - 
Sweden - Swedish Eco-bonus scheme for short sea shipping and inland waterway transport, Commission 
decision of 9 November 2018, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_50217; Case SA.50395 - 
Germany - Offshore-surcharge reduction for railway undertakings in Germany, Commission decision of 27 
March 2018, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_50395; Case  SA.50584 - 
Belgium - Structural aid measure reducing the cost disadvantage of bundling volumes transported by 
rail/inland waterways to and from Flemish seaports in order to promote a modal shift Commission decision 
of 24 October 2018, available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_50584.  
339 
 Case SA.43549 - Alleged aid to CFR Marfa, Commission decision of 18 December 2017, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_43549; and IP/17/5345, see: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-5345_en.htm. 
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In January 2018, the Commission opened an in-depth investigation into the restructuring of 
Polish Regional Railways.
340
 the largest passenger regional rail operator in Poland. The 
company has been in financial difficulties for some time. In 2015, Poland notified 
restructuring aid of around EUR 188 million in favour of the company. Under EU rules, 
companies in difficulty can receive restructuring aid only once in ten years (the “one-time / 
last-time” principle). This is to avoid that ailing firms rely on public funding to stay in 
business, instead of improving their business performance and competing on the merits. 
During its investigation, the Commission found that Polish Regional Railways had already 
received State support in the past. The Commission now has to determine, in particular, 
whether this past aid qualifies as restructuring aid and whether the 2015 restructuring support 
is in line with the one-time/last-time principle.  
State aid review in the road sector 
The Commission continued to enforce Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 on public passenger 
transport services.
341
  
Recent case law
342
 has confirmed the Commission approach on the application rationae 
temporis of the application of the above-mentioned Regulation. More specifically, these 
judgments confirmed that the compatibility of public measures adopted in the past but 
continuing having effects (i.e. they continue to provide aid), are assessed not on the basis of 
old rules but on the basis of the rules which are applicable at the moment the aid measures 
produce effects that fall within the scope of the new rules, unless the new rules explicitly 
exclude them from their scope. 
State aid review in the postal services sector 
The postal sector continues to evolve and traditional letter delivery, against the backdrop of 
electronic substitution, remains on a declining trajectory. Nevertheless, postal services have 
retained a very significant economic and social value. In a shrinking market of traditional 
letter delivery, many postal incumbents are being forced to diversify the portfolio of their 
activities and innovate in order to stay competitive. At the same time, the explosive growth of 
e-commerce necessitates a well-functioning parcel delivery market linking buyers and sellers. 
Efficient postal services are thus a key factor in allowing e-commerce to realise its potential in 
propelling growth and creating jobs.  
Through State aid control in the postal sector, the Commission pursues multiple related goals. 
State aid control ensures that where a postal service provider – typically a postal incumbent – 
is entrusted with a costly public service obligation, any compensation paid to the provider 
does not distort competition between postal incumbents and new entrants. State aid should not 
shield the recipients from competitive pressures and market developments, but should 
incentivise efficiency, innovation and investment.  
In February 2018, the Commission approved in two decisions two sets of compensations in 
favour of Czech Post: the first one amounting to CZK 2.6 billion (around EUR 97 million) for 
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 Case SA.43127 Restructuring of the Polish Regional Railways, Commission decision of 23 January 2018, 
see: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_43127; and IP/18/394, 
see: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-394_en.htm. 
341  
Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 of the European Parliament and the Council of 23 October 2007 on public 
passenger transport services by rail and by road and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) Nos. 1191/69 and 
1107/70, OJ L 315, 3.12.2007, p. 1. 
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  Judgement T720/16 Arfea v Commission and Judgements T185/15 Buonotourist v Commission and T186/15 
CSTP v Commission. 
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the delivery of the universal postal service over 2013-2017343 and the second one amounting 
to CZK2.3 billion (around EUR 86 million) for the provision of a Data Boxes Information 
System over the period 2018-2022.344 
In May 2018, the Commission also approved compensations in favour of Post Denmark 
amounting to DKK 1.2 billion (around EUR 160 million) for the delivery of the universal 
postal service over 2017-2019.345 
Finally, in July 2018, the Commission concluded its investigation in the Correos346
 
case with a 
negative decision with recovery. The Commission found that Correos, the publicly-owned 
Spanish postal operator, was overcompensated for the delivery of its universal postal service 
obligation between 2004 and 2010, and also benefited from incompatible tax exemptions. The 
recovery amounted to EUR 167 million.  
Anti-trust Enforcement in Legal Services 
In early 2018, the Commission raised concerns about the compatibility with the competition 
rules of the Cyprus Bar Association’s347 minimum fees scale for out-of-court work. In this 
context out-of-court work includes for instance the drawing up of wills and contracts, the 
administration of estates and the registration of companies.  
The relevant minimum fees for out-of-court work had been adopted by the Cyprus Bar 
Association pursuant to legislation adopted by the Cypriot State (the Advocates’ Law). 
Member States are required under Article 4 (3) TEU to sincerely cooperate in applying the 
competition rules. The Commission took the preliminary view that the Cypriot State, by 
empowering the Cypriot Bar Association to adopt the minimum fee scale, had failed in its 
duty to sincerely cooperate in applying the competition rules. Moreover, the Commission  
raised concerns with the Cypriot authorities that certain provisions of the Advocates’ Law 
were incompatible with EU competition rules. In response to the concerns raised, Cyprus 
amended the legislation in question by removing the specific provision empowering the 
Cyprus Bar Association to set these fees. In response to the Commission’s concerns, the 
Cyprus Bar Association abrogated the minimum fee scale, and the Commission could close its 
antitrust investigation in November 2018.   
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  Case SA.45281 (2017/N) and State Aid SA.44859 (2016/FC) – Czech Republic – State compensations 
granted to Czech Post for the provision of the universal postal service over the period 2013-2017. 
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  Case SA.47293 (2017/N) – Czech Republic – State compensations granted to Czech Post for the provision of 
the Data Boxes Information System over the period 2018-2022. 
345  
Case SA.47707 SA.47707(2018/N) – Denmark – State compensations granted to PostNord for the provision 
of the universal postal service. See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-3965_en.htm.  
346  
Case SA.37977 Complaint regarding unlawful State aid in favour of Sociedad Estatal Correos y Telégrafos, 
S.A. See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4444_en.htm.   
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 See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-18-6247_en.htm. 
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ANNEX  
Banking State aid cases: Decisions adopted by the Commission in 2018 
By country 
 
 
Member States 
 
Case Number/Title 
 
Type of Decision 
 
 
Date of 
Adoption 
 
 
1 
 
Austria 
 
SA.48840(2018/N) -  
 
Austrian Risk Capital Premium 
Scheme 
 
Decision not to raise 
objections 
 
11/07/2018 
 
2 
 
Cyprus 
 
SA.35334(2018/N-2) - 
 
Liquidation aid for the orderly market 
exit of Cyprus Cooperative Bank Ltd 
 
Decision not to raise 
objections 
 
19/06/2018 
 
 
3 
 
Cyprus 
 
SA.35334(2018/N-3) - 
 
Liquidation aid for the orderly market 
exit of Cyprus Cooperative Bank Ltd 
 
Decision not to raise 
objections 
 
28/08/2018 
 
4 
 
Denmark 
 
SA.51200(2018/N) - 
 
Prolongation of the winding-up scheme 
for small banks 
 
Decision not to raise 
objections 
 
31/08/2018 
 
5 
 
Greece 
 
SA.51087(2018/N) - 
 
Prolongation of the Greek State 
Guarantee Scheme for banks (Art. 2 
law 3723/2008) 
 
Decision not to raise 
objections 
 
07/06/2018 
 
6 
 
Ireland 
 
SA.52132(2018/N) - 
 
Eighth prolongation of the Credit Union 
restructuring and stabilisation scheme 
 
Decision not to raise 
objections 
 
08/11/2018 
 
7 
 
Ireland 
 
SA.50953(2018/N) - 
 
13th prolongation of the Credit Union 
Resolution Scheme 2018 
 
Decision not to raise 
objections 
 
25/05/2018 
 
8 
 
Ireland 
 
SA.50692(2018/N) - 
 
Seventh prolongation of the Credit 
Union restructuring and stabilisation 
scheme  
 
Decision not to raise 
objections 
 
30/04/2018 
 
9 
 
Italy 
 
SA.51026(2018/N) - 
 
Prolongation of the Italian guarantee 
scheme for the securitisation  of non-
performing loans 
 
Decision not to raise 
objections 
 
31/08/2018 
 
10 
 
Italy 
 
SA.50640(2018/N) - 
 
Italy - liquidation scheme for small 
banks 
 
 
Decision not to raise 
objections 
 
13/04/2018 
 
11 
 
Netherlands 
SA.48350(2017/N) - Uitgebreide groeifaciliteit – 
Nederlandse garantieregeling voor 
middelgrote en grote ondernemingen 
met een aanzienlijk groeipotentieel – 
Nederland 
 
Decision not to raise 
objections 
 
26/03/2018 
 
12 
 
Netherlands 
 
SA.48197(2018/N) - 
 
Groeifaciliteit 
 
No aid decision 
 
09/07/2018 
 
13 
 
Poland 
 
SA.51482(2018/N) -  
 
Eighth prolongation of the Credit 
Unions Orderly Liquidation Scheme 
 
Decision not to raise 
objections 
 
31/08/2018 
 3 
 
14 
 
Poland 
 
SA.51403(2018/N) -  
 
Second prolongation of the resolution 
scheme for cooperative banks and 
small commercial banks 
 
Decision not to raise 
objections 
 
10/08/2018 
 
15 
 
Poland 
 
SA.51235(2018/N) -  
 
Eighteenth prolongation of the Polish 
bank guarantee scheme 
 
Decision not to raise 
objections 
 
11/07/2018 
 
16 
 
Portugal 
 
SA.51042(2018/N) -  
 
17th Extension of the Portuguese 
Guarantee Scheme 
 
Decision not to raise 
objections 
 
09/08/2018 
 
17 
 
Portugal 
 
SA.51041(2018/N) -  
 
Ninth Prolongation of the Portuguese 
Guarantee Scheme on EIB lending 
 
Decision not to raise 
objections 
 
 
09/08/2018 
 
18 
 
Slovenia 
 
SA.33229(2017/N-3) -  
 
Amendment of the restructuring 
commitments of Nova Ljubljanska 
Banka d.d. 
 
Positive final decision 
 
10/08/2018 
 
19 
 
Slovenia 
 
SA.33229(2018/N-4) -  
 
Amendment of the restructuring 
commitments of Nova Ljubljanska 
Banka d.d. 
 
Decision not to raise 
objections 
 
10/08/2018 
 
20 
 
United 
Kingdom 
 
SA.49923(2018/N) -  
 
Amendments to the existing aid 
scheme "Enterprise Investment 
Scheme" and "Venture Capital Trust 
scheme" 
 
Decision not to raise 
objections 
 
05/07/2018 
 
